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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 DAVID PRYOR, Case No. 1:21-cv-00709-CDB (SS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON STIPULATION GRANTING AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 13 v. PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT,

(d) 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (Doc. 28) 15 Defendant. ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 16 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 17 (Doc. 26) 18 19 Pending before the Court is the parties’ joint stipulated request for the award of attorney’s 20 fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

(d), in the amount of 21 $11,450.00 to Jonathan O. Peña, counsel for Plaintiff David Pryor (“Plaintiff”).1 (Doc. 28). 22 The parties agree that an award of attorney’s fees to counsel for Plaintiff should be made 23 payable to Plaintiff, but if the Commissioner agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti- 24 Assignment Act and determines that Plaintiff has assigned the right to EAJA fees to counsel, and 25 the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the 26 Commissioner shall cause the payment of fees to be made directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Jonathan 27

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all proceedings in 1 O. Peña.

. 2 On March 31, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 3 remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of

(g) to the Commissioner for further 4 proceedings. (Doc. 24). Judgment was entered the same day. (Doc. 25). On June 30, 2025, 5 Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 26). On July 11, 2025, Defendant filed the 6 pending stipulated request for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 28). See Shalala v. Schaefer,

, 7 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. 8 § 405(g) is a prevailing party). As such, the filings are timely. Van v. Barnhart,

, 9 607 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees to private litigants who both prevail in 11 civil actions (other than tort) against the United States and timely file a petition for fees. 28 U.S.C. 12 § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party unless 13 it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make 14 such an award unjust.” Id. Here, the government did not show its position was substantially 15 justified and the Court finds there are not special circumstances that would make an award unjust. 16 Moreover, the Commissioner does not oppose the requested relief. (Doc. 28). See Sanchez v. 17 Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-01081-SKO,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (finding 18 position of the government was not substantially justified in view of the Commissioner’s assent 19 to remand); Knyazhina v. Colvin, No. 2:12–cv–2726 DAD,

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 20 Oct. 17, 2014) (same). 21 Plaintiff requests an award of $11,450.00 in EAJA fees as authorized by

2412(d). (Doc. 28). The Ninth Circuit maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates 23 authorized by the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, on its website. See 24 Thangaraja v. Gonzales,

(9th Cir. 2005). Even assuming Plaintiff’s counsel 25 seeks the median of the published maximum rate associated with the relevant years (2021 and 26 2022) during which he engaged in the majority of his services in this case (which the Court 27 1 | computes as $226.25),” the requested award would amount to approximately 50 hours of attorney 2 | time (not accounting for any paralegal time expended). The Court finds this reasonable and 3 | commensurate with the number of hours an attorney would need to have spent reviewing the 4 | certified administrative record in this case (approximately 2977 pages; Doc. 10), preparing a 5 | motion for summary judgment that includes approximately 12 pages of argument (Doc. 14 at 9- 6 | 21), and preparing a 15-page reply (Doc. 22). With respect to the results obtained, Plaintiff's 7 | counsel obtained a favorable judgment remanding the case for further proceedings. (Docs. 24, 8 | 25). 9 EAJA fees, expenses, and costs are subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset 10 | Program (“TOP”), as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff,

(2010). If the Commissioner 11 | determines upon effectuation of this order that Plaintiff's EAJA fees are not subject to any offset 12 | allowed under the TOP, the fees shall be delivered or otherwise transmitted to Plaintiff's counsel. 13 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 14 1. The parties’ stipulated request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA (Doc. 28) is 15 GRANTED; 16 2. Plaintiff's motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 26) is DENIED as moot; and 17 3. The Commissioner is directed to pay to Plaintiff as the prevailing party attorney’s fees in 18 the amount of $11,450.00, pursuant to the terms set forth in the parties’ stipulation. (Doc. 19 28). Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury 20 determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the 21 payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made directly to Plaintiffs counsel, as set forth 22 in the stipulation. 23 [T IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ July 14, 2025 | Wr 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28 2 Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited July 14, 2025).