Oganesyan v. Rakuten USA, Inc.

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

Oganesyan v. Rakuten USA, Inc.

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 Case No. 25-cv-01534-HSG

8 IN RE RAKUTEN BROWSER ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL 9 EXTENSION LITIGATION Re: Dkt. No. 43 10 This Document Relates To: All Actions 11

12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ application to appoint interim class counsel. See 14 Dkt. No. 43. Plaintiffs seek to appoint three attorneys from three different law firms as interim 15 class counsel: (1) Julian Hammond from HammondLaw, P.C.; (2) Thomas E. Loeser from 16 Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP; and (3) Ashley M. Crooks from Hausfeld LLP. Id. Plaintiffs 17 also seek to appoint David Almeida from Almeida Law Group and Mark S. Reich from Levi & 18 Korsinsky LLP to Plaintiffs’ executive committee. Id. Defendants oppose the motion. See Dkt. 19 No. 45. The Court held a hearing on this matter on July 10, 2025. For the reasons detailed below, 20 the Court DENIES the motion. 21 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3), a court “may designate interim counsel to 22 act on behalf of a putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.” 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3). The rule “authorizes [a] court to designate interim counsel during the 24 pre-certification period if necessary to protect the interests of the putative class.” See Fed. R. Civ.

25 P. 23

(advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendment); see also Manual for Complex Litig., 26 § 21.11 (4th ed. 2004) (“[D]esignation of interim counsel clarifies responsibility for protecting the 27 interests of the class during precertification activities, such as making and responding to motions, 1 “Although Rule 23(g)(3) does not provide a standard for appointment of interim counsel, courts 2 typically look to the factors used in determining the adequacy of class counsel under Rule 3 23(g)(1)(A).” See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. LLC Litig., No. 16-CV-00523-RMW,

2016 WL 4

3401989, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2016). These factors are: 5 (1) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential 6 claims in the action; (2) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex 7 litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and 8 (4) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class. 9 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The Court may also consider “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s 11 ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 23(g)(1)(B). 13 Here, counsel address the four factors under Rule 23(g)(1)(A), but fail to explain, as a 14 threshold matter, why the appointment of interim counsel is necessary at this stage to protect the 15 interests of the putative class. “Where there are no competing lawsuits or firms, courts in this 16 district have been unwilling to appoint interim class counsel.” See In re Seagate,

2016 WL 17

3401989 (collecting cases). To date, counsel have all worked together cooperatively, and given 18 their joint motion, appear to share a unified strategy regarding how this action should proceed. 19 Moreover, because counsel seek to represent Plaintiffs together as co-lead counsel and as members 20 of an executive committee, the appointment of interim counsel is not necessary to address any live 21 conflict among counsel or to clarify their respective roles in the litigation. See, e.g., Imran v. Vital 22 Pharm., Inc., No. 18-CV-05758-JST,

2019 WL 1509180

, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019) (denying 23 appointment of three firms as co-interim class counsel where there was no rivalry among the 24 firms). During the hearing, counsel did not identify any live disputes. 25 The Court also has reservations that appointing three different attorneys from three 26 different law firms will result in any efficiency gains. And counsel’s suggestion that “any one of 27 the three proposed leadership firms will have the authority to speak on behalf of all Plaintiffs,” 1 an opportunity to file a supplemental brief explaining the anticipated roles and leadership structure 2 || for co-interim class counsel and the executive committee. Counsel filed a one-page document 3 after the deadline had passed. See Dkt. No. 54. This cursory document, however, does little to 4 || explain the benefits and efficiency in appointing multiple firms as co-lead counsel at this stage. 5 In short, the Court finds that counsel did “not present the ‘special circumstances’ that 6 || warrant appointment of interim counsel at this stage.” See, e.g., In re Nissan N. Am., Inc. Litig., 7 || No. 18-CV-07292-HSG,

2019 WL 4601557

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2019) (quoting In re Nest 8 || Labs Litig., No. 14-CV-01363-BLF,

2014 WL 12878556

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2014)). 9 || Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice. Dkt. No. 43. Plaintiffs are 10 || directed to file the consolidated amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this order as 11 agreed in their stipulation. See Dkt. No. 42 at 6. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: 7/16/2025 Abepured 5 hdl) 5 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. nited States District Judge 16

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Reference

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