1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL R. QUINTERO, Case No.: 24cv1141-AJB (KSC) CDCR #BN-3161, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) DENYING REQUEST FOR 14 ANONYMITY AND EMERGENCY J. HILL, Warden, et al., 15 INJUNCTION PETITION, and Defendants. 16 (2) DISMISSING SECOND 17 AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 18 §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) WITHOUT 19 FURTHER LEAVE TO AMEND 20 21 On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff Daniel R. Quintero, a state inmate incarcerated in the 22 Eastern District of California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant 23 to

. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claimed that the denial of water and bathroom 24 breaks during his transport in April 2024 from the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 25 (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, to Sacramento in the Eastern District of California 26 interfered with his right to the free exercise of his religion under the First Amendment and 27 the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and subjected him 28 to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See id.) Plaintiff 1 also sought to have this case transferred to the Eastern District and consolidated with three 2 cases he filed in that District arising from conditions of confinement there after his transfer 3 from RJD. (ECF No. 4.) 4 On October 29, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and screened 5 the Complaint pursuant to

(e)(2) & 1915A(b), which require dismissal 6 of a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to 7 state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. (ECF No. 7.) The Court 8 determined that Plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege a sufficiently grave deprivation of 9 the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities to form the basis of an Eighth 10 Amendment violation by the denial of water or bathroom breaks during his transport from 11 RJD to Sacramento, or that the temporary denial of water during his religious observance 12 constituted a substantial burden on his religious beliefs necessary to state a violation of the 13 First Amendment or RLUIPA. (ECF No. 7 at 4-8.) The Court denied the motion to 14 consolidate, dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim, and granted Plaintiff leave 15 to amend. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on November 12, 2024, 16 which did not cure those pleading deficiencies and was dismissed for the same reasons. 17 (ECF Nos. 8-9.) Plaintiff was once again notified of his pleading deficiencies and given 18 one final opportunity to amend. (ECF No. 9 at 7-8.) 19 Plaintiff has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 18.) The 20 SAC once again alleges that the denial of water and bathroom breaks during the April 2023 21 transport to from RJD to Sacramento violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First and 22 Eighth Amendments, and that the transfer began a process which has led to the 23 deterioration of his health caused by allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement 24 in the Eastern District arising from a pattern of discrimination based on his disability. (See 25 id.) Plaintiff has also filed an Emergency Injunction Petition in which he seeks a 26 preliminary injunction requiring water and bathroom breaks during transport (ECF No. 17), 27 and a Request for Anonymity seeking to change his name on the docket from Daniel 28 Quintero to “DA. QUI. R.” (ECF No. 15.) 1 I. Screening Pursuant to

(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 2 A. Standard of Review 3 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-Answer 4 screening pursuant to

(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte 5 dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails 6 to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (

(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 9 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 10 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter,

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman,

(9th Cir. 13 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 14 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule 15 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 16 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009), 17 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). “Determining whether 18 a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 19 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

20 Title

“creates a private right of action against individuals who, 21 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 22 Devereaux v. Abbey,

(9th Cir. 2001). “To establish § 1983 liability, 23 a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws 24 of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under 25 color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2012). 26 B. Allegations in the SAC 27 Plaintiff alleges that he has a congenital disorder which affects all major aspects of 28 his life causing gender dysphoria and other conditions rendering him disabled within the 1 meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (ECF No. 18 at 1-3.) He states 2 that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) lists him as 3 “post-op transgender,” “intersex” or “transgender,” although he states that he is not 4 transgender but was born with female character traits and has been treated as a female his 5 entire life, rendering him vulnerable to sexual assault, particularly in prison. (Id.) As a 6 result of this condition, he has been transported to hospitals for gender affirming care 7 approximately 20 times over a period of two years, with trips lasting between 8 and 20 8 hours. (Id. at 3-7, 13.) He was not provided water or bathroom breaks during those trips, 9 despite other inmates having such access, and was told by the CDCR that no policy was 10 violated by the denial of water and bathroom breaks during transport. (Id. at 3-7.) 11 Plaintiff alleges those approximately 20 transports interfered with approximately 40 12 prayers required by the teaching of Islam. (ECF No. 18 at 8.) He claims the existence of 13 an obvious motive of discrimination for denying him water is shown by abusive remarks 14 by RJD staff, such as Defendant Lieutenant Poladian saying a “Tranny cannot be a 15 Muslim” and a “Muslim cannot be intersex.” (Id. at 9.) 16 On one occasion at RJD in April of 2023, the only occasion of denial of water and 17 bathroom breaks during a transport of which there are any details and the only one 18 identified as having taken place in the Southern District of California, Plaintiff refused a 19 transport order because there were ten days left in Ramadan and he wanted to complete his 20 religious observation. (Id. at 20.) As a result of the refusal, he was placed in the RJD 21 segregated housing unit without meals. (Id.) After 12 hours he agreed to the transfer and 22 was given a sandwich, but his request for water, which was necessary to complete his 23 Ramadan observation, was denied by Poladian, who called Plaintiff a “bitch” and said that 24 a transgender or intersex person could not be Muslim. (Id. at 20-21.) During the transport 25 from San Diego to Sacramento, which took 12 hours, Defendants transportation officers 26 Gose and Salagubang made stops for food, water and bathroom breaks but laughed at 27 Plaintiff when he asked for water and a bathroom break, stating that Poladian ordered them 28 not to provide him with water or bathroom breaks. (Id. at 21-23, 28.) Plaintiff states that 1 he missed five consecutive meals, and when he arrived at the prison in Sacramento he was 2 placed on a yard with aggressive homosexual inmates and was sexually assaulted. (Id. at 3 23, 28.) 4 Plaintiff alleges he has been diagnosed with stress-induced elevated blood pressure, 5 anxiety, panic attacks, constipation, depression, dehydration, reduced liver and kidney 6 function from alcoholism, abdominal pain, stress and post-traumatic stress disorder, and 7 that the denial of water and bathroom breaks over the years has caused stress, panic attacks, 8 physical pain, hyperventilation, sweating, disassociation, isolation, suicidal thoughts, 9 thoughts of harming others, physical and mental trauma, and his refusal of food, water and 10 medical care. (Id. at 5-7.) He claims Defendant CDCR Secretary Macomber has failed to 11 adopt policies regarding, and has failed to train his employees to provide, water and 12 bathroom breaks during transport, and has failed to prevent his employees, including 13 Defendants Poladian, Gose, Salagubang and RJD Warden Hill, from denying water and 14 bathroom breaks during transport to prisoners with medical and psychosocial conditions 15 and disabilities such as Plaintiff. (Id. at 14-19, 41.) He seeks to hold the CDCR liable for 16 the chain of events which began with his transport from San Diego, where he was close to 17 his family and friends, to the Eastern District, where he was sexually assaulted and where 18 he remains incarcerated. (Id. at 28-31.) He claims violations of RLUIPA and the First and 19 Eighth Amendments, and requests money damages along with injunctive relief in the form 20 of being provided drinking water, bathroom breaks and transfer to a female prison, as well 21 as assignment of a master for class certification or consolidation with ongoing class actions 22 regarding CDCR medical claims. (Id. at 42-46.) 23 C. Discussion 24 a) Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim 25 Plaintiff alleges that in light of his medical condition his transportation from RJD to 26 Sacramento without water or bathroom breaks violated the Eighth Amendment both by 27 itself and because the transfer set in motion a series of events cumulating in ongoing 28 unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Eastern District. (ECF No. 18 at 3.) “[A] 1 prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the 2 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

, 834 (1994), quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

(1991). Second, Plaintiff 4 must allege the prison official he seeks to hold liable had a “sufficiently culpable state of 5 mind,” that is, “one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to” his constitutional rights.

quoting

U.S. at 302-03. An objectively serious deprivation is a denial of “the minimal 7 civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Keenan v. Hall,

(9th Cir. 8 1996), quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,

(1981). 9 Plaintiff’s allegations are once again insufficient to plausibly allege that any 10 Defendant deprived him of “the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities” by not 11 permitting water or bathroom breaks during his transportation. Although Plaintiff states 12 he went without water for about 12 hours at RJD where he was refusing the transfer and 13 then about another 12 hours without water during the transport, such temporary 14 deprivations do not state an Eighth Amendment claim. “[E]xtreme deprivations are 15 required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because routine discomfort is 16 part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those 17 deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently 18 grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503

(1992) (internal quote marks and citation omitted); see Anderson v. County of 20 Kern,

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that short term or temporary 21 deprivations of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and sanitation do not plausibly 22 allege an Eighth Amendment violation); Wilson,

(“[O]nly those 23 deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently 24 grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (internal citation and quote 25 marks omitted). The allegations that Defendants verbally harassed and denigrated Plaintiff 26 do not state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Keenan v. Hall,

(9th 27 Cir. 1996), amended by

(9th Cir. 1998) (verbal harassment is not cognizable 28 as a constitutional deprivation under § 1983); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero,

, 139 1 (9th Cir. 1987) (vulgar language directed at inmate does not state a constitutional claim 2 under § 1983). To the extent Plaintiff attempts to raise claims in this action for alleged 3 violations of his constitutional rights in the Eastern District, which he has indicated he is 4 pursuing in three civil rights actions filed in that District, on the theory that those violations 5 only took place because he was transferred there from RJD, he may not proceed with such 6 claims in this District. See

(b) (“A civil action may be brought in – (1) a 7 judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State 8 in which the district is located; [or] (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 9 events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that 10 is the subject of the action is situated . . . .”) Plaintiff has failed to show that any of the 11 events or omissions in the Eastern District have given rise to claims alleged to have 12 occurred in either San Diego or Imperial County, nor that any Defendant involved in the 13 events or omissions while incarcerated in the Eastern District is alleged to reside here, or 14 that any events are common to all of Plaintiff’s claims. See

(d) (“The 15 Southern District of California comprises the counties of Imperial and San Diego.”) 16 The allegation that Secretary Macomber, Warden Hill or the CDCR failed to create 17 a policy of ensuring inmates receive water and bathroom breaks during transport also once 18 again fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. “In a section 1983 claim, a supervisor is 19 liable for the acts of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 20 violations, or knew of the violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent them.” 21 Corales v. Bennett,

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quote marks omitted). 22 There are once again no allegations that Secretary Macomber or Warden Hill knew Plaintiff 23 was deprived of water and failed to prevent that deprivation.

To the extent Plaintiff 24 intended to include the CDCR as a Defendant in the SAC, the CDCR is not a proper 25 defendant in a

action. See Howlett v. Rose,

(1990) 26 (“[Supreme Court authority] establishes that the State and arms of the State, which have 27 traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 28 in either federal court or state court.”) 1 To the extent Plaintiff intended to bring a discrimination claim under the ADA based 2 on Poladian having denied him water after remarking that Plaintiff could not be a Muslim 3 because he was transgender or intersex (see EFC No. 18 at 9), he has failed to state such a 4 claim because he has not shown “knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right [was] 5 substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the likelihood.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 6

, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying deliberate indifference standard to ADA 7 claim). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Poladian was aware that a violation of a federally 8 protected right was substantially likely when he denied Plaintiff water or ordered Gose and 9 Salagubang not to provide water during the transport from RJD to Sacramento, not only 10 because as noted above that temporary deprivation did not violate a constitutional right, 11 but also because Plaintiff states he was denied water on every transport due to the failure 12 of the CDCR to have a policy requiring water during transports. 13 The Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm,

. 15 b) First Amendment Freedom of Religion and RLUIPA Claims 16 In his original pleading and in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claimed the 17 Defendants denied him his right to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, 18 and his statutory rights under RLUIPA to practice his religion, when they deprived him of 19 water he needed to drink, to clean himself, and for ablution, as necessary to observe 20 Ramadan. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4; ECF No. 8 at 4.) The Court previously informed Plaintiff 21 twice that such conclusory allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege that an official 22 took an action which “substantially burdens” the practice of his religion,” and that such 23 “relatively short-term and sporadic” intrusions on the practice of religion do not constitute 24 substantial burdens. (ECF No. 7 at 6-8; ECF No. 9 at 6-7.) Plaintiff has not cured that 25 pleading defect in the SAC. Rather, he now alleges that during approximately 20 transports 26 on unidentified occasions the lack of access to water interfered with approximately 40 27 prayers required by the teaching of Islam. (ECF No. 18 at 8.) These allegations fail to 28 state a First Amendment or RLUIPA claim for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s 1 two prior dismissal orders (see ECF No. 7 at 6-8 and ECF No. 9 at 6-7), and because they 2 are conclusory. See Iqbal,

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 3 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim). 4 Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims are dismissed pursuant to 28

(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. 6 D. Leave to Amend 7 In light of his pro se status, the Court twice granted Plaintiff leave to amend after 8 notifying him of the deficiencies of his pleading. Because it is now clear Plaintiff is unable 9 to further amend to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the dismissal of this 10 action is without further leave to amend. See Rosati v. Igbinoso,

(9th 11 Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 12 unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 13 amendment.”) (internal quote marks omitted). 14 E. Plaintiff’s Motions 15 Plaintiff has filed a Request for Anonymity seeking to change his name on the docket 16 from Daniel Quintero to “DA. QUI. R.” (ECF No. 15.) He has also filed an Emergency 17 Injunction Petition in which he seeks a preliminary injunction requiring water and 18 bathroom breaks during transport. (ECF No. 17.) Because Plaintiff is no longer housed in 19 this District, and there is no showing of a likelihood that he will be transported to or from 20 this District in the future, his request for injunctive relief is denied as moot. See Darring 21 v. Kincheloe,

, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (inmate’s claim for injunctive relief 22 should be dismissed as moot when transferred to another prison and no reasonable 23 expectation or demonstrated probability that he would again be subjected to conditions 24 from which he seeks injunctive relief); see also Wiggins v. Alameda Cnty. Bd. of 25 Supervisors, No. C 94-1172 VRW,

, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1994) 26 (noting that prisoner lacked standing to seek injunctive relief related to prison conditions 27 after transfer). Because this action is terminated, Plaintiff’s request to change his name in 28 the caption to preserve his anonymity going forward in this action is also denied as moot. 1 ||TV. Conclusion and Orders 2 Accordingly, good cause appearing, the Court: 3 1) DENIES Plaintiff's Request for Anonymity (ECF No. 15) and Emergency 4 || Injunction Petition (ECF No. 17) as moot. 5 2) DISMISSES Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for failing to state a 6 ||claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)ai) & 7 || 1915A(b)(1) without further leave to amend. The Clerk of Court will enter a final judgment 8 || of dismissal and close the case. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: July 18, 2025 © ¢ Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10