Marin v. The People's Republic of China

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MEL MARIN, Case No.: 25-cv-1409-RSH-VET 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: (1) GRANTING v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IFP; AND (2) THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH dba DONGGUAN AIBOKESI 15 LEAVE TO AMEND NETWORK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD dba CIRCOOTER SCOOTER, 17 Defendant.

19 On June 3, 2025, plaintiff Mel Marin, proceeding pro se, commenced this action, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1 (“Compl.”); 2.

21 For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismisses the Complaint with leave to amend.

23 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 24 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.”); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing an inability to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life[.]” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015).

8 Here, Plaintiff reports a monthly income of $1,315.00 from retirement and disability benefits and monthly expenses totaling $1,540.00. ECF No. 2 at 2, 5. Plaintiff additionally claims he owns two motor vehicles worth $200 total, another $100 in unspecified assets, and $290 in his banking accounts. Id. at 2–3. Based on the above, the Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that he is unable to pay the filing fee at this time for this action.

14 II. MANDATORY SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 15 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 16 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte review and dismissal should the Court determine, inter alia, that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.”).

21 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 24 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). That is, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 26 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. 1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on December 8, 2023, he purchased an electric scooter with a defective front shock absorber from Dongguan Aibokesi Network Technology Co., Ltd. doing business as Circooter Scooter Company (“Circooter”).

4 Compl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff alleges he was injured when the scooter’s front shock absorber failed to adjust as he was riding over a small bump thereby causing him to be thrown onto the street. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff names the People’s Republic of China (“China”) as the “real party in interest” pursuant to an alter ego theory. Id. ¶ 3.

8 Here, Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim of alter ego liability against China. See Tan v. Quick Box, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-01082-H- DEB, 2021 WL 1293862, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021) (“At the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage, the court must decide whether the plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, could support a plausible claim of alter-ego liability.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

13 “[T]o satisfy the alter ego test, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case (1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate identities] would result in fraud or injustice.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Plaintiff, China is Circooter’s alter ego based on its alleged 51% ownership share. Compl ¶ 13. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, however, even “[t]otal ownership and shared management personnel are alone insufficient to establish the requisite level of control” to satisfy the alter-ego test. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 21 1073. As such, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s Complaint does not set forth a plausible claim against China that passes the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

23 III. CONCLUSION 24 For the above reasons, the Court: (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma papuperis; and (2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear ] ||that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal || quotation marks omitted).

3 If Plaintiff chooses, he may file a First Amended Complaint by July 31, 2025.

4 || Failure to do so will result in dismissal of his action.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: July 18, 2025 □ g Hon. Robert S. Huie 9 United States District Judge 1]