1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DISTRICT COUNCIL 16 NORTHERN Case No. 24-cv-07188-LJC CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND WELFARE 8 TRUST FUND, et al., ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 9 Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE DENIED AND 10 v. DEFAULT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE 11 SIDNEY KEYS, Re: Dkt. Nos. 16, 21 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 21) is currently pending before the 15 Court. As discussed below, the Court has identified two issues that warrant further evidentiary 16 filings and/or briefing. First, it is not clear that Plaintiffs properly served process on Defendant 17 Sidney Keys, raising questions as to both whether Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied and whether 18 Keys’s default should be set aside. Second, a set of collections procedures on which Plaintiffs rely 19 has an ambiguous title and pervasive redactions, which raise a question of whether they Court can 20 rely on that document in resolving Plaintiffs’ Motion. Plaintiffs are therefore ORDERED TO 21 SHOW CAUSE why the Motion for Default Judgment should not be denied and why Keys’s 22 default should not be set aside, by filing response no later than August 8, 2025. The hearing 23 previously set for July 29, 2025 is CONTINUED to September 9, 2025 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 24 G. 25 II. SERVICE OF PROCESS 26 As a threshold issue before Plaintiffs’ pending Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 21) 27 can be granted, the Court must determine that service of process was proper. See, e.g., Bank of the 1 2008). Service must comply with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 2 authorizes service either through several means specifically listed or in any manner allowed by 3 state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). There is some indication here that Defendant Sidney Keys is 4 aware of this action, see ECF No. 21-5, ¶ 18 (noting a voicemail that Keys left Plaintiffs’ counsel 5 about a rescheduled case management conference), 6 Plaintiffs’ certificate of service indicates that they served Defendant Sidney Keys through 7 substitute service by leaving copies of the summons, complaint, and other documents with Keys’s 8 brother “John Doe” at 441 Lexington Drive, Vallejo, California—purportedly Keys’s “Residence 9 or Usual Place of Abode”—and subsequently mailing documents to the same address. ECF No. 10 11. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “leaving a copy of [the summons and complaint] 11 at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion 12 who resides there” constitutes effective service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B). The process server’s 13 declaration lists Doe’s age as “50’s” and checks a box indicating that he was “a person of suitable 14 age and discretion who resides there.” ECF No. 11. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 15 and taking into account the note that Doe is Keys’s brother (which implies that the process server 16 spoke to Doe, as would likely be necessary to determine that Doe resided there), the Court finds 17 the proof of service sufficient to establish valid service under Rule 4(e)(2)(B)—but only if the 18 Lexington Drive address where service occurred was in fact also Keys’s residence. 19 The Court has identified no evidence in the docket to support that conclusion. Plaintiffs’ 20 Complaint says nothing about Keys’s residence, describing him (and his sole proprietorship trade 21 name) only as an “employers.” Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 2. Neither the certificate of service nor 22 Plaintiffs’ request for entry of default discusses how Plaintiffs determined Keys’s address. ECF 23 Nos. 11, 13. Plaintiffs’ present Motion for Default Judgment also does not discuss that issue. 24 ECF No. 21. An agreement signed by Keys submitted with that Motion lists an address for his 25 business in Oakland, not the Lexington Drive address in Vallejo. ECF No. 21-2 at 41. A letter 26 that Plaintiffs’ accountants sent to Defendants also lists the Oakland address. ECF No 21-4 at 2. 27 Plaintiffs submit a contractor’s license record for Keys’s sole proprietorship, Keys Painting & 1 indication from that page that the address is Keys’s residence. ECF No. 21-6 at 2. 2 Correspondence sent by Plaintiffs’ counsel includes both addresses, but again, there is no 3 indication of if or how Plaintiffs determined that the Vallejo address was Keys’s residence. ECF 4 No 21-6 at 13, 15, 16, 19, 22. Accordingly, the Court cannot determine from the present record 5 whether service was effective under Rule 4(e)(2)(B), because it is not clear that the address where 6 service occurred was Keys’s “dwelling or usual place of abode.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B). 7 California law, which is incorporated by Rule 4(e)(1) as providing alternative sufficient 8 methods of service, allows for a similar form of substitute service “by leaving a copy of the 9 summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house . . . in the presence of a competent 10 member of the household” and “thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint” 11 to the person to be served at the same address, but only if personal service cannot be completed 12 “with reasonable diligence.”

(b). The certificate of service here 13 includes a checked box indicating that a “(Declaration of Diligence) [is] attached stating actions 14 taken first to attempt personal service.” ECF No. 11. No such declaration appears in the docket. 15 If Plaintiffs wish to rely on Rule 4(e)(1) and section 415.20 (as opposed to Rule 4(e)(2)(B), which 16 does not include a requirement to attempt personal service), they must provide evidence of 17 reasonable diligence, in addition to explaining how they determined that the address at issue is 18 Keys’s residence. 19 Plaintiffs are therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why their Motion for Default 20 Judgment should not be denied for failure to establish effective service of process, and why Keys’s 21 default should not be set aside for the same reason. 22 III. COLLECTION PROCEDURES 23 Plaintiffs rely in part on a partially redacted document setting forth their collection 24 procedures. As discussed below, Plaintiffs are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the Court 25 should not disregard the collections procedures due to the ambiguous title of the document and 26 pervasive redactions to it. 27 The title of the collections procedures document reads as “Restated Collection Procedures 1 means, or if that “Unit” encompasses the employees at issue here.' Plaintiffs are directed to file a 2 || response to this Order addressing that title. 3 The redactions to the collections procedures, which include some provisions within the 4 specific sections of the procedures on which Plaintiffs rely, raise questions as to whether relevant 5 information has been obscured. As this Court has previously ordered in another case involving the 6 || same plaintiffs (represented by the same law firm), “Plaintiffs must file an unredacted version of 7 the Collection Procedures. Plaintiffs may file an administrative motion to file that document 8 || under seal if they believe there are compelling reasons to prevent public disclosure of the currently 9 || redacted paragraphs.” Dist. Council 16 N. Cal. Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Masterpiece 10 || Painting, Inc., No. 22-cv-06540-HSG (LJC),

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2024). 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 12 Dated: July 25, 2025

14 Lis, | harry ——

‘A J. CISNEROS 5 ited States Magistrate Judge 16

17

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ' That term might be the result of a typographical or technological error. The Court notes that 26 ee 1.09 ee 295 □□□ Bart:ainini:” would, much more sensibly, read as “Bargaining” if the two instances of “1:” were 07 replaced with the letter G. If so, however, some explanation is warranted to confirm that theory and ensure that this document is applicable to this case, particularly when Plaintiffs will need to 2g || file supplemental materials anyway to address the other concerns identified in this Order to Show Cause.