(PC) Harris v. City of Madera

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DANIEL JAFAIN HARRIS, No. 1:22-cv-00660 JLT GSA (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT 13 v. BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY FILED AND FOR FAILURE TO CITY OF MADERA, et al., EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 20) 16 PLAINTIFF’S SHOWING OF CAUSE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, HIS VOLUNTARY 17 DISMISSAL OF THIS MATTER DUE IN FOURTEEN DAYS Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

Before this Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. ECF No. 20. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why this matter should not be summarily dismissed as untimely and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s showing of cause or, in the alternative, his voluntary dismissal of this matter due in fourteen days.

1 I. RELEVANT FACTS 2 On May 20, 2025, Plaintiff’s complaint was screened. ECF No. 17. The complaint named the City of Madera; the Madera Sheriff Department, and the Madera County Department of Corrections as Defendants, and it raised general violations of right stemming from Defendants’ alleged violations of government policies related to the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (“CLETS”), and acts of negligence related to his federal rights. See ECF No. 1 at 1-3. It alleged that the violations of right occurred from September 29, 2016, through October 23, 2017, and that the alleged violations were ongoing. See id. at 6.

9 In the screening order, the Court found that the pleading failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it contained no specific facts and because it failed to identify the governmental policy and/or procedure that Defendants were alleged to have violated. See ECF No. 17 at 5. In addition, the Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations against entities like the sheriff’s department were not actionable under Section 1983 for the actions of an employee, and that absent a showing of a clear policy or custom, a municipality could not be held liable under Section 1983, either. Id. at 5-6.

16 Based on these findings, the Court found that the complaint failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted, and Plaintiff was given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 17 at 8-9. He was given thirty days to do so. At that time, Plaintiff was given instruction with respect to what his amended complaint should contain if he chose to file one. Id. at 8. He was also sent a copy of the Court’s Civil Rights Complaint By a Prisoner form to use when filing the amended complaint. See id. at 9.

22 II. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 23 Plaintiff has filed a first amended complaint. ECF No. 20. In it, Plaintiff names the City of Madera again as a Defendant. See id. at 1. However, he also names two completely different Defendants who were not mentioned in the original complaint: Luz Romero, the Administration Supervisor for the Madera Department of Correction, and Christine Najiri1 of the Madera County District Attorney’s Office. Id. at 2-3.

3 In Plaintiff’s two claims in the FAC, he essentially alleges that Defendants Romero and Najiri violated his due process rights and engaged in negligence, illegal misconduct, and the deprivation of his liberty, civil and constitutional rights when, on September 29, 2016, they conspired to and arranged unauthorized visitation between himself and one Klara Bess, for the purpose of entrapment and the gathering incriminating information against him related to a criminal conviction. ECF No. 20 at 3-4.

9 Plaintiff’s FAC also clearly states that there was an inmate appeal process available to him at the Madera County Jail, but that he did not file an appeal or a grievance related to his two claims because “remedies for complaint are unavailable at institution, facility or prison.” ECF No. 20 at 2 (errors in original).

13 III. APPLICABLE LAW 14 A. Statute of Limitations to File a Complaint 15 In federal court, federal law determines when a claim accrues, and “under federal law, a claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Two Rivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Fink v. Shedler, 192 19 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999)). In the absence of a specific statute of limitations, federal courts should apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048; Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (2004); Fink, 192 F.3d at 914. California's two- year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. See 23 Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions requires that the claim be filed within two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.

25 In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitations, the court should also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. See It is unclear what the correct spelling of this Defendant is. Plaintiff’s handwriting is not legible.

28 See ECF No. 20 at 3.

1 Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 2000 (1989). Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, § 352.1, a two-year limit on tolling is imposed on prisoners. Section 352.1 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) If a person entitled to bring an action, . . . is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a 6 criminal court for a term less than for life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, not to exceed two years.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 352.1.

The equitable tolling doctrine also tolls the statute of limitations while exhaustion occurs.

Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1988); Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 318 (1978). Additionally, whether an inmate is entitled to equitable tolling is decided by state law except to the extent that it is inconsistent with federal law. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that prisoners relying on the California statute of limitations are entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations while completing the mandatory exhaustion process. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005). “Where exhaustion of an administrative remedy is mandatory prior to filing suit, equitable tolling is automatic: ‘It has long been settled in this and other jurisdictions that whenever the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil action, the running of the limitations period is tolled during the time consumed by the administrative proceeding.’”

McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 101 (2008) (quoting Elkins v. Derby,12 Cal. 3d 410, 414 (1974); cf. Code Civ. Proc. § 356 [tolling applies whenever commencement of an action is statutorily prohibited].)

B. Exhaustion Requirement The claims of inmates who challenge their conditions of confinement are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “The PLRA mandates that inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under [Section] 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 28 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (brackets added) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies . . . before that complaint is tendered to the district court.”). There are few exceptions to this rule. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016) (exceptions to exhaustion requirement).

6 “Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availab[ility]’ of administrative remedies: An inmate . . . must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642 (brackets in original). In discussing availability in Ross, the Supreme Court identified three circumstances in which administrative remedies were unavailable: (1) where an administrative remedy “operates as a simple dead end” in which officers are “unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) where an administrative scheme is “incapable of use” because “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it;” and (3) where “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 15 644. “[A]side from [the unavailability] exception, the PLRA’s text suggests no limits on an inmate’s obligation to exhaust – irrespective of any ‘special circumstances.’ ” Id. at 639.

17 “[M]andatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.” Id. at 632.

19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Untimely 21 Irrespective of the fact that Plaintiff’s FAC impermissibly raises claims that were not raised in the original complaint – which is also grounds for dismissal (see generally George v. 23 Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)) (stating no unrelated claims may be filed in amended complaint), this matter must be summarily dismissed for two independent threshold reasons.

25 First, the FAC is untimely. In both claims, Plaintiff states that the incidents in question occurred on September 29, 2016. See ECF No. 20 at 3-4. Thus, absent any tolling to exhaust administrative remedies – which Plaintiff’s FAC clearly states he never did – Plaintiff’s original complaint should have been filed no later than four years from that date, which is September 29, 2020.

3 Plaintiff’s original complaint was signed, and thus, constructively filed on April 29, 2022.2 See ECF No. 1 at 7 (signature date of complaint). This was a full one year and seven months past September 29, 2020, the last day that Plaintiff was able to file a complaint in this Court. For this reason, this case should be summarily dismissed.

7 B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Without Excuse 8 Plaintiff’s FAC must also be dismissed because in it, he has failed to provide a viable and plausible excuse under Ross for not having exhausted his administrative remedies in the Madera County Jail prior to filing his original complaint in this Court. See generally ECF No. 20.

11 Plaintiff’s contradictory statements that there is an administrative remedy process at the jail, but that he did not use the process because “remedies for complaint are unavailable at institution, facility or prison,” (see id. at 2), without more, does not, consistent with Ross, sufficiently excuse the fact that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. For this reason as well, Plaintiff’s complaint must be summarily dismissed.

16 V. CONCLUSION 17 In sum, because: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint was filed well beyond the four-year statute of limitations period, and (2) it is clear on the face of the FAC that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and that he has provided no viable excuse under Ross for not having done so, the Court must recommend that this matter be summarily dismissed. Prior to doing so, however, Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why it should not be. As an alternative to filing the showing of cause, Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Plaintiff will be given fourteen days to take either course of action.

2 The signing date of a pleading is the earliest possible filing date pursuant to the mailbox rule.

See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 769 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating constructive filing date for prisoner giving pleading to prison authorities is date pleading is signed); Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 28 U.S. 408 (2005).

1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen days from the date of this order, Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE why this matter should not be SUMMARILY DISMISSED as untimely in violation of the Statute of Limitations and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

5 Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to timely respond to this order within the time allotted may result in a recommendation that this matter be dismissed.

7 Plaintiff is further cautioned that absent exigent circumstances, no requests for extensions of time to respond to this order will be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12 Dated: July 29, 2025 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE