Hardy v. Silva

United States District Court for the Southern District of California

Hardy v. Silva

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KRISTIN HARDY, Case No.: 3:24-cv-0899-JAH-MSB CDCR# AA8633, 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO ALTER OR SET ASIDE vs. THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 14 FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

15 PROCEDURE 59(e) A. SILVA, JOHN DOE, 16 Defendants. ECF No. 13 17

18 19 Kristin Hardy (“Hardy” or “Plaintiff”) is an inmate proceeding pro se with a civil 20 action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983

. In his original complaint, Hardy alleged his 21 constitutional rights under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause were violated 22 when a parcel containing educational books that he ordered by mail was improperly 23 returned to the sender. See ECF No. 1. On November 11, 2024, the Court granted Hardy’s 24 request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) but dismissed his original complaint without 25 prejudice for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 6. After an extension of time, Hardy filed a 26 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), again raising First Amendment and Due Process 27 claims. ECF No. 10. On April 22, 2025, the Court concluded Hardy had again failed to 28 state a claim and dismissed the action without further leave to amend. ECF No. 11. The 1 Court entered judgment and certified that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith. 2 ECF Nos. 11, 12. Hardy has now filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant 3 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). ECF No. 13. 4 DISCUSSION 5 “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it is presented with newly 6 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the 7 controlling law.” Wood v. Ryan,

759 F.3d 1117, 1121

(9th Cir. 2014). “A Rule 59(e) motion 8 may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could 9 reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Carroll v. Nakatani,

342 F.3d 934

, 10 945 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion is an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used 11 sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Wood, 759 12 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Kona Enteres., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop,

229 F.3d 877

, 890 (9th Cir. 13 2000)). 14 In his motion, Hardy does not allege any newly discovered evidence or intervening 15 changes in the controlling law. Instead, he appears to argue the Court’s decision was clearly 16 erroneous. “Clear error occurs when the reviewing court on the entire record is left with 17 the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Smith v. Clark Cty. 18 School Dist.,

727 F.3d 950, 955

(9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 First, Hardy asserts the Court erred by failing to infer Defendants had an improper 20 motive in returning his books to sender. As stated in this Court’s dismissal order, an 21 isolated incident of delay or other mail interference without evidence of improper motive 22 does not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. See Crofton v. Roe,

170 F.3d 957

, 23 961 (9th Cir. 1999). And the Court found a mere alleged failure to follow California 24 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation mail regulations was insufficient to plausibly 25 allege Defendants acted with improper motive. See Lingo v. Boone,

402 F. Supp. 768

, 773 26 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (finding prisoner not entitled relief under § 1983 where prison officials 27 improperly withheld a piece of mail); Smith v. Maschner,

899 F.2d 940, 944

(10th Cir. 28 1990) (concluding that single alleged incident of a failure to deliver permissible catalogs 1 mailed to a prisoner was insufficient to amount to a First Amendment violation); Nixon v. 2 Sec’y Penn. Dep’t of Corr.,

501 F. App’x 176, 178

(3d Cir. 2012) (holding that a prisoner’s 3 allegation of a “single, isolated interference with personal [non-legal] mail was insufficient 4 to constitute a First Amendment violation”). Hardy has shown no clear error. 5 Next, Hardy contends the Court erred by failing to liberally construe his FAC. While 6 a federal court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338

, 342 7 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 8 pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska,

673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). And 9 here, the Court did construe the FAC liberally and concluded Hardy failed to allege 10 sufficient facts to plausibly support the elements of his First Amendment claim. Iqbal, 550 11 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 12 liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 13 relief.”); see also Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co.,

751 F.3d 990

, 996 14 (9th Cir. 2014). 15 Hardy also alleges the Court improperly found Defendants made an “honest error” 16 in returning his books to sender. The Court made no such finding. Instead, Plaintiff appears 17 to be referencing language included in a case citation parenthetical, which was provided as 18 an example of an instance where a court found no improper motive. See ECF No. 11 at 4. 19 The other cases cited in the same paragraph also found no improper motive when officials 20 intentionally (but mistakenly) and negligently withheld mail. See Lingo,

402 F. Supp. at 21

773 (finding prisoner not entitled to monetary relief under § 1983 where prison officials 22 erroneously withheld a single piece of mail on the grounds that it was inflammatory); 23 Canales v. Guzman,

2023 WL 5418771

, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (finding allegation of a 24 single incident of negligence in failing to deliver the plaintiff’s package insufficient to state 25 a First Amendment claim). In short, the Court concluded the allegations contained Hardy’s 26 FAC were insufficient to raise a plausible inference of “improper motive” in returning the 27 books to sender. And Hardy has not shown this was clear error. 28 1 Finally, Hardy alleges the Court erroneously found he suffered only a “mere delay” 2 his receiving the books when, in fact, the books were “returned to sender, and not merely 3 || delayed.” ECF No. 13 at 3. But the Court clearly stated in its dismissal order that the books 4 || were returned to sender, see ECF No. 11 at 3, and simply noted that in Hardy’s original 5 ||complaint, he stated he ultimately received the books after they were reshipped. See

id.

at 6 |/4n.2. 7 In sum, the Court finds no clear error. Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the 8 judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is therefore DENIED. The 9 || Clerk shall close the file. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 ||Dated: August 7, 2025 12 13 OHN A. HOUSTON 14 j/ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

Reference

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