Rosa Estela Saucedo Serna v. Target Corporation
Rosa Estela Saucedo Serna v. Target Corporation
Trial Court Opinion
1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSA ESTELA SAUCEDO SERNA, Case No. 2:25-cv-05710-FLA (MBKx)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING ACTION FOR 13 v. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION [DKT. 11] 14 TARGET CORPORATION, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 RULING 2 On October 1, 2024, Rosa Estela Saucedo Serna (“Plaintiff”) initiated this 3 action against Defendant Target Corporation (“Defendant”) in the Los Angeles 4 County Superior Court. Dkt. 1 at 9–15 (“Compl.”).1 The Complaint asserts two 5 causes of action for: (1) negligence; and (2) premises liability. Id. 6 On June 23, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this court pleading the 7 existence of diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dkt. 1. In its Notice of 8 Removal, Defendant alleges the court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff 9 seeks $10 million in general damages and $49,909 in special damages in her 10 Statement of Damages.
Id. at 2. 11 On July 2, 2025, the court ordered the parties to show cause (“OSC”) why the 12 action should not be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to an 13 insufficient amount in controversy. Dkt. 11. Defendant filed its response on July 16, 14 2025. Dkt. 12 (Pedone Decl.). 15 Having reviewed the Notice of Removal and Defendant’s response to the OSC, 16 and for the following reasons, the court finds Defendant fails to establish subject 17 matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. The court, therefore, 18 REMANDS this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power 22 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 23 Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377(1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. District courts are 24 presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the 25 record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). 26
27 1 The court cites documents by the page numbers added by the court’s CM/ECF 28 System, rather than any page numbers included natively. 1 Additionally, federal courts have an obligation to examine jurisdiction sua sponte 2 before proceeding to the merits of a case. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
3 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 4 Most commonly, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction where: (1) an 5 action arises under federal law (federal question jurisdiction),
28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (2) 6 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the 7 citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from that of each defendant (diversity 8 jurisdiction),
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Except as otherwise provided by an act of 9 Congress expressly, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 10 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[] may be removed by the 11 defendant or the defendants” to the district court for the district and division where the 12 action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441. 13 A defendant’s notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the 14 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin 15 Operating Co. v. Owens,
574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “[W]hen the plaintiff contests, or 16 the court questions, the defendant’s allegation,” “both sides [must] submit proof,” at 17 which point “the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 18 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.”
Id.at 88–89. Courts “strictly 19 construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction 20 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 21 Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,
980 F.2d 564, 566(9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ 22 against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 23 establishing that removal is proper.”
Id.24 B. Plaintiff’s Statement of Damages and Claims for General Damages 25 Defendant contends the amount in controversy is satisfied because Plaintiff 26 seeks $10 million in general damages and $49,909 in special damages in her 27 Statement of Damages, for a total demand of $10,049,909. Dkt. 1 at 2, 30; Dkt. 12 28 (Pedone Decl.) ¶ 1. 1 A statement of damages “is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it 2 appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.” See Cohn v. 3 Petsmart, Inc.,
281 F.3d 837, 840(9th Cir. 2002). “A plaintiff’s damage estimate will 4 not establish the amount in controversy, however, if it appears to be only a bold 5 optimistic prediction.” Romsa v. Ikea U.S. W., Inc., Case No. 2:14-cv-05552-MMM 6 (JEMx),
2014 WL 4273265, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014) (internal quotation marks 7 omitted). 8 It is clear the $10 million in general damages stated in Plaintiff’s Statement of 9 Damages is nothing more than a “bold optimistic prediction” and not a reasonable 10 estimate of Plaintiff’s claims. See
id.(“The leap from $4,597.77 in medical expenses 11 incurred to [defendant’s] assertion that [plaintiff’s son] has suffered damages in 12 excess of $75,000 because he cries a lot and wakes up several times a night is difficult 13 to credit. [Defendant] cites no facts that indicate a damages award anywhere near 14 $75,000 – let alone $1,000,000 – is likely.”). Significantly, the Complaint, Notice of 15 Removal, and Statement of Damages do not explain how Plaintiff determined the $5 16 million in pain, suffering, and inconvenience, and $5 million in emotional distress she 17 demands, or provide any specific facts to establish these estimates are reasonable. See 18 Dkt. 1 at 1–15; see also See Romsa,
2014 WL 4273265, at *2 (remanding action 19 where Plaintiff’s statement of damages did not explain how he arrived at the damages 20 estimated); Schroeder v. Petsmart, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-01561-FMO (AGRx), 2019
21 WL 1895573, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2019) (same); Mata v. Home Depot U.S.A., 22 Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-01758-FMO (AFMx),
2022 WL 3586206, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 23 Aug. 22, 2022) (same). 24 The court, therefore, declines to consider Plaintiff’s demand of $10 million in 25 general damages in determining the amount in controversy. Plaintiff’s remaining 26 demand for $49,909 in special damages is insufficient to meet the $75,000 threshold 27 for diversity jurisdiction. 28 / / / CONCLUSION 2 Given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must 3 || be resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus,
980 F.2d at 566, 4 | the court finds Defendant has not met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the 5 | evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as required for diversity 6 | jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332. 7 Accordingly, the court REMANDS the action to the Los Angeles County 8 | Superior Court, Case No. 24TRCV03288. All dates and deadlines in this court are 9 | VACATED. The clerk of the court shall close the action administratively. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 | Dated: August 7, 2025 14 : '° FERNANDQ'L. AENLLE-ROCHA 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Reference
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