Campa v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

Campa v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CORINA CAMPA, Case No. 24-cv-00576-NW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. RECONSIDERATION

10 UNITED OF OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE Re: ECF No. 85 COMPANY, 11 Defendant.

12 13 On May 27, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff Corina Campa’s motion for summary 14 judgment and denied Defendant United of Omaha Life Insurance Company’s (“United”) cross- 15 motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 80 (“Summary Judgment Order”). On August 8, 2025, 16 United filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Summary Judgment Order with leave of 17 the Court. Mot., ECF No. 85. Campa opposed, ECF No. 86, and United filed a reply, ECF No. 18 87. After careful review of the briefing, the Court DENIES United’s motion. 19 A litigant dissatisfied with an interlocutory ruling may seek leave to file a motion for 20 reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9. Meas v. City & County of San Francisco,

681 F. 21

Supp. 2d 1128, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A motion for 22 reconsideration may be made on one of three grounds: (1) a material difference in fact or law 23 exists from that which was presented to the Court, which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 24 the party applying for reconsideration did not know at the time of the order; (2) the emergence of 25 new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest failure by the Court to consider material 26 facts or dispositive legal arguments presented before entry of judgment. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)-(3). 27 The moving party may not re-argue any written or oral argument previously asserted to the Court, 1 v. City of Napa, No. 13-3886-EDL,

2014 WL 342085

at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Arakji v. Microchip 2 Tech. Inc., No. 19-2936-BLF,

2019 WL 5626265

at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2019). “Motions for 3 reconsideration are generally disfavored,” and they should not “be used to ask the Court to rethink 4 what it has already thought.” Johnson v. Broomfield, No. 98-CV-04043-SI,

2021 WL 4170683

, at 5 *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2021). 6 United contends that reconsideration is appropriate because the Court manifestly failed to 7 consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments presented before entry of judgment “by 8 allowing Plaintiff’s claims for bad faith and punitive damages to survive United’s motion for 9 summary judgment.” Mot. at 1. United does not challenge the Court’s determination that there 10 are disputes of material fact as to whether Mr. Campa (the Plaintiff’s son) was a tobacco smoker in 11 the 12 months prior to Plaintiff applying for insurance, which informs United’s argument that Mr. 12 Campa misrepresented his smoking history. Id. at 3. 13 Regarding Campa’s bad faith claim, United argues that the Court’s finding of a genuine 14 dispute of material fact as to Mr. Campa’s smoking status necessarily means that there is a 15 “genuine issue” as to United’s liability because “[i]f United had a reasonable basis for its position, 16 it cannot be liable for bad faith, as a matter of law.” Mot. at 4. United states that, under California 17 recission case law, the Court’s “only inquiry is whether the misstated fact would affect the 18 insurer’s decision to issue the contract.” Mot. at 7; Old Line Life Ins. Co. v. Sup. Court, 229

19 Cal.App.3d 1600

, 1604 (1991). 20 The Court understands, as it did when it denied United’s motion for summary judgment, 21 that United’s position is that had it known about Mr. Campa’s smoking status, it would have either 22 not issued the life insurance policy for Mr. Campa or would have done so at a different rate. 23 However, United’s argument presupposes that Mr. Campa was a smoker. To reach that 24 conclusion, United had to rely on a single note in one medical record for Mr. Campa that 25 inexplicably used the phrase “current some day smoker.” This record is inconsistent with the 26 other medical records, including one that clearly indicated Mr. Campa did not smoke, and another 27 that stated his smoking status was unknown. It is unclear how, if at all, United investigated and 1 rescinding the policy. Thus, while there is a factual dispute regarding Mr. Campa’s smoking 2 history, there is also a triable issue of fact regarding whether United’s decision to rescind the life 3 insurance policy for Mr. Campa following his death was made unreasonably and in bad faith. 4 These are questions for the jury. At summary judgment, courts ask, “whether the evidence 5 presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that 6 one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242

, 251–52 7 (1986). Here, the Court reaffirms its decision that the evidence is not “so one-sided” that United 8 “must prevail as a matter of law.”

Id.

9 To the extent the Court was insufficiently clear in its Summary Judgment Order, there are 10 numerous disputed issues of material fact in this case, including: what the various medical records 11 indicate about Mr. Campa’s smoking status; if and how United assessed Mr. Campa’s smoking 12 status prior to issuing the policy; if and how United weighed and investigated the various medical 13 records for Mr. Campa before issuing the life insurance policy to Plaintiff; if and how United 14 weighed and investigated the various medical records for Mr. Campa before rescinding the policy; 15 and whether United acted reasonably in its investigation and communications with Plaintiff. 16 United also contends that the Court “failed to address United’s attack on Plaintiff’s request 17 for punitive damages.” Mot. at 10. United argues that “the evidence falls far short of the 18 significantly higher threshold required to sustain the finding of liability for punitive damages,” and 19 therefore the Court should have granted United’s motion for summary judgment. Reply at 5. 20 United is correct that to prevail on its bad faith claim against Untied, Plaintiff will need to meet 21 this high bar at trial. United is incorrect that the facts of this case, including United’s investigation 22 and ultimate rescission of the policy, are so clearcut and one-sided that Plaintiff will not be able to 23 prove United acted in bad faith. This factual dispute is an issue for the jury to resolve at trial, not 24 for the Court to order in a motion for summary judgment. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / ] Because United does not identify a basis to reconsider the Court’s ruling on the motion for 2 |} summary judgment, the motion for reconsideration is denied. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: September 9, 2025 5 Noél Wise 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] as 12

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Reference

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