1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JASON BRIAN SMITH, No. 2:21-cv-00412-SCR 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 18 (“Commissioner”), denying his application for benefits under the Social Security Act. On 19 September 15, 2023, Magistrate Judge Barnes granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 20 and entered judgment remanding this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings. ECF 21 Nos. 20 & 21. On remand, Plaintiff was awarded past benefits of $115,7441. 22 Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s August 4, 2025 Motion for an award of 23 attorney’s fees pursuant to

(b), which seeks an award of $22,733.26. ECF 24 No. 30. The Commissioner has filed a statement that he “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s 25 request for attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 34 at 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be 26 granted. 27 1 The Notice of Award states that Plaintiff’s past due benefits are $115,744.70 and that 28 $28,936.18 is being withheld as a potential representative fee. ECF No. 31-4 at 3. 1 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 2 At the outset of the representation, Plaintiff and his counsel entered into a contingent-fee 3 agreement. ECF No. 31-1. Pursuant to that agreement Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 4 fees in the amount of $22,733.26 which represents 19.6% of the retroactive disability benefits 5 awarded to Plaintiff on remand. 6 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 7 security claimants: 8 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 9 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 10 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 11 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 12 13

(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42

, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 15 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) 16 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002)). The goal of fee awards under 17 § 406(b) is “to protect claimants against inordinately large fees and also to ensure that attorneys 18 representing successful claimants would not risk nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.” Parrish v. 19 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 20 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 21 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. See Gisbrecht,

(“406(b) does not 22 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 23 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 24 boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 25 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 26 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 27 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 28 Crawford,

(quoting Gisbrecht,

). 1 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 2 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford,

(quoting Gisbrecht,

). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is 4 warranted, the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or 5 delayed the case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 6

Finally, the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 7 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford,

-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 8

); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers 9 “the time and labor required”). 10 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel states that over the last decade he has represented approximately 11 180 individuals in social security cases. ECF No. 31 at 2. He states that his customary rate for 12 representing individuals in federal non-contingency and general civil actions during the relevant 13 time period was $500/hour.

Counsel obtained a successful result for his client in this matter. 14 There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard performance 15 by counsel. There is also no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any dilatory conduct 16 resulting in excessive delay. The Court finds that the $22,733.26 fee, which is less than 25% of 17 the amount paid in past-due benefits to Plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits 18 awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case 19 and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent Plaintiff on 20 such terms. See Crawford,

(“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in 21 accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be 22 a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). 23 Counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF 24 No. 31-2. The statement reflects 35.2 hours of attorney time. The Court finds that the amount of 25 time expended is reasonable. See also Costa v. Commissioner,

(9th Cir. 26 2012) (“Many district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often 27 requested and granted in social security cases.”). The Court observes that the effective hourly 28 rate of $646/hour is in accord, and in fact lower, than recent awards in this District. See Garcia v. 1 || O'Malley,

(E.D. Cal. September 9, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $685); 2 || Guzman Paz v. Commissioner,

(E.D. Cal. September 3, 2024) (effective 3 | hourly rate of $883); Garcia v. Commissioner,

(E.D. Cal. August 28, 2024) 4 | (effective hourly rate of $864). In Crawford, the Ninth Circuit found the fee awards in the three 5 || consolidated cases to be reasonable, and the fee requests ranged from $11,500 to $24,000, and if 6 || divided by the hours expended would have resulted in effective rates in the range of $500 to 7 | $900/hour. 586 F.3d at 1145-1147. Some courts have also approved higher effective rates. See 8 | Roxsann D. A. v. O'Malley,

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024) (“The Central District 9 | of California has frequently found reasonable fees with effective hourly rates exceeding $1,000”). 10 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 11 | counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 12 I]. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 13 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 14 || under the EAJA.

; Gisbrecht,

. Here, as stated in the motion, 15 | there was no prior request for, or award of, EAJA fees. ECF No. 30 at 4. Accordingly, there is 16 | no prior award of EAJA fees that needs to be offset. 17 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 18 1. Plaintiffs Motion for attorney Fees under

(b) (ECF No. 24), is 19 | GRANTED; and 20 2. Counsel for Plaintiff is awarded $22,733.26 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 21 || Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 22 | for the payment of such fees. 23 | ORDERED: 24 | DATE: August 26, 2025

26 SEAN C. RIORDAN 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28