1 O 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4

5 Case No.: 2:25-cv-04580-MEMF-E MARIO MENDOZA,

6 Plaintiff, ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE 7 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER v. PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS 8

9 O-NEX INC.; NABIL NASSIB KAIDBEY; and 10 DOES 1 to 10, 11 Defendants. 12 13 Before the Court is the Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Regarding 14 Supplemental Jurisdiction filed by Plaintiff Mario Mendoza. ECF No. 12. For the reasons stated 15 herein, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mendoza’s state law claims 16 and DISMISSES the claims. 17 I. Background 18 A. Factual Background1 19 Plaintiff Mario Mendoza (“Mendoza”) suffers from cerebral palsy and requires a wheelchair 20 while traveling in public. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendants O-Nex Inc., Nabil Nassib Kaidbey, and Does 1 to 21 10 (“Defendants”) are the owners, business operators, lessors and/or lessees of the real property for 22 an auto parts store (the “Business”) located at or about 14910 Nelson Ave., City of Industry, 23 California. Id. ¶ 2. 24 In or about February 2025, Mendoza went to the Business. Id. ¶ 10. He encountered barriers 25 in doing so. Id. ¶ 12. The Business does not have signage with the International Symbol of 26 Accessibility marking the parking space designated for persons with disabilities, nor does it have 27 28 1 The factual allegations included in this section are taken from the Complaint. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The 1 signage warning others not to park in the designated space, signage stating the minimum fine, 2 signage stating the spot is van accessible, or maintain proper van accessibility for such a space. Id. ¶ 3 13. These issues deny Mendoza the full and equal access to the Business and deter him from visiting 4 the Business. Id. ¶ 14. 5 B. Procedural History 6 On May 21, 2025, Mendoza filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting: (1) a claim for 7 injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 8

, et seq.; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 9 (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, et seq.; (3) a claim for damages pursuant to the California 10 Disabled Persons Act,

, et seq.; (4) a claim for damages and injunctive relief 11 based on California Health and Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; (5) a claim for damages for negligence. 12 See generally Compl. On July 22, 2025, the Court ordered Mendoza to show cause as to why the 13 Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. ECF No. 11 (“OSC”). 14 Mendoza filed a response on August 5, 2025. Response, ECF No. 12 (“Resp.”). 15 II. Applicable Law 16 A. Supplemental Jurisdiction 17

“reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise 18 supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every 19 stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of 20 Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

(1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie- 21 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

(1988)). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction 22 over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 23 they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 24

(a). However, district courts have the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental 25 jurisdiction if: 26 (1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district 27 court has original jurisdiction; (3) The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 28 1 declining jurisdiction. 2

§ 1367(c). A district court declining supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the section 3 1367(c)(4)’s “exceptional circumstances” provision must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) the “district 4 court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 5 1367(c)(4)”; and (2) “in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction 6 . . . the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and 7 comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Vo v. Choi,

, 1171 (9th Cir. 8 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arroyo v. Rosas,

(9th Cir. 9 2021) (describing the inquiry)). 10 B. The ADA and Unruh Act 11 The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment 12 of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 13 accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 14 accommodation.”

(a). Only injunctive relief is available under the ADA. See 15 Wander v. Kaus,

(9th Cir. 2002). 16 The Unruh Act entitles all people within California, regardless of their disability “to the full 17 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 18 establishments of every kind whatsoever.”

(b). Under the Unruh Act, a violation 19 of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh Act. See id. § 51(f). And although the Unruh 20 Act also permits injunctive relief, unlike the ADA, it also allows for recovery of monetary damages. 21 It entitles plaintiffs to actual damages for each offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount 22 of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Id. § 52(a). “The litigant need not 23 prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski 24 v. M.J. Cable, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2007). 25 Under the Unruh Act, all persons in California, “no matter what their . . . disability . . . are 26 entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 27 business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”

(b). The Unruh Act and the 28 1 ADA go hand-in-hand—a violation of the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act. Vo, 49 2 F.4th at 1169 (citing Arroyo,

). However, unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for 3 recovery of monetary damages for every offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount of 4 actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000).”

(a). 5 Further, California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for lawsuits brought under 6 the Unruh Act. See

(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading standard 7 requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant case to file a 8 verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the specific 9 barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff 10 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See

§ 425.50(a). A “high-frequency litigant fee” of 11 $1,000 is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t 12 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints 13 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 14 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation” 15 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant 16 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing 17 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 18 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 19 is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 20 is a plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 21 high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 22 individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 23 individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 24 III. Discussion 25 In the Order to Show Cause, the Court ordered Mendoza to show cause in writing why the 26 Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim, California Disabled 27 Persons Act claim, California Health and Safety Code claim, and negligence claim. See

1367(c). Further, the Court ordered Mendoza to identify the amount of statutory damages he seeks to 1 recover and provide all facts necessary for the Court to determine if Mendoza and Mendoza’s 2 counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigants” as provided by California Code of Civil 3 Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). The Court finds Mendoza’s state law claims unsuitable for 4 supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). 5 A. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 6 claims. 7 In the OSC, the Court ordered Mendoza to “identify the amount of statutory damages” 8 sought under the Unruh Act and include declarations “providing all facts necessary” for the Court to 9 determine whether Mendoza and Mendoza’s counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency 10 litigant” as provided by California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). OSC at 2. 11 i. Mendoza qualifies as a high frequency litigant. 12 In the response to the Court’s OSC, Mendoza admits that he has filed more than ten 13 complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period 14 immediately preceding the instant complaint. ECF No. 12-2. Correspondingly, Mendoza’s counsel 15 conceded that their law firm “likely” qualifies as a high-frequency litigant but failed to provide any 16 facts from which the Court could determine whether Mendoza’s counsel satisfies the definition of a 17 high-frequency litigant under

(b)(2); see ECF No. 12-1. 18 Therefore, in state court, Mendoza would not only be obligated to pay the $1,000 high- 19 frequency litigant fee but would also be required to meet the heightened pleading standard and allege 20 specific facts relating to his claim. Although Mendoza alleges that he “is deterred from visiting the 21 Business,” he has not set forth the allegations required by the heightened pleading standard— 22 namely, he fails to disclose in his complaint that the complaint was filed by or on behalf of a high- 23 frequency litigant, state the number of construction-related accessibility complaints he filed within 24 the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint, or explain why he was in the geographic area of 25 the Business. See Compl. 26 The California legislature has determined that requiring Mendoza and other high frequency 27 litigants to meet this heightened pleading standard would serve California’s interest in preventing 28 1 therefore appropriate in view of the Gibbs values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to 2 litigants, and comity to decline supplemental jurisdiction so that Mendoza may comply with the 3 requirements and California’s interest in curtailing abuse can be vindicated. See United Mine 4 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

, 726–27 (1966). 5 ii. Mendoza’s state law claims predominate over the federal ADA claim. 6 Mendoza asserts five claims: one federal law claim and four state law claims. See generally 7 Compl. Of these four claims, Mendoza seeks damages and injunctive relief in connection with his 8 state law claims and, as prescribed by statute, only seeks an injunction in connection with his ADA 9 claim. See

10 A district court may dismiss state law claims without prejudice if a state law claim 11 “substantially predominates” over a federal claim “in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised 12 or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27. Indeed, the Unruh 13 Act entitles plaintiffs to a minimum award of $4,000 for each violation of the Act.

52(a). 15 The Court finds that Mendoza’s state law claims predominate over the federal law ADA 16 claim. Mendoza seeks “all appropriate damages, including but not limited to statutory damages, 17 general damages and treble damages in amounts, according to proof,” and as such, any potential 18 monetary damages awarded predominate over the injunctive relief sought on the ADA claim. 19 Compl. at Prayer. 20 iii. Given the comity concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit, exceptional 21 circumstances exist to justify declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 22 In the Ninth Circuit, to qualify as “exceptional circumstances” under section 1367(c)(4), the 23 circumstances at hand “should be ‘quite unusual’ and should not rest ‘solely’ on routinely occurring 24 conditions such as ‘docket congestion.’” Arroyo,

(quoting Ex. Software N. Am., Inc. 25 v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal.,

, 1558, 1560 n.15 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth 26 Circuit has held that in the context of joint ADA-Unruh Act claims, the specific legislative apparatus 27 surrounding the Unruh Act and the ADA meets the “exceptional circumstances” threshold. Vo, 49 28 1 F.4th at 1170 (citing Arroyo,

). Specifically, the California Legislature created the 2 Unruh Act to give plaintiffs seeking an injunction under the ADA the additional option of pursuing 3 monetary damages. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. The Unruh Act “relies dispositively on the ADA’s 4 substantive rules [and] expands the remedies available in a private action” to include monetary 5 damages.

. The California legislature became concerned that “high-frequency litigants 6 may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief for themselves without accompanying adjustments 7 to locations to assure accessibility to others.”

But rather than adjust the language of the statute, 8 the California Legislature opted to impose filing restrictions on potential litigants, making it “very 9 unattractive” for litigants seeking monetary relief to file joint ADA-Unruh Act claims in state court.” 10

at 1211–12. However, as these restrictions do not apply in federal court, they have been rendered 11 “largely toothless,” causing a “wholesale shifting of Unruh Act/ADA cases into the U.S. District 12 Court for the Central District of California.”

As the Ninth Circuit concluded, because this evasion 13 of the Legislature’s limitations would both be unfair to defendants and constitute “an affront to the 14 comity between federal and state courts,” it rises to the level of “exceptional circumstances” under 15 section 1367(c)(4). Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. The plaintiff asserts that “there is nothing unique in the 16 state court procedures that are not replicated in some fashion in the federal system,” Response at 10, 17 but the Ninth Circuit considered both systems and determined otherwise. See Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170- 18 1171. 19 Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously 20 discussed, Mendoza and/or his counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the 21 “unique configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and 22 the comity between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Mendoza’s 23 Unruh Act claim results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions. Id. 24 Moreover, as discussed above, Mendoza’s four state law claims predominate over the single 25 federal law claim. Thus, extending supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act would run afoul of 26 principles of federal-state comity. 27 iv. As this case is in its nascent stages, there are compelling reasons for declining 28 supplemental jurisdiction. l Given that the first prong is satisfied, this Court must proceed to the second prong and 2 | consider “what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 3 || underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” /d. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 4 | Arroyo,

). 5 This case is still in its early stages—the initial complaint was filed on May 21, 2025. 6 || Accordingly, Yo does not dictate that the Court retain jurisdiction. Compare id. at 1172 (concluding 7 | that because “[{t]he district court here declined supplemental jurisdiction over Vo’s Unruh Act claim 8 || well before it ruled on the merits of the ADA claim,” there is “no reason to hold that the district 9 | court abused its discretion in determining there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over 10 | the Unruh Act claim”), with Arroyo,

(“If the district court had declined 11 | supplemental jurisdiction over Arroyo’s Unruh Act claim at the outset of the litigation, it might then 12 | still have been possible to further California’s interest in cabining Unruh Act damages claims 13 | through the imposition of heightened pleading requirements and a substantial up-front filing fee.”). 14 Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mendoza’s 15 || state law claims. The Court therefore DISMISSES the Unruh Act claim, California Disabled Persons 16 | Act claim, the California Health and Safety Code, and the negligence claim WITHOUT 17 || PREJUDICE. 18 19 | ISSO ORDERED. f= 20 Dated: September 5, 2025 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28