1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 WONDERSHARE TECHNOLOGY Case No. 25-cv-07322-JSC GROUP CO., LTD., et al., 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE 9 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY v. RESTRAINING ORDER 10 SUPERACE SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY 11 CO., LTD, et al., Defendants. 12 13 On August 29, 2025, Wondershare Technology Group Co., Ltd. and Wondershare 14 Technology (Hunan) Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Wondershare”) sued Superace Software Technology 15 Co., Ltd. and Hongkong Superace Software Technology Co., Limited (collectively, “Superace”) 16 alleging “Superace has engaged in a campaign of false and misleading comparative advertising 17 designed to mislead consumers, discredit Wondershare’s products, and divert business 18 opportunities.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1.) On September 15, 2025, Wondershare moved for a temporary 19 restraining order (“TRO”). Wondershare seeks an ex parte TRO requiring Superace to (1) remove 20 false and misleading comparative advertising; (2) take reasonable steps to neutralize residual 21 dissemination of the statements; and (3) refrain from publishing further misleading statements. 22 (Dkt. No. 15 at 2.) Wondershare also seeks an ex parte TRO directing PayPal, Inc. to freeze 23 Superace’s accounts. (Id.) In addition, Wondershare asks the Court to authorize alternative 24 service of process. Having carefully considered the submissions, the Court DENIES without 25 prejudice Wondershare’s request to issue an ex parte TRO and DENIES without prejudice 26 Wondershare’s request to authorize alternative service of process. 27 I. EX PARTE TRO 1 dissemination of misleading claims, mitigate their lingering availability, and maintain the 2 availability of funds should Wondershare prevail. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 12-13.) The Court need not 3 address whether Wondershare is entitled to this injunctive relief because Wondershare has not 4 made the threshold showing that proceeding ex parte is appropriate. “[C]ourts have recognized a 5 very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant 6 would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n., Inc. v.

F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). Such cases include situations when 8 “an alleged infringer is likely to dispose of the infringing goods before the hearing.”

(citation 9 omitted). In this situation, the plaintiff “must show that defendants would have disregarded a 10 direct court order and disposed of the goods within the time it would take for a hearing . . . [and] 11 must support such assertions by showing that the adverse party has a history of disposing of 12 evidence or violating court orders or that persons similar to the adverse party have such a history.” 13

(citation omitted). 14 Wondershare has not made the requisite showing here. Wondershare merely offers the 15 general observation that “[p]roceeding ex parte is warranted where advance notice would likely 16 enable a defendant to frustrate the Court’s ability to grant effective relief, for example, by 17 removing or modifying online materials, destroying evidence, or dissipating assets.” (Dkt. No. 18 15-1 at 12.) But Wondershare does not assert that risk is present here. Nor does Wondershare 19 present evidence Superace previously violated court orders or disposed of evidence, as required by 20 Ninth Circuit precedent. To the contrary, in response to the demand letter Wondershare sent on 21 September 1, 2025, Superace responded it “has taken immediate action upon reading 22 [Wondershare’s] message, and the comparison webpage in question (along with any related 23 descriptions or promotional materials) has now been removed from all of our platforms.” (Dkt. 24 No. 16-2 at 4.) So, as the record now stands, Superace did not dispose of evidence but instead 25 took measures to address Wondershare’s concerns. Wondershare contends Superace’s response 26 was insufficient and its assurances false because Superace continues to host additional comparison 27 content. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 8.) This issue will be litigated in due course, but it does not justify the 1 Moreover, Wondershare’s concern that advance notice will enable Superace to destroy 2 evidence is belied by the fact that Wondershare already provided Superace notice of this litigation. 3 In the demand letter sent on September 1, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Superace of the 4 present lawsuit and the possibility of seeking emergency relief:

5 Pending Litigation. Please be advised that on August 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 6 District of California, Case No. 3:25-cv-7322, asserting claims under

(a) and related state law. Absent full compliance by 7 the Deadline, we will promptly seek emergency injunctive relief. 8 (Dkt. No. 16-1 at 5.) Wondershare responded to the demand letter on September 4, 2025. (Dkt. 9 No. 16-2 at 4.) Thus, since at least September 4, 2025, Wondershare has had the “advance notice” 10 Plaintiffs contend will “frustrate the Court’s ability to grant effective relief.” (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 11 12.) So, the Court DENIES without prejudice Wondershare’s request to issue an ex parte TRO. 12 II. SERVICE 13 The Court also DENIES without prejudice Wondershare’s request for alternative service 14 by electronic mail. The complaint alleges Defendant Superace Software is organized under the 15 laws of the People’s Republic of China with its principal place of business in China. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 16 8.) And Defendant Hong Kong Superace Software Technology is organized under the laws of the 17 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China with its principal 18 place of business in Hong Kong, China. (Id. ¶ 9.) “The United States and China are both parties 19 to the Hague Service Convention, a multilateral treaty whose purpose is to simplify, standardize, 20 and generally improve the process of serving documents abroad.” Facebook, Inc. v. 9 Xiu 21 Network (Shenzhen) Tech. Co.,

, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citation omitted). 22 Wondershare, citing Facebook, asserts “courts in this District have permitted email service 23 on Chinese defendants.” (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 24.) In fact, the Facebook court determined “under the 24 [Hague] Convention, service by e-mail on defendants in China [was] prohibited.” Id. at 988. The 25 court explained that because email service is not among the approved methods of service in the 26 Convention, to “permit service by e-mail would bypass the means of service set forth in 27 Convention.” Id. at 984. As Facebook did not “assert[] that an exception to the Hague Service 1 service by email. Jd. at 979, 988. 2 So, Wondershare’s legal authority does not support the relief it requests. And even though 3 district courts are split on whether email service on foreign defendants is permissible, see, e.g., 4 Permissibility of Effectuating Service of Process by Email Between Parties to Hague Convention 5 of Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 14 6 || A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 8 (2016), Wondershare does not provide any analysis or argument as to why 7 the decisions permitting email service correctly interpreted the Hague Service Convention, Federal 8 Rules of Civil Procedure, and binding authority. Nor does Wondershare argue any exception to 9 the Hague Convention applies in this case. Because Wondershare does not establish alternative 10 service of process is proper, the Court DENIES without prejudice its request to serve Superace by 11 email. 12 CONCLUSION 5 13 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES without prejudice Wondershare’s request 14 || to issue an ex parte TRO and DENIES without prejudice Wondershare’s request to authorize 3 15 alternative service by electronic mail. 16 This Order disposes of Docket No. 15. IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: September 15, 2025 19

CQWELINE SCOTT CORLEY, United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28