1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DEONTAE CHARLES FAISON BY AND Case No. 24-cv-06059-JSC THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM 8 THERESA FLORES, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 Plaintiff, SEPARATE JUDGMENT 10 v. Re: Dkt. No. 89

11 ALAMEDA COUNTY, et al., Defendants. 12

13 The Court granted Alameda County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave 14 to amend. (Dkt. No. 84.)1 Pending before the Court is Alameda County’s motion for entry of a 15 separate judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). (Dkt. No. 89.) Having carefully 16 considered the County’s motion, the Court determines oral argument is unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. 17 Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the October 2, 2025 hearing, and DENIES the motion. 18 BACKGROUND 19 The claims in the Second Amended Complaint arise out of the tasing of Plaintiff on April 20 5, 2024, and, in particular, an East Bay Regional Park District (“EBRPD”) officer tasing Plaintiff 21 while he was in a park lake. Plaintiff alleges Alameda County officers, along with EBRPD 22 officers, “watched DEONTAE yell for help and struggle in the frigid 50°F water for 23 approximately 40 minutes without rendering any aid.” (Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 50.) “After approximately 24 40 minutes without aid, DEONTAE drowned, went under the water, and floated 10 to 15 feet from 25 the opposite shoreline of the estuary.” (Id. ¶ 52.) Only then did County and EBRPD officers pull 26 27 1 him out of the water. (Id. ¶ 53.) Neither County nor EBRPD officers requested EMT or 2 Paramedic Services and “[i]t was not until after DEONTAE was in police custody and lay 3 unresponsive on the shore of the estuary that medical personnel were called.” (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) And 4 no officer communicated to medical personnel that he had been tased. (Id. ¶ 56.) While Plaintiff 5 lay “unresponsive, cold, and wet on the shore for approximately 15 minutes in police custody,” no 6 officer administered CPR. (Id. ¶ 57.) Plaintiff “has been in a coma and on life support ever 7 since.” (Id. ¶ 62.) 8 The Court granted the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to 9 amend on August 1, 2025. (Dkt. No. 84.) The case is proceeding against EBRPD and an EBRPD 10 officer. 11 DISCUSSION 12 I. Entry of Judgment 13 Generally, the United States Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from “final 14 decisions of the district courts.”

; see Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,

, 15 627 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he foundational rule [is] that generally we have jurisdiction to hear an 16 appeal only if it arises from a final order.”). Rule 54(b) is an “important exception.” Jewel, 810 17 F.3d at 627. Under the Rule, “[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or 18 when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 19 more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 20 The separate judgment rule has two requirements. First, the order adjudicating fewer than 21 all the claims in the case must be an “ultimate disposition,” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. 22 Co.,

(1980), and “sufficiently divisible from the other claims such that the case 23 would not inevitably come back to this court on the same set of facts,” Jewel,

24 (cleaned up). Second, there must be “no just reason for delay.”

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 54(b)). The second requirement considers both the parties’ interests and “judicial administrative 26 interests” to “assure that application of the Rule effectively preserves the historic federal policy 27 against piecemeal appeals.” Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC,

(9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned 1 risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are 2 outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some 3 claims or parties.” Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer,

(9th Cir. 1981). 4 The Court’s order is an ultimate disposition of Plaintiff’s claims against the County. But, 5 as to the second requirement, there are just reasons to wait until the entire case is resolved to enter 6 judgment. Specifically, judicial administration is an important reason to delay judgment and 7 appeal until the entire case is resolved. See Wood,

(“Duplication of proceedings 8 and overall delay in final disposition of the action implicate sound judicial administration.”). 9 Because Plaintiff’s claims against the County are based on the exact same factual situation as the 10 claims against the EBRPD defendants, appeal will only conserve judicial resources if the County 11 prevails on its appeal. That is not a sound basis for a Rule 54(b) judgment. See Tsyn v. Wells 12 Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 14-CV-02552-LB,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016). 13 And, even an affirmance may require the Ninth Circuit to hear two different appeals involving the 14 same facts. See Ursua v. Alameda Cnty. Med. Ctr., No. C 04-3006 BZ,

, at *1 15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (denying Rule 54(b) separate judgment when “[p]laintiffs’ claims 16 against all of the defendants arise out of the same event, and the nature of the claims is such that 17 an appellate court is likely to have to consider many of the same facts and issues if there are 18 multiple appeals”). 19 If the judgment in favor of the County is reversed, the Court will have to hold a second 20 jury trial with the exact same witnesses as the first trial against the EBRPD defendants. And, the 21 first trial, which is scheduled to occur well before any appeal on the County judgment can be 22 decided, may result in a second appeal—again on the same facts. Such a situation does not, at a 23 minimum, meet the second requirement for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b). See Wood, 422 24 F.3d at 878. 25 The County’s lament that if a separate judgment does not issue it will have to monitor the 26 underlying case does not make sense. Whether the Court grants separate judgment or not, the case 27 is scheduled to go to trial long before any appeal will be decided. So, the County will be in the 1 appeals. 2 CONCLUSION 3 “[D]enying Rule 54(b) certification hews to the strong judicial preference for unitary 4 appeals, for truly final judgments, and for the efficient use of judicial resources that the preference 5 embodies.” Tsyn v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 14-CV-02552-LB,

, at *4 6 || (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016). So, the County’s motion for a Rule 54(b) separate judgment is 7 || DENIED. 8 This Order disposes of Docket No. 89. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: September 24, 2025 , ne 11 AC@UELINE SCOTT CORLE 12 United States District Judge

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