Martinez v. WinCo Holdings, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MIA MARTINEZ, Case No. 1:25-cv-00935-JLT-SAB Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CASE 13 SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED FOR v. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 14 JURISDICTION WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Defendants.

17 On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff, a California citizen, initiated this action in Fresno County Superior Court against Defendants WinCo Holdings, Inc. (“WinCo”); Kwasi Addo-Boateng, an alleged citizen of California; and Odell Hill, an alleged citizen of California. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6- 14.) On July 30, 2025, WinCo removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.

21 (ECF No. 1.) In its notice of removal, Defendant WinCo alleges it is an Idaho corporation with its principal place of business in Boise, Idaho. (Id. at 3.) WinCo further alleges that individual defendants Addo-Boateng and Hill, both California residents, should be disregarded because they are sham defendants and cannot be found liable as a matter of law. (Id. at 4.)

25 On August 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleging a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Addo-Boateng and Hill, with additional factual allegations than those contained in the original complaint. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 6-14.) The FAC fails to provide a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(1). It does not appear that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action because no federal question is alleged, and Plaintiff and Defendants are not completely diverse. See also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting federal courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter jurisdiction”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

7 On August 20, 2025, Defendant WinCo filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. (ECF No. 6.)

8 The arguments presented at the time of removal related to fraudulent joinder in the original complaint are not contained within the motion to dismiss. Upon a cursory review of the motion, Defendant WinCo moves for dismissal with prejudice on behalf of non-appearing defendants Addo-Boateng and Hill under Rule 12(b)(6) but does not address fraudulent joinder at the time the action was removed. Defendant re-asserts that Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations that could plausibly constitute extreme and outrageous conduct by either Addo- Boateng or Hill; neither can be individually liable for IIED under the doctrine of managerial privilege; and Plaintiff’s IIED claim is preempted by the Worker’s Compensation Act. (Id. at 14-18.)

17 “The test for fraudulent joinder and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are not equivalent. A claim against a defendant may fail under Rule 12(b)(6), but that defendant has not necessarily been fraudulently joined.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 20 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2018); see also McGrann v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00701 TLN KJN, 2016 WL 6205596, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (noting that “a defendant is not fraudulently joined simply because the action is likely to be dismissed against the defendant.

23 Rather, it requires the removing party to prove that there is absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court, or that there has been outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleadings of jurisdictional facts.”). “[I]f there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the (citation and quotation omitted). Further, in cases “in which defendants have argued that a supervisor's alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to support an [IIED] claim, district courts applying the fraudulent joinder standard have generally found a non-fanciful possibility of liability, even where plaintiff's claim appeared ‘relatively weak.’ ” Barsell v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. CV 09-02604 MMM (RZx), 2009 WL 1916495, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2009) (quotation and citation omitted). Courts have also remanded actions where the complaint failed to allege outrageous conduct because it was possible that the plaintiff could cure the deficiency by amendment. See Madayag v. McLane/Suneast, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-1082 AWI SAB, 2017 WL 9 30014, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017) (collecting cases).

10 Before the Court makes any determination related to the merits of the motion to dismiss of the FAC, the Court must first have subject matter jurisdiction, which requires a finding that the individual California resident defendants are fraudulently joined. The Court shall therefore order that Defendant separately show cause why this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. The Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to respond. The parties are directed to address whether the Court looks to Plaintiff’s original complaint at the time of removal or a subsequently filed amended complaint to determine whether the individual defendants are fraudulently joined.

17 Additionally, Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss was due by September 3, 2025. L.R. 230(c). That deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed any response. The Local Rules provides that a party who fails to file a timely opposition is not entitled to be heard in opposition to the motion at oral argument. L.R. 230(c). Plaintiff is advised that any opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be disregarded if it is not filed with a supporting application for leave to file a late opposition.

23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 24 1. Defendant shall show cause in writing on or before September 12, 2025, why this 25 action should not be remanded to Fresno County Superior Court for lack of 26 subject matter jurisdiction; and / / / 1 2. Plaintiff SHALL file a response limited to addressing this Court’s subject matter 2 jurisdiction and Defendant’s response to this order to show cause on or before 3 September 19, 2025.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee | Dated: _ September 5, 2025 STANLEY A. BOONE 7 United States Magistrate Judge