1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 GREGORY RITTENHOUSE and LINDA No. 2:23-cv-1906 WBS DB GAGE, individually and on behalf 13 of all others similarly situated, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT RYAN PAMPLIN’S 15 MOTION TO DISMISS THE THIRD v. AMENDED COMPLAINT 16 BLENDJET INC., RYAN PAMPLIN, 17 MAVORCO HOLDINGS LLC, MAVORCO IP, LLC, and MAVORCO OPERATIONS, 18 LLC, 19 Defendants. 20 21 ----oo0oo---- 22 Plaintiffs Gregory Rittenhouse and Linda Gage brought 23 this putative class action against defendants BlendJet Inc., Ryan 24 Pamplin, Mavorco IP, LLC, and Mavorco Operations, LLC, alleging 25 several violations of law in connection with purportedly 26 defective blenders. (See Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) (Docket No. 27 77) ¶¶ 153-222.) Defendant Ryan Pamplin, chief executive officer 28 1 and co-founder of BlendJet, moves to dismiss the following 2 against him in his individual capacity: Count II alleging 3 violation of New York General Business Law § 349, Count III 4 alleging violation of New York General Business Law § 350, Count 5 IV alleging violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and 6 Deceptive Business Practices Act, and Count VI alleging 7 fraudulent omission. (See Docket No. 80 at 3-4.)1 8 I. Discussion 9 Generally, there are two avenues open to a plaintiff 10 seeking to hold a corporate officer personally liable: the 11 doctrine known as “piercing the corporate veil,” and liability 12 based on the officer’s tortious conduct. See Harrison v. 13 Portfolio Grp. Mgmt., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-1104 MCE KJN,

2550991, at *3-5 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2021) (“Courts may also find 15 a corporate officer or director personally liable for their own 16 tortious conduct and this liability does not depend on the same 17 grounds as piercing the corporate veil, but rather on the officer 18 or director’s personal participation or specific authorization of 19 the tortious act.” (citation modified)). Plaintiffs do not 20 advance a veil-piercing theory; as in their Second Amended 21 Complaint, they allege Pamplin is personally liable for the 22 common law tort of fraud. (See TAC ¶ 131.) 23 Plaintiffs are now on their third attempt to keep 24 Pamplin in this lawsuit. This court partially dismissed the 25

1 Pamplin also requests judicial notice of consumer 26 reports cited in the Third Amended Complaint. (See Docket No. 27 80-2 at 2-3.) Because these reports would not change the outcome of this motion, the court need not consider them. The request is 28 therefore DENIED. 1 Second Amended Complaint because plaintiffs’ fraud claims were 2 insufficiently specific under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 9(b). (See Docket No. 72 at 3-5.) Plaintiffs were given leave 4 to amend and timely submitted a Third Amended Complaint. (Docket 5 No. 77.) The Third Amended Complaint largely reiterates the 6 allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, with the exceptions 7 of three purportedly fraudulent media appearances by Pamplin. 8 (See TAC ¶¶ 61-65.) 9 A. Pleading Fraud Under Rule 9(b) 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that 11 fraud claims be pled with specificity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 12 This standard applies equally to claims where fraud is not an 13 essential element, if the underlying claim is grounded in fraud. 14 See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.,

(9th Cir. 15 2009).2 Plaintiffs allege Pamplin had personal knowledge of 16 product defects which he wrongfully concealed from consumers. 17 (See TAC ¶¶ 132-44.) These allegations are grounded in fraud and 18 their circumstances must be specified. See Marolda v. Symantec 19 Corp.,

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (under Rule 20 9(b), “some form of factual basis for plaintiff’s beliefs must . 21 . . be asserted.”). 22 Omission-based fraud claims, such as those sought to be 23

24 2 Rule 9(b) also applies to the state law claims here. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 25 state law is relevant for establishing the elements of a fraud cause of action, but the Rule 9(b) standard still applies when 26 pleading “the circumstances of the fraud,” for which 27 particularity is “a federally imposed rule.”

, 1103 (citing Hayduk v. Lanna,

(1st Cir. 1985) 28 (emphasis in original)). 1 stated here, can succeed without the same specificity as those of 2 typical fraud, but some particularity is still required. See 3 Eisen v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc.,

, at *2- 4 3 (C.D. Cal 2012) (citing Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.,

(9th Cir. 2009)). A claim of omission-based fraud 6 must also, as the court previously explained, allege a “fiduciary 7 relationship,” “exclusive knowledge” of the supposed defects, 8 “active concealment,” or “misleading partial representations.” 9 (See Docket No. 72 at 4.) 10 This court’s analysis of a defective omission-based 11 claim under Rule 9(b) in Shanmugam v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. 12 See No. 2:20-cv-1647 WBS KJN,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 13 June 2, 2022) is helpful in determining the sufficiency of 14 plaintiff’s claims here. There, the plaintiffs did not indicate 15 how the defendant became aware of a defect, when the defendant 16 became aware, what exactly they were aware of, whether they had 17 exclusive knowledge of the defect, or how the defect was 18 concealed. See

As a result, this court dismissed the 19 plaintiffs’ fraudulent omission claim. See id. at *4; see also 20 Loughlin v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., No. 2:21-cv-539 WBS AC,

5204147, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2021) (dismissing claim for 22 fraudulent concealment because “plaintiff does not allege that 23 defendants were aware the substances were injuring her and 24 concealed that information” with requisite specificity (citation 25 modified)). 26 The Third Amended Complaint here -- much like the 27 Second Amended Complaint –- suffers from the defects identified 28 in Shanmugam: the complaint still does not specify how Pamplin 1 became aware of a defect, when he was aware, what exactly he 2 knew, whether his knowledge was exclusive, and how specifically 3 he concealed his knowledge. (See Docket No. 72 at 4-5 4 (“Plaintiffs still falter in answering the crucial question of 5 ‘what, when,’ or ‘how’ Pamplin defrauded or even just misled 6 plaintiffs.” (citation modified)).) The assertions of Pamplin’s 7 personal knowledge and fraudulent omission are still factually 8 unsupported and remain conclusory. 9 Rule 9(b) provides that knowledge may be “alleged 10 generally,” but “such allegations still require sufficient 11 factual support.” See Suit v. City of Folsom, No. 2:16-cv-807 12 WBS AC,

, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016). The 13 Third Amended Complaint asserts Pamplin knew of the defect as of 14 August 8, 2022, because of reports to the Consumer Product Safety 15 Commission (“CPSC”). (See TAC ¶¶ 6-7, 40-44, 60, 65, 216.) But 16 the mere existence of a report does not imply personal knowledge. 17 See Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp.,

, 974-75 & 18 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Random anecdotal examples of disgruntled 19 customers posting their views on websites is not enough to impute 20 knowledge.” (citation modified)), aff’d,

, 493 21 (2009). 22 Plaintiffs’ addition of a date goes to the “when” of 23 fraud, but the “how” and “what” remain unaddressed. Pamplin’s 24 supposed awareness is grounded on the assumption that he “would 25 obviously get these complaints as the head of marketing and 26 customer relationship practices,” but again no facts support this 27 conclusion. (See Docket No. 84 at 8.) 28 During oral argument, plaintiffs referred to paragraph 1 seventy-four (74) of their complaint, which states, “[d]efendant 2 BlendJet, Inc. admitted to a policy and practice of deleting 3 negative reviews from their website.” (TAC ¶¶ 74.) But it is 4 still not alleged that Pamplin himself was involved with or even 5 aware of this policy; plaintiffs allege his participation “upon 6 information and belief” without elaborating. (Id.) This is 7 precisely the sort of conjecture the heightened pleading standard 8 of Rule 9(b) is designed to preclude. See United States v. 9 Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc.,

, 1246 & 10 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2019); see also Goldberg v. Meridor,

(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (under Rule 9(b), “allegations based 12 on information and belief require the source of the information 13 and the reasons upon which the belief is founded.” (citation 14 modified)). 15 The Third Amended Complaint tries to right the ship by 16 adding that “Pamplin was personally aware of the CPSC complaints, 17 as he had personal responsibility under the Consumer Product 18 Safety Act (“CPSA”) to report dangers to the CPSC or be liable.” 19 (TAC ¶ 41 (citation modified).) But this is circular; plaintiffs 20 confuse a statutory duty with the factual predicate for that 21 duty. The CPSA’s reporting obligation applies when an entity 22 “obtains information which reasonably supports the conclusion” 23 that a product is defective. See

(b); see also 24 U.S. v. Mirama Enterprises, Inc.,

, 1158 25 (S.D. Cal 2002) (“Companies should report as soon as they have 26 information which ‘reasonably supports’ the conclusion that the 27 product contains a reportable defect . . .”). Acquisition of 28 information triggers the duty to report, not the other way 1 around. Once again, it is nowhere alleged when and how Pamplin 2 acquired such information. 3 Owing to the persistent lack of specificity, plaintiffs 4 have again failed to plead fraud as required by Rule 9(b). 5 B. New Allegations of Additional Representations 6 The Third Amended Complaint includes new allegedly 7 misleading partial representations. (See TAC ¶¶ 61-64.) The 8 first is a press release in which Pamplin celebrates a 9 partnership with Venus Williams while promoting his product as 10 “the perfect way to ace your nutrition goals and unleash your 11 inner champion.” (Id. ¶ 61.) The second is a YouTube video in 12 which Pamplin advertises the product’s “really nice design, 13 really nice quality” and praises “the incredible engineering 14 talent” behind it. (Id. ¶ 63.) The third is yet another 15 promotional video in which Pamplin “touts BlendJet and its 16 relationship with Shopify.” (Id. ¶ 64 (citation modified).) 17 These statements do not provide a basis for fraud 18 claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Generalized, vague and 19 unspecific assertions, constituting mere puffery upon which a 20 reasonable consumer could not rely” are not actionable as fraud. 21 Glen Holly Ent., Inc. v. Tektronix Inc.,

, 379-80 22 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Pamplin’s promotional 23 statements constitute puffery, as they relate broadly to product 24 quality and commercial partnerships. This sort of generic brand 25 endorsement does not reasonably induce consumer reliance and is 26 outside the purview of fraud. See id. 27 Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the particularity 28 requirements of Rule 9(b), and their new allegations fail to 1 support a fraud claim. Accordingly, Pamplin’s motion to dismiss 2 will be granted. 3 II. Leave to Amend 4 Leave to amend should be granted “freely when justice 5 so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (citation modified). 6 Leave should only be denied if amendment (1) would cause 7 prejudice to the opposing party, (2) is sought in bad faith, (3) 8 would create undue delay, or (4) is futile. Chudacoff v. Univ. 9 Med. Ctr. of S. Nev.,

, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). An 10 amendment is futile when “no set of facts can be proved under the 11 amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and 12 sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845

(9th Cir. 1988). 14 Plaintiffs have now taken their third bite at the 15 apple. The Third Amended Complaint builds on the Second with 16 allegations of Pamplin’s responsibility under the CPSC and his 17 purported fraudulent omission in his promotional advertising. 18 Both are unproductive. 19 These new allegations follow an admonition that the 20 Second Amended Complaint lacked particularity. (See Docket No. 21 72 at 3-5.) Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to cure that 22 problem, and they have not. If plaintiffs had factual 23 confirmation of their allegations, they should have included it 24 in their amendment. Failing that, it appears no allegation of 25 other facts can cure the deficiency. 26 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Pamplin’s motion to 27 dismiss (Docket No. 80) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 28 Counts II, III, IV, and VI are DISMISSED with prejudice as to III ROSIN IGE IE ISDE. OGIO IOI IORI IIS IIR II IIE IID □□□ SEI ERE

1 defendant Ryan Pamplin. - 2 Dated: September 4, 2025 Pi he Vi (eh 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28