1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JORGE RIVERA LARIOS, Case No. 25-cv-08799-AMO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 9 v. INJUNCTION

10 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 5 Defendants. 11

12 13 Before the Court is Petitioner Jorge Rivera Larios’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On 14 October 14, 2025, Rivera Larios filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and on October 15, he 15 filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against San Francisco Field Office 16 Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Sergio Albarran, Secretary of the 17 Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela 18 Bondi (“Respondents” or the “Government”). Dkt. Nos. 1, 5. Petitioner asked this Court to 19 (1) order his immediate release from Respondents’ custody pending these proceedings, and 20 (2) enjoin Respondents from transferring him out of this District or deporting him during the 21 pendency of the underlying proceedings. See Notice of Mot., Dkt. No. 5. On the same day 22 Petitioner filed his motion, Defendants submitted an opposition. Dkt. No. 6. The Court granted 23 Rivera Larios’s motion, issued a TRO, and ordered Respondents to show cause why a preliminary 24 injunction should not issue. Dkt. No. 7. Respondents released Rivera Larios pursuant to the 25 Court’s order. Dkt. No. 9. Since then, Respondents submitted a brief opposing a preliminary 26 injunction, Dkt. No. 14, and Rivera Larios submitted a reply brief along with further evidence, 27 Dkt. No. 15. The Court held a hearing regarding Petitioner’s request for preliminary injunctive 1 briefs regarding the Government’s contention that Title

(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips this 2 Court of jurisdiction to consider some of Petitioner’s arguments, which they submitted on October 3 30, 2025. See Dkt. Nos. 20, 21. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their 4 arguments therein and those made at the hearing, as well as the relevant legal authority, and good 5 cause appearing, the Court hereby GRANTS Rivera Larios’s motion for a preliminary injunction 6 for the following reasons. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 Rivera Larios is a native of Mexico. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Pet.”) ¶¶ 12, 16. ICE records 9 indicate that Petitioner first entered the United States unlawfully in 2005 and was removed 10 pursuant to an expedited removal order. See Dkt. No. 6-1, Helland Decl. ¶ 2. He reentered 11 unlawfully again in 2005 and 2007 and was again removed under expedited removal orders both 12 times. See

He again reentered unlawfully in 2014 and 2016, and on both occasions the 13 government reinstated his prior order of removal and removed him to Mexico. See

14 Rivera Larios last entered the United States in 2017 fleeing the Sinaloa Cartel. Rivera 15 Larios Decl. ¶ 3; see also Pet. ¶ 16. Cartel members beat him, threw him out of a moving vehicle 16 on a highway, and left him for dead.

In October 2021, Petitioner claimed a fear of torture if he 17 were returned to Mexico. See Pet. ¶ 17. An asylum officer determined that he had a reasonable 18 fear and referred his claim to the immigration court. See

Rivera Larios applied for 19 withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) in 20 immigration court. Shugall Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13, 16; Dkt. No. 14 at 3-4. 21 On September 29, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained 22 Petitioner and reinstated his previous order of removal. Ramirez Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. 3. On January 23 28, 2022, DHS released Rivera Larios on an order of supervision. Ramirez Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. 2; see 24 also Helland Decl., Ex. A. One of the conditions of that order was that Rivera Larios not commit 25 any crimes. See Helland Decl., Ex. A. 26 Rivera Larios was the victim of two violent crimes in the United States, one in 2018 and 27 another in 2020. Rivera Larios Decl. ¶ 8. The 2018 attack is the basis of his application for U- 1 (“USCIS”). Dkt. No. 5-4 ¶ 12; Shugall Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C. USCIS received Rivera Larios’s 2 application on July 31, 2023, while he was out of custody. Shugall Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C. Rivera 3 Larios also pursued his application for withholding of removal and deferral of removal under CAT 4 while on the order of supervision. Shugall Decl. ¶¶ 11, 12. In 2023, Rivera Larios applied for a 5 non-immigrant U-visa based on suffering a criminal attack in the United States and subsequently 6 cooperating with law enforcement. See

. In January 2025, Rivera Larios’s withholding- 7 only proceedings were administratively closed due to his pending U-visa application. See

8 Rivera Larios met his wife, Phylis Rivera Larios, in 2017 and they married in 2022. 9 Rivera Larios Decl. ¶ 4. Rivera Larios’s wife has been physically and emotionally abusive to him 10 on and off since approximately November 2020.

. She struggles with alcoholism and is 11 abusive to Rivera Larios when she drinks.

Rivera Larios eventually learned during an 12 argument with his wife that she was behind both attacks against him in the United States.

. 13 Although Rivera Larios had been advised by a neighbor that calling the police could lead 14 to his arrest rather than hers, Rivera Larios called the Lake County Sheriff’s Office in August 15 2025 on an occasion when his wife was behaving violently toward him. Rivera Larios Decl. ¶ 9. 16 Although Rivera Larios was the one to call for help and did not engage in any harm against his 17 wife, officers detained him.

. He was released approximately one day later with a 18 Detention Certificate from the Lake County Sheriff’s Office showing that he was detained, not 19 arrested, and no charges were being filed. Shugall Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B. The Detention Certificate 20 identifies Rivera Larios as a detainee and quotes California Penal Code section 849.5, stating, “In 21 any case in which a person is arrested and released and no accusatory pleading is filed charging 22 him with an offense, any record of arrest of the person shall include a record of release. 23 Thereafter, the arrest shall not be deemed an arrest, but a detention only.”

(Dkt. No. 15-1 at 24 10). 25 On October 14, 2025, Rivera Larios attended a check-in appointment at the ICE Field 26 Office in San Francisco. See Pet. ¶ 22. The ICE Field Office Director determined that Petitioner’s 27 August 2025 contact with the Lake County Sheriff’s Office evidenced a violation of his conditions 1 Rivera Larios filed this habeas petition on October 14 and moved for a TRO on October 2 15. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 5. Respondents filed an opposition to the motion for temporary restraining 3 order approximately one hour after Petitioner filed his motion. See Dkt. No. 6. The Court granted 4 Petitioner’s request for a TRO as modified just after midnight on October 16 and ordered 5 Petitioner’s release. See Dkt. No. 7. Respondents confirmed that Petitioner was released at 6 approximately 7:00 a.m. that morning. See Dkt. No. 9. 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 Rivera Larios seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent Respondents from re-detaining him 9 absent notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before an Immigration Judge to evaluate whether his 10 re-detention is warranted. Before reaching the merits of the motion for preliminary injunction, the 11 Court considers Respondents’ argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review aspects of the 12 habeas petition. 13 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 14 Respondents assert that the ICE officer’s determination that Rivera Larios violated the 15 terms of his release is unreviewable under Title

(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Dkt. No. 21. 16 The statute provides that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review “any other decision or action of 17 the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified 18 under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 19 Security.”

(a)(2)(B)(ii). Respondents argue that Congress gave the agency 20 authority over detention of noncitizens subject to final removal orders, directed the agency to 21 promulgate regulations, and therefore, any discretionary determination under

(l) is 22 unreviewable pursuant to Title

(a)(2)(B)(ii). Dkt. No. 21. The Court finds two 23 bases to reject Respondents’ argument, which it explains in turn. 24 First, Respondents’ argument directly contravenes Supreme Court authority considering 25 judicial review of a discretionary agency decision under a regulation. See Kucana v. Holder, 558

, 237 (2010) (“We hold that the key words ‘specified under this subchapter’ refer to 27 statutory, but not to regulatory, specifications.”). In Kucana, the Supreme Court considered 1 proceedings, where the agency’s regulation declares that a decision to grant a motion to reopen is 2 within that agency’s discretion. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 239 (citing

(a) (2009)). 3 Considering the same statute that Respondents assert strips the district court of jurisdiction here, 4 Title

(a)(2)(B)(ii), the Court held that federal courts retained authority to review 5 and stated in part, “[i]f Congress wanted the jurisdictional bar to encompass decisions specified as 6 discretionary by regulation along with those made discretionary by statute, moreover, Congress 7 could easily have said so.” Kucana, 558 U.S. at 248.1 8 As Respondents emphasize here, Congress afforded the Executive Branch the authority to 9 issue regulations regarding release of a noncitizen after the 90-day removal period. 8 U.S.C. 10 § 1231(a)(3). DHS promulgated such regulations at

, wherein subsection (l) sets 11 forth procedures for the revocation of release. Thus, as in the context raised in Kucana, a decision 12 by the administrative agency to exercise discretion under a regulation, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 13 § 241.4(l), is not a decision “under this title” and is therefore reviewable notwithstanding Title 14

(a)(2)(B)(ii). 15 Second, Respondents aver that an ICE decision to revoke release under

(l) 16 is a pure factual determination that the district court cannot review under Section 17 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). See Dkt. No. 21 at 3-4. In a relatively recent case, the Ninth Circuit considered 18 what types of inquiries are questions of fact, which are left to agency discretion where 19 congressionally conferred, what types of inquiries are mixed questions of law and fact, which 20 require the application of a statutory standard to a given set of facts, and what types of inquiries 21 1 The Supreme Court further warned against the Executive’s broad assertion of discretionary 22 authority to shield its conduct from judicial review, stating,

23 To read § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to apply to matters where discretion is conferred on the Board by regulation, rather than on the Attorney 24 General by statute, would ignore that congressional design. If the Seventh Circuit’s construction of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) were to prevail, 25 the Executive would have a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-of-discretion appellate court review simply by issuing a 26 regulation declaring those decisions ‘discretionary.’ Such an extraordinary delegation of authority cannot be extracted from the 27 statute Congress enacted. 1 are pure questions of law. Martinez v. Clark,

(9th Cir. 2024). The Ninth 2 Circuit noted that “underlying factual determinations” that remain unreviewable by federal courts 3 include, for example, “credibility, the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, or the 4 level of financial support a noncitizen currently provides.”

at 783 (quoting Wilkinson v. 5 Garland,

(2024)). On the other hand, courts may review mixed questions of 6 law and fact such as those involving “[t]he application of a statutory legal standard (like the 7 exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard) to an established set of facts.” Wilkinson, 8

. 9 Respondents here contend that ICE’s determination that Rivera Larios committed a crime 10 and therefore violated the conditions of his release is a “pure factual determination.” Dkt. No 21 11 at 3. Not so. The question of whether Rivera Larios committed a crime and thus violated the 12 conditions of his release is a mixed question of law and fact that requires the application of some 13 standard to a set of facts. This is not a purely factual determination as Respondents aver, as it does 14 not require merely an assessment of accuracy or credibility. Rather, it requires the identification 15 of a standard, here a criminal statute, and its application to a set of facts. The Court finds that 16 whether Rivera Larios committed a crime – and thus violated the terms of his supervised release – 17 presents a mixed question of law and fact, and Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not put the question 18 beyond the reach of this Court. 19 B. Preliminary Injunction 20 1. Legal Standard 21 To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of 22 success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of 23 preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in the favor of the moving party, and (4) an 24 injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

, 20 25 (2008). Where the government is a party, courts merge the analysis of the final two Winter 26 factors, the balance of equities and the public interest. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell,

1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder,

(2009)). Courts “explore the 1 v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan,

(1991) (internal 2 quotation marks and citation omitted). The Winter factors may be evaluated on a sliding scale, 3 such that preliminary relief may be issued when the moving party demonstrates “that serious 4 questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the 5 plaintiff’s favor.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011) 6 (citation omitted). To grant preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find that “a certain 7 threshold showing [has been] made on each factor.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder,

, 966 8 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 9 2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 10 Rivera Larios brings his habeas petition on two bases: for violation of Title 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1231 and for violation of the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment. See Dkt. No. 1. 12 The Court takes up the likelihood of success on both claims in turn. 13 a. Violation of Title

14 Rivera Larios first claims that his re-detention outside of the 90-day removal period 15 violates Title

(a)(2) and (6). See Pet. ¶¶ 31-34. The detention of a noncitizen 16 following reinstatement of a prior order of removal is governed by Title

(a). See 17 Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,

(2021). Section 1231(a)(2) provides that the 18 government “shall detain” the noncitizen for a 90-day “removal period,” the commencement of 19 which can be triggered by various events in the noncitizen’s proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1231(a)(1)(B). “If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the 21 alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the 22 Attorney General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3). And, “if released,” the noncitizen “shall be subject to the 23 terms of supervision in paragraph (3).” Id. § 1231(a)(6). Section 1231(a)(3) allows the 24 Government to promulgate regulations for the supervision of releasees. The applicable regulations 25 provide that DHS may release a noncitizen under certain conditions and may revoke the 26 noncitizen’s release when those conditions are violated. See generally

. Unless 27 an individual violates the terms of their supervision following release upon expiration of the 90- 1 statutory or regulatory basis for DHS to take someone back into custody. See also Zadvydas v. 2 Davis,

(2001) (identifying risk of flight and danger to the community as the 3 statutory purposes of civil immigration detention). 4 Respondents assert here that Rivera Larios violated the terms of his release by committing 5 a crime as demonstrated by his arrest by Lake County Sheriff’s Office in August 2025. See Dkt. 6 No. 14 at 19. Respondents’ reasoning can be distilled to this excerpt from their brief: “[f]aced 7 with the evidence of Petitioner’s arrest for a domestic violence offense, and no evidence that 8 Petitioner did not commit such an offense, ICE reasonably determined that Petitioner violated the 9 conditions of his release.” Dkt. No. 14 at 19. Respondents made this assertion based solely on 10 Rivera Larios’s disclosure of his contact with law enforcement during his ICE check-in with 11 Deportation Officer Jennifer Ramirez and in the absence of any corroborating facts. Ramirez 12 Decl., Exs. 4-5. Respondents fail to point to any authority in support of the premise that a 13 releasee’s disclosure of an arrest constitutes a factual basis showing commission of a crime. 14 In their opposition brief and at the hearing, Respondents tried to bolster the basis of ICE’s 15 re-detention determination by pointing to the FBI rap sheet detailing Rivera Larios’s criminal 16 history for its entry related to the events of August 17, 2025. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 14 at 19. The 17 report itself does not present factual or legal support for the premise that Rivera Larios committed 18 a crime; instead, it identifies a criminal statute, “INFL CRPL INJ: SPOUSE/COHAB/DATE 19 (273.5(A) PC),” and it includes the following comments: “RELEASED/DETENTION ONLY” 20 and “ARREST/DETAINED/CITED.” Ramirez Decl., Ex. 6 (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 40). Such 21 imprecise references to law enforcement contact do not constitute factual support that Rivera 22 Larios committed a crime. Even still, Respondents cannot claim to have relied on the FBI report 23 as factual support for re-detaining Rivera Larios on October 14 when the report is dated October 24 15. See Ramirez Decl., Ex. 6. More importantly, Respondents’ assertion that Rivera Larios’s 25 arrest demonstrated commission of a crime is severely weakened by the evidence submitted by 26 Petitioner – the certificate of Rivera Larios’s detention makes clear that he was not arrested and 27 instead merely detained. Shugall Decl., Ex. B. 1 Respondents do not identify an applicable standard of review for their determination that 2 Rivera Larios violated the conditions of his release and instead urge without basis that a standard 3 of “reasonableness” applies. See Dkt. No. 14 at 13 (“DHS reasonably determined that Petitioner 4 had violated his conditions of release.”). As Respondents describe, in revocation hearings in the 5 criminal context, decisions are made based on a weighing of the evidence, involve application of 6 the preponderance of the evidence standard and, allow for review, albeit under an abuse of 7 discretion standard. Dkt. No. 14 at 12-13. Similar protections were not provided in Rivera 8 Larios’s “informal interview.” No matter the standard of review applicable, it is difficult to 9 conceive how Respondents’ decision to re-detain Rivera Larios – in the absence of any factual 10 support establishing that he committed a crime – comports with the statutory and regulatory 11 scheme for his release. 12 Rivera Larios attests that he called the sheriff in August of 2025 because his wife had 13 become violent. Rivera Larios Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. Rivera Larios sought protection from authorities, 14 and officers instead took him into custody.

Subsequently, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office 15 issued a “Detention Certificate” to Rivera Larios, corroborating that he was neither arrested nor 16 charged with criminal conduct. Shugall Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B. In light of this evidence, as well as the 17 lack of evidence showing commission of a crime, Rivera Larios has not violated the terms of his 18 supervision, and Respondents lack legal or factual support to re-detain him even under an abuse of 19 discretion standard. Thus, Respondents’ actions contravene Title

(a)(6) and 20

(l). 21 Unless a noncitizen violates the terms of their supervision following release upon 22 expiration of the 90-day removal period pursuant to Title

(a)(6) and 8 C.F.R. 23 § 241.4(l), there is no statutory or regulatory basis for the government to take the noncitizen back 24 into custody. Therefore, Rivera Larios has demonstrated a likelihood of success on his claim that 25 Respondents’ efforts to re-detain him in the absence of evidence that he committed a crime violate 26 Title

and

(l). 27 // 1 b. Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 2 Petitioner further asserts that his re-detention violates his right to due process. Under the 3 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no person shall be 4 “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The 5 Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in deportation proceedings.” Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 6

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Campos-Sanchez v. I.N.S.,

(9th Cir. 7 1999), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Arizmendi-Medina v. Garland,

1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2023)). In deciding what procedural process is due, the court considers well- 9 trodden factors set forth by the Supreme Court: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the 10 official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 11 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and 12 (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 13 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. 14 Eldridge,

(1976). 15 At the outset, Respondents question the application of Mathews in this case, given “the 16 unique constitutional treatment of detained aliens.” Dkt. No. 14 at 15 (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v. 17 Garland,

, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022)). Despite this glancing contention, Respondents 18 avoid citing any case in which a court avoided applying Mathews in the immigration context, and 19 to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit and its sister circuits have consistently applied the Mathews test 20 to due process challenges like this, where the non-citizen has entered and been residing in the 21 United States. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1206-07 (collecting cases). This Court follows 22 that reasoning and will apply the Mathews three-prong test to assess the propriety of ordering a 23 hearing before a neutral arbiter before an individual is deprived of his liberty. See also Pinchi v. 24 Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (applying 25 Mathews); Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser,

, at *4 (same); Rodriguez Rodriguez v. 26 Kaiser, 1:25-cv-1111-KES-SAB,

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025) (same). 27 Here, the Mathews factors weigh heavily in favor of affording Rivera Larios further due process: 1 without a pre-detention hearing is great in light of the questions about whether respondents have a 2 reasonable basis to find he violated the terms of his release; and the Government’s interest in 3 detention without a hearing is low in light of the fact that Rivera Larios has complied with his 4 supervision requirements for several years. 5 i. Liberty Interest 6 “Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other forms of 7 physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty that the [due process clause] protects.” 8 Zadvydas,

. Therefore, individuals conditionally released from detention have a 9 protected interest in their “continued liberty.” See Young v. Harper,

, 152- 10 53 (1997) (holding that a pre-parolee released to “reduce prison overcrowding” enjoyed a 11 protected liberty interest). The Supreme Court has recognized this protected liberty interest even 12 though the released individual is subject to extensive conditions of release, like reporting regularly 13 to a parole officer, not using alcohol, and not traveling out of the country. Young,

; 14 see also Morrissey v. Brewer,

(1972) (“[T]he liberty of a parolee, although 15 indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 16 ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

, 782 17 (1973) (same in the context of probation). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole 18 “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never been in 19 custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family and 20 friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey,

. 21 “Though the [government] properly subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to 22 other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking authorization to work and travel, “his condition is 23 very different from that of confinement in a prison.”

“The parolee has relied on at least an 24 implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.”

25 The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.”

(quotations 26 omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected liberty interest in his “continued liberty.”

27 at 481-84. 1 Like the individuals in Young, Morrissey, and Gagnon, Rivera Larios has a liberty interest 2 in his continued release. Rivera Larios has remained out of detention for several years, living with 3 his family and contributing to the household. The evidence demonstrates that he complied with 4 the conditions of his release. Rivera Larios possesses an interest in his continued liberty, which 5 has grown over time, and he also possesses a due process right to a hearing before being re- 6 detained. Indeed, given the civil context of detention in immigration proceedings, Petitioner’s 7 “liberty interest is arguably greater than the interest of parolees in Morrissey.” See Ortega v. 8 Bonnar,

, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Morrissey,

). 9 Respondents observe that, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court instructed that removable non- 10 citizens’ “release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release 11 that are appropriate in the circumstances, and [they] may no doubt be returned to custody upon a 12 violation of those conditions.”

. However, Zadvydas provided no instruction for 13 what process is necessary to protect non-citizens’ liberty interest when the government seeks to 14 return them to custody. Instead, Morrissey and Young address that issue, explaining that the 15 deprivation is a “grievous loss” that can be taken away only upon review at a hearing before a 16 neutral arbiter, regardless of whether government agents otherwise possess statutory authority to 17 re-detain. Morrissey,

; see also Young,

. That Rivera Larios 18 is a noncitizen thus does not reduce his liberty interest or distinguish his circumstances from the 19 petitioner in Morrissey, contrary to Respondents’ argument. 20 Respondents describe Rivera Larios’s liberty interest as “reduced by the fact that he is a 21 noncitizen subject to a final order of removal who violated the conditions of his release.” Dkt. No. 22 14 at 15 (citing Uc Encarnacion v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-04369-CRB,

, at *3 (N.D. 23 Cal. Oct. 14, 2022); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland,

, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 2022)). 24 Respondents also rely on Rivera Larios’s immigration history and that he is subject to an 25 administrative order of removal to support their assertion that Rivera Larios has a reduced liberty 26 interest. See generally Dkt. No. 14. Neither his immigration history nor the fact that he is subject 27 to an order of administrative removal lessen Rivera Larios’s protectable liberty interest. Similarly, 1 courts recognize the strong liberty interest implicated in cases like that of Rivera Larios, where a 2 petitioner was previously released on supervision and there has been no change in circumstances. 3 See, e.g., Guillermo M.R.,

, at *4; Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 4 2025 WL1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025). By releasing Rivera Larios in January 2022, 5 Respondents necessarily determined that he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk, 6 and that his removal was not foreseeable. Respondents were aware of Rivera Larios’s 7 immigration history at the time they released him over three years ago. By attempting to re-detain 8 Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing before an immigration judge, Respondents contravene 9 the “implicit promise that [petitioner’s bond] will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the 10 [bond] conditions.” Morrissey,

. 11 The only case cited by Respondents in support of the premise that an arrest may represent 12 “changed circumstances” sufficient to merit re-detention of an individual previously released on 13 bond considered the lawfulness of an arrest under Section 1226(b) in the context of a motion to 14 suppress evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. United States v. Cisneros, No. 19-CR-00280- 15 RS-5,

, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2021) (“An arrest can be considered in 16 determining whether an immigrant should be detained”).2 There, the defendant challenged his re- 17 arrest by ICE premised on the defendant’s arrest by San Francisco Police Department, which was 18 executed in the course of a joint investigation with ICE.

at *1-*2. While an arrest in certain 19 instances might constitute sufficient changed circumstances to warrant rearrest by ICE, as in 20 Cisneros where ICE was working with local law enforcement related to the underlying arrest, the 21 22 23

24 2 Respondents also contend that “reinvolvement with the criminal justice system” can qualify as “changed circumstances.” See Dkt. No. 14 at 16 (citing Panosyan v. Mayorkas,

, 25 788 (9th Cir. 2021)). But the quoted excerpts from dicta do not stand for the broader premise asserted by the Government, as the Ninth Circuit found the matter moot following the immigration 26 detainee’s release on bond.

. The Panosyan memorandum disposition does not inform the question of whether an arrest may demonstrate commission of a crime sufficient to show a 27 violation of an immigrant’s conditions of release that would, in turn, support a deprivation of 1 Court does not find that logic persuasive here where the ICE lacked any information about Rivera 2 Larios’s contact with local law enforcement.3 3 The Court finds that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release as previously 4 ordered by the immigration judge. See Guillermo M. R.,

, at *4 (recognizing 5 that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the 6 Due Process Clause”); Ortega,

, at *3 (collecting cases finding that noncitizens 7 released on bond possess a strong liberty interest). 8 ii. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 9 Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect,” is justified 10 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. Zadvydas,

690; see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,

, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 12 2023). The risk of erroneous deprivation of a noncitizen’s liberty interest is particularly high 13 where, after being previously found to not be a flight risk or danger to the community, the 14 government seeks to re-detain them without a hearing or other procedural safeguard. See Garcia 15 v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884-TLN-SCR,

, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025); 16 Arzate v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00942-KES-SKO (HC),

, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 17 Aug. 4, 2025). In Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, the court considered a similar habeas petition from 18 an ICE detainee. There, ICE determined that the petitioner was deportable under Title 8 U.S.C. 19 § 1231(a)(6) due to a conviction for an aggravated felony. Guillermo M. R.,

, 20 at *1. In March 2023, an Immigration Judge released the petitioner on bond, and ICE imposed a 21 requirement that he “not commit any crimes” as a condition of his release.

The petitioner 22 remained on bond for several years without incident, maintaining gainful employment and caring 23 for his ailing mother, before he was arrested for robbery and vandalism but released without 24 charge.

The police report associated with the arrest identified a witness who described and 25 corroborated the petitioner’s potentially criminal conduct.

Though it learned of petitioner’s 26

27 3 Moreover, the Court finds the Government’s selective reliance on Cisneros dubious. In 1 arrest the next day, ICE took no action to re-detain him for over five weeks, until petitioner 2 appeared for an in-person check-in with ICE.

In response to petitioner’s motion for 3 preliminary injunction in the habeas action that followed, ICE contended that it could re-detain 4 immigration releasees for purely technical reasons, without even establishing a “change in 5 circumstances” compared to those existing at the time of the initial bond release.

. The 6 Court concluded that leaving detainees effectively unable to seek review of their detention by an IJ 7 for at least six months “is a recipe for arbitrary and erroneous deprivations of liberty.”

at *8 8 (citing Zadvydas,

(“The Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an 9 administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental 10 rights.’ ”)). In light of the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty associated with re-detention 11 without a bond hearing, combined with ICE’s lack of factual support to find a material change in 12 circumstances since petitioner’s initial release on bond, the court found a likelihood of success on 13 a due process violation under Mathews. Id. at *8. 14 In this case, ICE similarly seeks to re-detain Rivera Larios after a tenure on bond that has 15 lasted several years, since January 2022. Petitioner was arrested without notice while appearing 16 for a check-in with ICE and was not provided any procedural safeguards to determine whether the 17 circumstances had changed such that his re-detention was justified. Respondents seek to re-detain 18 Rivera Larios for violating the terms of his release, but they present no evidence of criminal 19 conduct and assert that Rivera Larios is not entitled to a pre-detention hearing under Section 20 1231(a)(6). See, e.g., Dkt. No. 14 at 13-14. This refusal to afford a pre-detention hearing in the 21 unique posture of re-detention of an immigrant poses a constitutionally impermissible risk of 22 erroneous deprivation. See Guillermo M. R.,

, at *8-9. 23 Respondents’ positions only highlight the significant risk of erroneous deprivation of 24 liberty if Rivera Larios is not afforded additional process. Rivera Larios called the Lake County 25 Sheriff in August of 2025 because his wife had become violent toward him. Rivera Larios Decl. 26 ¶¶ 13-14. Rivera Larios sought protection from authorities, which resulted in the officers taking 27 him into custody.

The Lake County Sheriff’s Office subsequently issued a Detention 1 Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B. In light of Respondents’ apparent lack of justification to re-detain Rivera Larios, 2 the risk of erroneous deprivation is high, and “allowing a neutral arbiter to review [these] facts 3 would significantly reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.” Guillermo M. R.,

1983677, at *4. 5 iii. Burden on Respondents Versus Petitioner’s Interest 6 Turning to Mathews’s third prong, Respondents aver that “the government clearly has a 7 strong interest in preventing aliens from remain[ing] in the United States in violation of our law.” 8 Dkt. No. 14 at 19 (quoting Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 9 However, the Government’s interests in controlling noncitizens’ unlawful presence in the United 10 States does not particularly inform the legal issue presented at this juncture – whether the burden 11 on the Government to present evidence supporting a violation of Rivera Larios’s conditions of 12 release outweighs Rivera Larios’s interests in remaining free from arbitrary detention. Mathews, 13

. Respondents’ interest in detaining Rivera Larios without a hearing is “low.” 14 Ortega v. Bonnar,

, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe v. Becerra,

1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025). In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a 16 “minimal” cost. Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Any additional burden does not outweigh Rivera 17 Larios’s substantial liberty interests and the risk of erroneous deprivation. 18 iv. Due Process Conclusion 19 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Rivera Larios is entitled to a pre-deprivation 20 hearing, which should have been provided before he was detained. “ ‘[T]he root requirement’ of 21 the Due Process Clause” is “ ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before [she] 22 is deprived of any significant protected interest.’ ” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,

532, 542 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut,

(1971)); see Zinermon v. 24 Burch,

(1990) (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that 25 the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty”). 26 The Supreme Court has held that due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing before those 27 released on parole from a criminal conviction can have their bond finally revoked. See Morrissey, 1 Scarpelli,

. Given the absence of “evidence of urgent concerns,” the Court 2 concludes that “a pre-deprivation hearing [was] required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R., 3

, at *9. With these considerations in mind, Rivera Larios is likely to succeed on 4 the merits of his procedural due process claim. 5 3. Irreparable Harm 6 Beyond establishing a likelihood of success of the merits, plaintiffs seeking a preliminary 7 injunction must show that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief. 8 Winter,

. “Irreparable harm is traditionally defined as harm for which there is no 9 adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages.” Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757

(9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A “showing of a mere possibility of 11 irreparable harm is not sufficient under Winter.” Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton,

, 468 12 (9th Cir. 2010). “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably 13 constitutes irreparable injury.” Melendres v. Arpaio,

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 14 Elrod v. Burns,

, 272 (1976)). Relevant here, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has recognized 15 ‘irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention’ including ‘the economic 16 burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms 17 to children of detainees whose parents are detained.’ ” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (quoting Hernandez v. Sessions,

, 996 19 (9th Cir. 2017)). In this case, Rivera Larios sets forth a compelling case that his detention would 20 impose severe burdens – both financially and otherwise – on himself and his family. Rivera 21 Larios faces the loss of freedom, the zenith of a constitutional liberty interest. The element of 22 irreparable harm weighs heavily in Rivera Larios’s favor. 23 4. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 24 In deciding whether to grant an injunction, “courts must balance the competing claims of 25 injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested 26 relief.” Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter, 27

). Courts “explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the

, 1305 (1991) Gnternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where the government is 2 a party, the balance of equities and public interest factors merge. Drakes Bay Oyster Co., 747 3 || F.3d at 1092 (citing Nken,

). 4 As the court in Diaz v. Kaiser recently explained: 5 The public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 6 the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering. . . . Without the requested injunctive relief, Petitioner-Plaintiff might be 7 abruptly taken into ICE custody, subjecting both him and his family to significant hardship. Yet the comparative harm potentially 8 imposed on Respondents-Defendants is minimal — a mere short delay in detaining Petitioner-Plaintiff, should the government 9 ultimately show that detention is intended and warranted. 10 Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (Freeman, 11 J.) (citations omitted). The same reasoning applies here. The potential harm to Petitioner due to 12 || improper detention far outweighs any delay faced by Respondents or disruption in their effort to

13 || re-detain him for a legally cognizable reason. “Moreover, the [Government] cannot reasonably

v 14 assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional

15 violations.” Zepeda v. ILN.S.,

(9th Cir. 1983). The balance of equities and Q 16 || public interest thus weigh in Rivera Larios’s favor.

17 || 1. CONCLUSION

18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion for a 19 Preliminary Injunction. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining 20 || Rivera Larios without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before an Immigration Judge to 21 evaluate whether his re-detention is warranted based on flight risk or a danger to the community. 22 || No security bond is required, as the government provides no evidence of costs it will incur due to 23 Petitioner’s release. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: October 31, 2025 26 □□□ - 27 coh ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN United States District Judge