1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 ARIANNA MARINO, Case No. 25-cv-00503-BAS-DEB

13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 14 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14) 15 AVEN FINANCIAL, INC.,

16 Defendant. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Defendant Aven Financial’s motion to dismiss. (ECF 19 No. 14.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES 20 IN PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Id.) The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff leave 21 to amend her claims for actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(2) and under Cal. Civ. 22 Code § 1785.31(a)(3), for statutory damages under

(a)(2), and for 23 injunctive relief under

(b). Plaintiff may file an amended 24 complaint on or before November 26, 2025. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff Arianna Marino signed up for Defendant Aven Financial’s application 27 “Aven Advisor: Credit Check App” to “monitor her credit score, track active subscriptions, 28 and receive various financial insights.” (ECF No. 13 ¶ 15.) Aven’s application offers a 1 Starbucks gift card to those who maintain a credit score above 800. (Id. ¶ 16.) On February 2 25, 2025, Plaintiff attempted to reclaim the Starbucks gift card, which resulted in Plaintiff 3 receiving email notifications that Defendant had opened a new home equity loan on 4 Plaintiff’s behalf and had requested a credit report from Experian to do so. (ECF No. 13 ¶ 5 19.) Plaintiff alleges she did not apply for a home equity loan or authorize Defendant to 6 apply for one on her behalf. (ECF No. 13 ¶ 20.) Defendant allegedly opened a home equity 7 loan to back a credit card Plaintiff did not sign up for. (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 24, 36.) Defendant 8 disputes Plaintiff’s allegation that she did not sign up for any of Defendant’s credit card 9 offerings. (ECF No. 14-1 at 9:12–10:16.) Defendant also disputes that Defendant had 10 opened a home equity loan on Plaintiff’s behalf, asserting instead, that Plaintiff had signed 11 up for one of its credit card offerings not backed by home equity loans. (Id.) 12 Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff later 13 amended her Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff alleges causes of action for: (1) 14 Fair Credit Reporting Act,

et. seq, (“FCRA”), and (2) Consumer Credit 15 Reporting Agencies Act,

, et. seq. (“CCRAA”). (Id.) Defendant 16 moved to dismiss the FAC on grounds that Plaintiff’s claims lacked Article III standing. 17 (ECF No. 14.) More specifically, Defendant sought to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on 18 grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has not pled concrete injury sufficient to establish standing for 19 her FCRA claim, and (2) Plaintiff has not pled damages to establish standing for her FCRA 20 and CCRAA claims. (Id.) The Court finds the matter appropriate to rule on the papers and 21 without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1.d.1. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss based on 24 the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “[T]hose who seek 25 to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement 26 imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.” City 27 of L.A. v. Lyons,

(1983). Article III requires that: “(1) at least one named 28 plaintiff suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 1 conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. 2 Defenders of Wildlife,

, 560–61 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over 4 an action. Ass'n of Med. Colls. v. U.S.,

, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2000). “For purposes 5 of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial judge and reviewing 6 courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and must construe the 7 complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Maya v. Centex Corp.,

, 1068 8 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,

(1975)). “At the pleadings 9 stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may 10 suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, we presume that general allegations embrace those 11 specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”

(citation and internal quotation 12 marks omitted). 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to 14 dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 15 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts 16 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). Ordinarily, for purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court 18 “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the 19 light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 20 Co.,

(9th Cir. 2008). “Determining whether a complaint states a 21 plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 22 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

, 679 23 (2009). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 26 1. Whether Plaintiff Pled Concrete Injury Sufficient for FCRA 27 Violation 28 1 The Ninth Circuit adopted a two-step “Spokeo III” framework to determine whether 2 alleged violations of FCRA provisions are sufficiently concrete to confer Article III 3 standing: “(1) whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect [a 4 plaintiff's] concrete interests ([establishing substantive rather than] purely procedural 5 rights), and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually 6 harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such interests.” Tailford v. Experian Info. Sols., 7 Inc.,

, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.,

, 8 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Spokeo III”) (adopting the standard set forth in Strubel v. Comenity 9 Bank,

(2nd Cir. 2016))). A violation of a substantive right invariably 10 “offends the interests that the statute protects.” Nayab v. Cap. One Bank (USA), N.A., 942

(9th Cir. 2019) (citing Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc.,

(9th 12 Cir. 2017)). 13 i. Whether Statutory Provisions Protect Concrete Interests 14 The Ninth Circuit has determined that, for 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) (“§ 1681b(f)”) in 15 particular, Plaintiff needs only to allege that a third party has obtained her credit report for 16 a purpose not authorized by FCRA, regardless of whether the credit report is published or 17 otherwise used by that third-party. Nayab, 942 F.3d at 493 (9th Cir. 2019). “Obtaining a 18 credit report for a purpose not authorized under FCRA violates a substantive provision of 19 FCRA.” Rendon v. Cherry Creek Mortg., LLC, No. 22-CV-01194-DMS-MSB,

17824003, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022) (citing Nayab, 942 F.3d at 492). In addition to 21 finding that obtaining a credit report for a purpose not authorized under FCRA violates a 22 substantive provision of FCRA, Ninth Circuit reasoned that the interests protected by 23 § 1681b(f) are not “purely procedural” because the statutory provision: (1) safeguards the 24 right to privacy in one's consumer credit report, and (2) aims to protect “the same harm that 25 forms the basis” for the traditionally recognized tort, “intrusion upon seclusion.” Id. at 26 492. Thus, under the first part of the Spokeo III framework, “the statutory provisions at 27 issue were established to protect [a plaintiff's] concrete interests”—not just procedural 28 interests. Tailford, 26 F.4th at 1099. It follows that, if Defendant violated § 1681b(f), such 1 violation would constitute a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing under Spokeo 2 III. 3 ii. Whether Alleged Violations Establish Harm 4 “Privacy interests protected by § 1681b(f)(1) are harmed when a credit report is 5 obtained for a purpose not authorized under FCRA.” Rendon v. Cherry Creek Mortg., 6 LLC, No. 22-CV-01194-DMS-MSB,

, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022) 7 (emphasis added). Again, under the Spokeo III framework, the Ninth Circuit determined 8 the plaintiff can allege harm if she could sufficiently allege a § 1681b(f) violation—since 9 § 1681b(f) protects concrete, substantive privacy interests. Nayab, 942 F.3d at 493. To 10 survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff only needs to allege facts giving 11 rise to a “reasonable inference” that Defendant obtained her credit report for a purpose not 12 authorized by FCRA. Id. at 490. 13 § 1681b(f)(1) provides: “A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any 14 purpose unless…the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer 15 report is authorized to be furnished under this section.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) 16 (“§ 1681b(a)(3)(A)”) provides that an authorized use for obtaining consumer reports is “in 17 connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to 18 be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account 19 of, the consumer.” 20 Crucially, according to § 1681b(a)(3)(A), the credit transaction must “involve” 21 Plaintiff—“the consumer on whom information is to be furnished.”1 According to the 22 Ninth Circuit, “a person is ‘involved’ in a credit transaction for purposes of 23 1 Though there are circumstances in which defendants can demonstrate an authorized purpose to access 24 plaintiffs’ credit reports without plaintiff’s initiation, such as the collection of credit card debt or in 25 circumstances listed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(m) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c), those circumstances are not applicable here. See e.g., Hennessey v. Radius Glob. Sols. LLC, No. 3:24-CV-05654-DGE,

5119824, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2024) (collection of credit card debt is a permissible purpose under § 1681a(m)); Abbink v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. SACV191257JFWPJWX,

, at *3 27 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) (a consumer reporting agency furnishing a credit report to a creditor in connection with a firm offer of credit is a permissible purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(i)). 28 1 § 1681b(a)(3)(A) where she is ‘draw[n] in as a participant’ in the transaction, but not where 2 she is ‘oblige[d] to become associated’ with the transaction.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors 3 Ass'n,

(9th Cir. 2010). The Pintos court then held that, because the 4 plaintiff “did not initiate the transaction that resulted in [the defendant] requesting her 5 credit report,” the defendant did not have authorized access to plaintiff’s credit report under 6 § 1681b(a)(3)(A). Id. (holding against authorized use where defendant sought a line of 7 credit on plaintiff’s behalf to cover the costs of towing her vehicle because: (1) plaintiff 8 did not initiate defendant towing her car, and (2) plaintiff did not initiate opening a line of 9 credit to satisfy debts to defendant). Defendant carries the “burden of pleading it had an 10 authorized purpose to acquire [Plaintiff’s] credit report.” Nayab, 942 F.3d at 495. More 11 specifically, Defendant must demonstrate that it had authorization to access Plaintiff’s 12 credit report based on a FCRA exception. Id. 13 Defendant alleges that “Plaintiff had already given Aven access to her credit score 14 and credit information in order to use the App for credit monitoring and to take advantage 15 of offers dependent on Aven accessing her credit score.” (ECF No. 14-1 at 15:9–11.) 16 Defendant also alleges Plaintiff had selected an option to simultaneously reclaim a 17 Starbucks reward and a credit card from Defendant—contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that 18 Plaintiff only intended to sign up for a Starbucks reward and not a credit card. Because the 19 Court is bound to the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court 20 considers whether Plaintiff signing up for the Starbucks reward—which allegedly resulted 21 in Defendant requesting credit reports to open a credit line on behalf of Plaintiff—is enough 22 to constitute an authorized use under FCRA. See Chase v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 23 17-CV-00881-GPC-BLM,

, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) (rejecting 24 Defendant’s allegations where they “go beyond the scope of the Complaint” and “introduce 25 new evidence when the Court must, at the motion to dismiss stage, accept the facts pleaded 26 in the Complaint as true”) (citing Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner and Co.,

, 1555 n.19). 28 1 Though Plaintiff signed up for Defendant’s credit monitoring service and did sign 2 up for a Starbucks reward offered by Defendant’s app, “the requirement that the consumer 3 initiate the transaction is not satisfied simply because the consumer did something that 4 arguably led to the creditor's claim.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n,

, 675 5 (9th Cir. 2010). In contrast to Plaintiff’s authorization for Defendant to access her reports 6 for credit monitoring, Plaintiff alleges she did not “authorize Defendant to access Plaintiff’s 7 credit report for the purpose of any extension of credit”—including the home equity loan 8 that Defendant allegedly applied for on her behalf. (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 15, 26.) 9 It is a more complicated issue whether Plaintiff signing up for the Starbucks reward 10 offered by Defendant means she also initiated the transaction resulting in Defendant 11 requesting her credit report for the alleged purpose of signing up for a home equity loan. 12 On the one hand, Plaintiff signing up the Starbucks gift card triggered Defendant starting 13 to apply for a home equity loan on Plaintiff’s behalf—even if that trigger was due to a 14 technical error in Defendant’s app as Plaintiff alleges. (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 30–31.) On the 15 other hand, Plaintiff “never asked” Defendant to open a line of credit on her behalf and 16 according to Plaintiff, she was “obliged to become associated” with the home equity loan 17 application when signing up for an allegedly separate Starbucks gift card. Pintos,

at 674–75. The Court follows the latter interpretation at this time, since the Court must 19 draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage. See 20 Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.,

(9th 21 Cir. 2014). Under the second part of the Spokeo III framework, therefore, Plaintiff has 22 sufficiently alleged that Defendant has violated FCRA such that those violation “actually 23 harm, or present a material risk of harm to, [Plaintiff’s privacy] interests.” Tailford, 26 24 F.4th at 1099. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged concrete injury under FCRA. 25 2. Whether Plaintiff Pled Concrete Injury Sufficient for CCRAA 26 Violation 27 Plaintiff also alleges a claim under CCRAA,

et seq. (ECF 28 No. 13 ¶¶ 81–85.) Because “[t]he CCRAA mirrors the provisions of FCRA,” CCRAA is 1 also a statute aimed at protecting Plaintiff’s substantive privacy interests, and, Plaintiff has 2 also plausibly demonstrated that Defendant willfully violated CCRAA. See Adler v. 3 DirecTV, LLC, No. CV181665DMGPJWX,

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 4 2018) (citing Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1335). Therefore, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(1), the 5 Court also finds that Plaintiff has Article III standing to pursue her CCRAA claims under 6 the Spokeo III framework. Robins,

. 7 * * * 8 For the reasons above, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff’s 9 FCRA and CCRAA claims and DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss them for lack of 10 standing under Rule 12(b)(1).

(b)(6) 12 Plaintiff’s FAC seeks actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1) for Defendant’s 13 alleged access to Plaintiff’s credit report without a permissible purpose in violation of § 14 1681b(f). (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 79–80.) Plaintiff also seeks actual damages for violation of 15 CCRAA under

(a)(3). (ECF No. 13 ¶ 85.) Plaintiff further seeks 16 statutory damages under § 1681n(a)(1)(A) and under Civ. Code § 1785.31(a); and for 17 injunctive relief under

(b). (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 55, 80.) In this 18 section, the Court evaluates whether Plaintiff’s allegations for damages under FCRA and 19 CCRAA meet the pleading standards in Rule 12(b)(6). 20 1. Actual Damages 21 Unlike statutory or punitive damages under either FCRA or CCRAA, proving actual 22 damages for negligent and willful violations of FCRA (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 79–80) and of 23 CCRAA requires Plaintiff to show she suffered actual damages as a result of Defendant’s 24 violative conduct. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1);

(a). 25 In the FAC, Plaintiff seeks actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1) and Cal. 26 Civ. Code § 1785.31(a). (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 55, 79.) Plaintiff alleges harms in the form of: 27 (1) decreased credit score (ECF No. 13 ¶ 52); (2) emotional distress (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 53– 28 54); (3) loss of time associated with the litigation (ECF No. 13 ¶ 54); (4) attorney’s fees 1 (ECF No. 13 ¶ 54). In its motion to dismiss, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s harms— 2 construed by Defendant as “decreased credit score”, “emotional distress,” and “expenses 3 related to her claim, including attorney fees and ‘waste[d] time’ reviewing her credit 4 reports”—are too “vague and conclusory” to establish actual damages. (ECF No. 14-1 at 5 17–23.) Plaintiff responded that “Plaintiff and the Class [Members] do not seek relief for 6 any personal harm.” (ECF No. 17 at 14:24.) Instead, Plaintiff seeks “uniform statutory 7 damages and injunctive relief.” (Id. at 17:6.) Defendant replied that, by failing to directly 8 address Defendant’s contentions regarding actual damages in the motion to dismiss, 9 Plaintiff waived its claims for actual damages. (ECF No. 18 at 5:15–6:17.) 10 The Court has not yet decided on whether to certify Plaintiff’s class, and refrains 11 from doing so, or ruling on other class-wide issues, at this stage of litigation. See e.g., 12 Mirkarimi v. Nevada Property 1 LLC,

(S.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) 13 (declining to adjudicate class certification issues at the motion to dismiss stage). So, by 14 pleading that her factual allegations are merely “contextual” to substantiate broader class 15 claims for damages, and, expressly stating that she does not seek actual damages, Plaintiff 16 has waived her individual claims for actual damages. More specifically, the Court agrees 17 with Defendant that Plaintiff has waived its claims for actual damages under

1681o(a)(1) (FCRA actual damages provision) and

(a)(3) 19 (CCRAA actual damages provision). 20 In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for 21 actual damages under FCRA (specifically, under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1)) and CCRAA 22 (specifically, under

(a)(3)). (ECF No. 14-1 at 16:19–17:3.) 23 2. Statutory Damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) 24 To prove a claim for statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“§ 25 1681n(a)(1)(A)”), Plaintiff needs to show Defendant had “willfully fail[ed] to comply 26 with” the requirements set forth in § 1681b(f). Willfulness need not be pleaded with 27 particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Ballard v. P. Logistics Corp.,

, 28 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2019). 1 Under FCRA, to show that a violation was willful, a plaintiff must show that the 2 defendant either knowingly violated the Act or recklessly disregarded the Act's 3 requirements. Marino v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC,

(9th Cir. 2020) 4 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr,

(2007)). Recklessness is “action 5 entailing an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should 6 be known.” Safeco,

. To show that a defendant recklessly disregarded the 7 Act's requirements, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “ran a risk of violating the law 8 substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading [of the Act] that was merely 9 careless.”

10 One way to show that a defendant acted recklessly is by establishing that it adopted 11 an interpretation of FCRA that conflicts with “legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at 12 the time.” See Safeco,

. To determine whether the defendant acted 13 “willfully,” the Safeco Court considered whether the defendant's interpretation of FCRA 14 “ha[d] a foundation in the statutory text” and whether the defendant had “guidance from 15 the courts of appeals…that might have warned it away from the view it took.” Marchioli 16 v. Pre-Employ.com, Inc., No. EDCV162305JGBDTBX,

, at *9 (C.D. 17 Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69–70). “A lack of guidance, however, does 18 not itself render [a defendant's] interpretation reasonable.” See Syed, 853 F.3d at 504. 19 Rather, when a statutory provision is unambiguous and a plaintiff alleges that a defendant 20 violated it, the defendant “act[s] in reckless disregard of the statutory language, and 21 therefore willfully,” regardless of whether courts have “clearly established” that the 22 defendant's interpretation is erroneous. Id. at 506. 23 Here, the Court has already found that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendants 24 violated FCRA to establish standing on an individual basis. See supra § III.A.2. For the 25 same reasons the Court finds Defendant likely violated FCRA, Defendant’s interpretation 26 of FCRA as allowing it to seek a home equity loan on behalf of Plaintiff does not “have a 27 foundation in the statutory text” and is not rooted in “guidance from the courts of appeals.” 28 Marchioli v. Pre-Employ.com, Inc., No. EDCV162305JGBDTBX,

, at 1 *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) (citing Safeco,

–70). See supra § III.A.2. The 2 Court, therefore, finds Defendant’s likely violation of FCRA to be “willful.” Further 3 supporting the Court’s finding that Defendant’s FCRA violation was “willful,” Defendant 4 allegedly failed to fulfill Plaintiff’s multiple requests to cancel the sign-up process for a 5 credit card based on home equity loans, despite representing otherwise. (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 6 25–39.) 7 Further, “the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), clearly and plainly 8 provides for statutory damages without the need to prove or allege actual harm.” See 9 Sciaretta v. Yard House Restaurants, LLC, No. 07CV1212 WQH (NLS),

9776769, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007) (citing Arcilla, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 973–74 (FCRA 11 “clearly provides” for statutory damages even without actual harm). 12 Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s individual 13 claims for statutory damages under FCRA (specifically, under § 1681n(a)(1)(A)). 14 3. Statutory Damages and Injunctive Relief under

1785.31(a) and 1785.31(b) 16 Defendant does not specifically address Plaintiff’s individual claim for statutory 17 damages under

(a)(2)(B) (see ECF No. 13 at 16:4), or for 18 injunctive relief under

(b)2 (see ECF No. 13 at 16), but does move 19 to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s CCRAA claims on the grounds that “[a]ctual damage is required 20 to state a claim under the CCRAA.” (ECF No. 14-1 at 18:23–19:23.) 21 First, the California Court of Appeals has held that CCRAA, unlike FCRA, requires 22 a showing of actual harm even where, as here, the plaintiff seeks statutory damages under 23 section 1785.31(a)(2)(B). See Ramirez v. Trans Union, LLC,

, 424–25 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Trujillo v. First American Registry, Inc.,

, 25 637–38,

(2008)). The federal courts are bound by decisions of the 26 California Court of Appeals on questions of California law “unless there is convincing 27

28 1 evidence that the California Supreme Court would decide the matter differently.”

Here, 2 Plaintiff seeks statutory damages under

(a)(2)(B). (ECF No. 13 3 at 16:4.) Defendant alleges that since Plaintiff has failed to allege actual damages, Plaintiff 4 is not entitled to statutory damages under CCRAA (ECF Nos. 14 at 2:9–15, 14-1 at 18:23– 5 19:23.) 6 Second, the CCRAA provides that “[i]njunctive relief shall be available to any 7 consumer aggrieved by a violation or a threatened violation of this title whether or not the 8 consumer seeks any other remedy under this section.”

(b). This 9 would appear not to require actual damages. Poinsignon v. Imperva, Inc., No. 17-CV- 10 05653-EMC,

, at *4 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018). However, the 11 California Court of Appeal has conditioned injunctive relief under § 1785.31(b), at least 12 for plaintiffs “uninjured by violations that have already occurred” (as opposed to threatened 13 violations), on a showing of actual damages. See Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc., 157

(2007); see also Abdelfattah v. Carrington Mortg. Servs. LLC, 15 No. C-12-04656-RMW,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (applying 16 Trujillo to require actual damages for injunctive relief). 17 Since Plaintiff has not adequately alleged actual harm (see § III.B.2), the Court 18 GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CCRAA claims for statutory damages 19 and for injunctive relief. 20 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 21 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her claims for actual damages under 22 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a) and

(a)(3), for statutory damages under Cal. 23 Civ. Code § 1785.31(a)(2), and for injunctive relief under

(b). 24 V. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 26 PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14.) More specifically, the Court denies 27 Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 28 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1); and Plaintiff’s claims for statutory damages under

|| 1681n(a)(1)(A), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Ud.) However, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the 2 || Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for actual damages under 15 3 ||U.S.C. § 1681(0)(a)(1) and

(a)(3), and Plaintiffs claims for 4 statutory damages and under

(a), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (/d.) 5 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her claims for actual damages under 6 ||

(a)(2) and under

(a)(3), for statutory damages 7 |{under

(a)(2), and for injunctive relief under

|}1785.31(b). Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before November 26, 2025. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ~ 11 || DATED: November 5, 2025 yatta Bahar D H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 —412_