1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CRISTOFER GARCIA MAGADAN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2889-JES-KSC

12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF Department of Homeland Security; TODD 15 HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO M. LYONS, Acting Director, Immigration

; AND 16 and Customs Enforcement, PATRICK

DIVVER, Field Office Director, San Diego 17 (2) DENYING AS MOOT COUNT Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. TWO OF THE PETITION. 18 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement;

CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior 19 [ECF NO .1] Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, San 20 Diego, California; SIRCE OWEN, Acting Director for Executive Office for 21 Immigration Review; and PAMELA 22 BONDI, Attorney General of the United States 23 Respondents. 24 25 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Before the Court is Petitioner Cristofer Garcia Magadan’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 2 a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner seeks 3 habeas relief by asserting that Respondents’ application of

(b)(2), not 8

(a), with respect to his detention violates the: (1) Immigration and Nationality 5 Act (“INA”); and (2) the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. For the reasons set 6 forth below, the Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition and DENIES AS MOOT 7 Count Two of the Petition. 8 I. BACKGROUND 9 On or about 2008, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection, and since 10 then, has built deep and longstanding ties to his community. Pet. ¶ 33. On July 16, 2025, 11 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents executed an administrative warrant 12 and apprehended Petitioner in Vista, CA.

; see ECF No. 1-2 at 2. On that same 13 date, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Petitioner with an initial 14 custody determination, pursuant to INA § 236, and initiated removal proceedings against 15 him. Pet. ¶¶ 37-38; see ECF No. 6-1 at 2-3. Petitioner is currently in DHS custody at the 16 Otay Mesa Detention Center. Pet. ¶ 1. 17 After being detained, and despite Respondents’ contention that he was not entitled 18 to do so pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2), Petitioner sought a custody reconsideration hearing 19 before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). Id. ¶ 4. There, Respondents argued that the IJ lacked 20 jurisdiction to conduct Petitioner’s bond determination hearing. Id. However, the IJ found 21 that under Section 1226(a), he did have jurisdiction and granted Petitioner’s release, 22 pursuant to a $4,500 bond with Alternatives to Detention supervision at the discretion of 23 DHS. Id.; see ECF No. 1-3 at 2. 24 Respondents immediately appealed the IJ’s bond decision pursuant to

1003.19(i)(2), which automatically stayed the IJ’s order pending BIA review. Pet. ¶ 5. On 26 September 29, 2025, the BIA relied on its precedential decision in Matter of Yajure 27 Hurtado and sustained Respondents’ appeal and vacated the IJ’s bond order.

. 28 // 1 Petitioner contends that he has been illegally detained by DHS and the Executive 2 Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which have adopted a new interpretation of the 3 INA. Pet. ¶ 2. This interpretation treats all individuals who entered the country without 4 inspection as “applicants for admission,” which subjects them to mandatory detention 5 under 8 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1225(b)(2). Id. Petitioner argues that he has lived in the United 6 States for well over a decade, and therefore, Section 1225(b) does not apply to him. Id. ¶ 7 44. Further, that to the extent he remains in custody, his detention should proceed under 8 Section 1226(a), which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. Id. 9 Accordingly, Petitioner seeks habeas relief from the Court because his continued 10 detention, resulting from Respondents’ application of Section 1225(b), violates the INA 11 and the Due Process of the Fifth Amendment. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 14 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 15 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 16 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 17 Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 18 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 19 law.

(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 20 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 21 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,

(2001). Accordingly, challenges 22 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 23 jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis,

(2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538

, 517 (2003). 25 Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law 26 ... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or 27 confinement.” Fay v. Noia,

(1963). “The application for the writ usurps 28 the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives 1 prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S.,

1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. Jurisdiction and Applicability of Section 1225 vs. 1226 5 The Court finds that the Parties’ arguments with respect to whether: (1) the Court 6 has jurisdiction to hear this petition; and (2) Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. 7 §§ 1225(b)(2) or 1226(a), are analogous—if not identical—to those raised in the Court’s 8 recent decision in Martinez Lopez v. Noem, et al., No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG,

3030457, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the 10 reasoning it stated in Martinez Lopez and incorporates it by reference.

11 Based on the facts of this Petition, the Court finds that: (1)

's 12 jurisdiction stripping provisions do not bar this Court from considering Petitioner's habeas 13 petition; and (2)

(a)—not

(b)—applies to Petitioner. Thus, 14 Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing by an IJ, who may not deny bond 15 on the basis that

(b) governs Petitioner’s detention. 16 B. Procedural Due Process 17 The Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner's due process claim given that 18 the Court will grant the relief he seeks based on its conclusion that Section 1226(a) applies 19 here. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing, 20 pursuant to

(a), or release him within the time allotted, Petitioner may 21 renew his Fifth Amendment Due Process claim. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 Based on the foregoing: 24 (1) The Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition; 25 (2) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Count Two of the Petition; 26 (3) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized 27 bond hearing under

(a) within ten (10) days of this Order, or 28 // l otherwise release him from custody, under the same conditions that existed 2 before his detention; and 3 (4) Respondents are ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within ten 4 days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: November 5, 2025 1 Str J. 8 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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