1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SONXAI RASAKHAMDEE, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02816-RBM-DEB

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department [Docs. 1, 3] of Homeland Security, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 19 20 Pending before the Court are Petitioner Sonxai Rasakhamdee’s (“Petitioner”) 21 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) pursuant to

and 22 Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO 23 Motion”) (Doc. 3.) The Petition and TRO Motion seek the same relief—Petitioner’s 24 release from detention. Respondents filed a Return in Opposition to Petitioner’s Habeas 25 Petition and Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 26 (“Response”) (Doc. 8), and Petitioner filed a Traverse in Support of Petition for Writ of 27 Habeas Corpus (“Reply”) (Doc. 9.) Having reviewed these filings, and for the reasons set 28 forth below, the Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion is DENIED AS MOOT. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 Petitioner, the son of Lao parents, was born in a refugee camp in Thailand. (Doc. 1 4 at 2, 27 .)1 He fled to the United States with his father in 1990 and soon after became a 5 lawful permanent resident. (Id.) In 1996, when he was about 17 years old, Petitioner was 6 convicted of second-degree murder. (Id. at 27.) His conviction was overturned on appeal, 7 and Petitioner then pled guilty to manslaughter. (Id.) On July 20, 2011, an immigration 8 judge ordered Petitioner removed to Laos. (Id.; Doc. 8-2 at 6.) Because ICE was unable 9 to obtain travel documents for Petitioner, he was released on an order of supervision on 10 October 14, 2011. (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 8 at 2.) Since being released, Petitioner has complied 11 with all the conditions of his release and has not been convicted of any other offenses. 12 (Doc. 1 at 4, 27.) 13 On September 15, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner at a check-in appointment required 14 by his order of supervision. (Id.) At the time, ICE “did not tell [Petitioner] why they were 15 revoking [his] supervision.” (Doc. 1 at 27.) The following day, ICE provided Petitioner 16 with a Notice of Revocation of Release informing Petitioner that his order of supervision 17 was revoked upon “a determination that there are changed circumstances in [his] case.” 18 (Doc. 8 at 3; Doc. 8-2 at 26.) On October 20, 2025, ICE Enforcement and Removal 19 Operations (“ERO)” submitted a travel document request for Petitioner “to the Laos Unit 20 of ERO’s Removal and International Operations,” though it has not yet sent any request to 21 the Lao embassy. (Doc. 8 at 3.) On October 29, 2025, ICE interviewed Petitioner. (Id.) 22 According to the sworn declaration of Deportation Officer Jason Cole, ICE “is not seeking 23 to remove Petitioner to a third country.” (Doc. 8-2 [Declaration of Jason Cole] (“Cole 24 Decl.”) ¶ 13.) ICE believes “there is a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal to 25 Laos on or before March 1, 2026.” (Id. ¶ 20.) 26 27 1 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination unless otherwise noted. 28 1 B. Procedural Background 2 On October 21, 2025, Petitioner filed the Petition against Respondents Kristi Noem, 3 Pamela Bondi, Todd Lyons, Jesus Rocha, and Christopher LaRose (collectively, 4 “Respondents”). (Doc. 1.) The same day, Petitioner filed a Motion for Appointment of 5 Counsel (Doc. 2) and the TRO Motion. (Doc. 3). On October 24, 2025, the Court ordered 6 Respondents to show cause why the Petition and accompanying TRO Motion should not 7 be granted by filing a written response. (Doc. 4 at 2–3.) On October 29, 2025, Respondents 8 filed the Response. (Doc. 8.) On October 31, 2025, Petitioner filed the Reply. (Doc. 9.) 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 11 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 12 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 13 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 14 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 15 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 16 judge within their respective jurisdictions.”

(a). The petitioner bears the 17 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 18 treaties of the United States.”

§ 2241(c)(3). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Petitioner argues that his detention unlawfully violates: (1) the regulations set forth 21 in

(l) and § 241.13(i); (2) the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. 22 Davis,

(2001); and (3) the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 2, 8–18.) Petitioner 23 also claims ICE may not remove him to a third country “without providing an opportunity 24 to assert fear of persecution or torture before an immigration judge.” (Id. at 3, 18–21.) 25 Respondents argue first that Petitioner is jurisdictionally barred from bringing the 26 entire Petition under

(g), and the third-country claim because “there is no 27 controversy concerning third-country resettlement for this Court to resolve.” (Doc. 8 at 3– 28 5.) Respondents argue second that Petitioner’s ongoing re-detention falls within the six- 1 month detention period presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas or, alternatively, that 2 ICE has shown a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal to Laos. (Id. at 7–9.) 3 Respondents argue third that even if ICE failed to comply with the regulatory requirements 4 when it re-detained Petitioner, Petitioner cannot establish that he was prejudiced by such 5 violations. (Id. at 11–14.) 6 A. Jurisdiction 7 As the Court has an obligation “to determine that [it has] jurisdiction before 8 proceeding to the merits” of any case, it will first address Respondents’ jurisdictional 9 argument. Lance v. Coffman,

(2007); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 10 Better Env’t,

, 94–95 (1998). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds 11 that it has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims.2 12 Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Petition under 13

(g). (Doc. 8 at 4–5.) This statutory bar against judicial review precludes 14 the Court from exercising jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s decision to “commence 15 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any [noncitizen].” 16 8 U.S.C § 1252(g). However, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted § 1252(g) as 17 applying “only to [those] three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take.” Reno 18 v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,

(1999) (emphasis omitted) 19 (quoting

(g)). 20 Petitioner does not challenge the legitimacy of his 2011 order of removal. Rather, 21 he challenges the legality of his detention, which does not require judicial review of the 22 Attorney General’s decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 23 removal orders. See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer,

(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (noting 24 courts have “distinguished between challenges to ICE’s discretion to execute a removal 25 order, which are barred, and challenges to the manner in which ICE executes the removal 26 27 2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court does not reach Respondents’ argument that 28 1 order, which are not.”). 2 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims “necessarily arise” from the Attorney 3 General’s decision to commence removal proceedings against him. (Doc. 8 at 5.) This 4 interpretation of

(g) would “eliminate judicial review of immigration 5 [detainees’] claims of unlawful detention . . . inconsistent with Jennings v. Rodriguez and 6 the history of judicial review of the detention of noncitizens under

.” 7 Sanchez v. LaRose, Case No.: 25-cv-2396-JES-MMP,

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 8 Sept. 26, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez,

(2018); Zadvydas, 9

; Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland,

, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022)). 10 Accordingly, as other courts in this District have found in similar cases, the Court has 11 jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims that his detention is unlawful under 28 U.S.C. 12 § 2241. See Sanchez,

, at *2; Rokhfirooz v. LaRose et al., Case No.: 25- 13 cv-2053-RSH-VET,

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025); Palma v. LaRose, Case 14 No. 3:25-cv-1942-BJC-MMP (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025), ECF No. 14. 15 B. Due Process 16 Petitioner challenges his detention as unlawful based on ICE’s decision to revoke 17 his release without providing the required notice or prompt interview. (Doc. 1 at 2, 8–11; 18 Doc. 9 at 6–10.) Petitioner’s claims therefore implicate the Due Process Clause. The Due 19 Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due process of 20 law. U.S. Const. amend. V. Due process rights extend to noncitizens present in the United 21 States, including those subject to final removal orders. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693–94. The 22 fundamental requirements of due process are that a person be afforded notice and 23 opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. 24 Eldridge,

(1976). 25 The detention and release of noncitizens who are subject to a final order of removal 26 are governed by

. Under that statute, “when [a noncitizen] is ordered 27 removed, the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within 28 a period of 90 days,” also known as the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C § 1231(a)(1)(A). “If 1 the [noncitizen] does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the 2 [noncitizen], pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed 3 by the Attorney General.” § 1231(a)(3). Those regulations, which govern release and 4 revocation of release of noncitizens subject to a final order of removal, are

5 and § 241.13. The Parties discuss both regulations in their filings, and it is unclear from 6 the record which regulation controls. Under either regulation, however, ICE failed to 7 comply with the required procedures, thereby violating Petitioner’s due process rights. 8 1. Agency Regulations 9 In relevant part, release may be revoked under

when the Executive 10 Associate Commissioner or a district director believes revocation “is appropriate to enforce 11 a removal order or to commence removal proceedings against [a noncitizen].” 8 C.F.R. 12 § 241.4(l)(2)(iii). Section 241.13 provides “special review procedures” that apply where a 13 noncitizen “has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of 14 removal to the country to which he or she was ordered removed . . . in the reasonably 15 foreseeable future.” § 241.13(a). Release may be revoked under this section if, “on 16 account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant 17 likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 18 § 241.13(i)(2). Under both regulations, “[u]pon revocation,” the noncitizen “will be 19 notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release or parole” and will be given “an 20 initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody” to “respond 21 to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” § 241.4(l)(1); § 241.13(i)(3). 22 Petitioner argues that his detention is procedurally deficient because he was not 23 provided (1) sufficient notice of the reasons for revocation of his release nor (2) a prompt 24 interview to respond to those reasons. (Doc. 18 at 6; Doc. 19 at 4–5.) 25 As to notice, Petitioner argues that there was “no determination before or at his arrest 26 that there are ‘changed circumstances’ such that there is ‘a significant likelihood that 27 [Petitioner] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” (Doc. 1 at 10 (quoting 28 § 241.13(i)(2).) He also argues that the Notice of Revocation of Release, which states only 1 that revocation was “based on a review of [Petitioner’s] official alien file and a 2 determination that there are changed circumstances in [his] case,” is insufficient to meet 3 the requirements of §241.4(l) and § 241.13(i). (Doc. 9 at 6–7 (quoting Doc. 8-2 at 26).) 4 Respondents argue not only that the Notice of Revocation of Release provided 5 sufficient notice, but also that that Petitioner “was informed of the reason for his re- 6 detention when he was served with and signed the Form I-205, Warrant of 7 Removal/Deportation, on September 15, 2025.” (Doc. 8 at 13 (citing Doc. 8-2 at 16).) 8 The Warrant of Removal/Deportation reads: 9 To any immigration officer of the United States Department of Homeland 10 Security:

11 Sonxai Rasakhamdee who entered the United States at Los Angeles, CA on 12 December 12, 1990 is subject to removal/deportation from the United States, based upon a final order by: an immigration judge in exclusion, deportation, 13 or removal proceedings and pursuant to the following provisions of the 14 Immigration and Nationality Act:

15 **This section was left blank on the Form I-205** 16 I, the undersigned officer of the United States, by virtue of the power and 17 authority vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security under the laws of the 18 United States and by his or her direction, command you to take into custody and remove from the United States the above-named alien, pursuant to law[.] 19

20 (Doc. 8-2 at 16) (emphasis added). 21 Under the circumstances, the Court concludes Petitioner was not provided adequate 22 notice of the reasons for revocation of his release. ICE’s conclusory explanations for 23 revoking Petitioner’s release “did not offer him adequate notice of the basis for the 24 revocation decision such that he could meaningfully respond at the post-detention informal 25 interview.” Diaz v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT EPG,

, at 26 *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,

1, 14 (1978) (“The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected 28 individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.”) (citation 1 omitted)). The documents Respondents point to as evidence of notice indicate there was 2 “a determination that there are changed circumstances in [Petitioner’s] case” and that 3 Petitioner “is subject to removal/deportation from the United States, based upon a final 4 order by: an immigration judge.” (Doc. 8-2 at 16, 26.) But “[s]imply to say that 5 circumstances had changed or there was a significant likelihood of removal in the 6 foreseeable future is not enough.” Sarail A. v. Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,

2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025). “Petitioner must be told what circumstances had 8 changed or why there was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully 9 respond to the reasons and submit evidence in opposition.” Id.; see also McSweeney v. 10 Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB,

2998376, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (granting habeas petition because “Petitioner 12 could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation when he 13 had not yet even been informed of those reasons”). 14 Nor was Petitioner given the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time.” 15 Mathews,

. Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on September 15, 2025. 16 (Doc. 1 at 4, 27.) Despite the requirement in

(l) and § 241.13(i) that 17 Petitioner be afforded “an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to 18 Service custody,” he was not interviewed until October 29, 2025. (Doc. 8 at 3; Cole Decl. 19 ¶ 12.) That six-week delay violated the promptness requirement. See M.S.L. v. Bostock, 20 Civ. No. 6:25-cv-01204-AA,

, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (finding 21 an informal interview given 27 days after petitioner was taken into ICE custody “cannot 22 reasonably be construed as . . . prompt” and granting petition); Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25- 23 cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC),

, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (finding 24 “the failure to provide an informal interview during that lengthy [two-month] period of 25 time renders petitioner’s re-detention unlawful”); Sayvongsa v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv- 26 02867-AGS-DEB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2025), ECF No. 10 (granting petition where petitioner 27 28 1 did not receive informal interview for three weeks after being re-detained). Thus, ICE 2 violated its own regulations by failing to provide sufficient notice and a prompt interview. 3 2. Prejudice 4 Respondents argue that even assuming ICE violated agency regulations, “Petitioner 5 could not establish that he was prejudiced by those omissions nor that a constitutional level 6 violation has occurred.” (Doc. 8 at 12 (citing Brown v. Holder,

, 1148–50 7 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he mere failure of an agency to follow its regulations is not a violation 8 of due process.”); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,

, 92 n.8 (1978) 9 (holding that Accardi “enunciate[d] principles of federal administrative law rather than of 10 constitutional law”).) 11 Where there is a regulatory violation, the Court should assess “whether violation of 12 the regulation prejudiced the party involved.” Carnation Co. v. Sec’y of Labor,

, 804 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981). In the immigration context, “violation of a regulation does 14 not invalidate a deportation proceeding unless the regulation serves a purpose of benefit to 15 the [noncitizen],” i.e., the violation “prejudiced interests of the [noncitizen] which were 16 protected by the regulation.” United States v. Calderon-Medina,

, 531 17 (9th Cir. 1979). 18 ICE’s failure to comply with the requirements of § 241.4 and § 241.13 “prejudiced 19 interests of [Petitioner] which were protected by the regulation[s].” Id. Both § 241.4 and 20 § 241.13 were intended “to provide due process protections to [noncitizens] following the 21 removal period as they are considered for continued detention, release, and then possible 22 revocation of release.” Orellana v. Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC,

2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). ICE deprived Petitioner of these due process 24 protections when it failed to provide him with sufficient notice or a prompt interview to 25

26 27 3 See Sayvongsa, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02867-AGS-DEB, ECF No. 8-1 [Declaration of Deportation Officer Jason Cole] ¶¶ 8, 11 (noting the petitioner was detained on 28 1 respond to the reasons for revocation of his release. “It is well established that the 2 deprivation of constitutional rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable 3 injury.” Melendres v. Arpaio,

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 4

(1976); see also Hernandez v. Sessions,

, 1000 5 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that “[u]nlawful detention” by immigration officials constituted 6 “irreparable harm”). Therefore, Petitioner was prejudiced by ICE’s failure to comply with 7 its own regulations. 8 Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations. United States ex 9 rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,

(1954); Confederated Tribes & Bands of 10 Yakima Indian Nation v. F.E.R.C.,

, 474 (9th Cir. 1984) (“It is a well-known 11 maxim that agencies must comply with their own regulations.”) ICE failed to do so here. 12 The Court’s research indicates that every district court, except two,4 to consider the issue 13 has “determined that where ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the 14 detention is unlawful and the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Rokhfirooz,

2646165, at *4; see, e.g., K.E.O. v. Woosley, Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-74-RGJ,

2553394, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 4, 2025) (noting “courts across the country have ordered 17 the release of individuals” in ICE custody where ICE “violated their own regulations”); 18 Rombot v. Souza,

, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2017); Grigorian v. Bondi, CASE 19 NO. 25-cv-22914-RAR,

, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (“The failure 20 to provide [the petitioner] with an informal interview promptly after his detention or to 21 otherwise provide a meaningful opportunity to contest the reasons for revocation violates 22 23 24 4 See Louangmilith v. Noem, Case No.: 25-cv-2502-JES-MSB,

, at *3– 25 4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); Medina v. Noem, Case No. 25-cv-1768-ABA,

, at *12 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2025) (denying habeas petition without prejudice 26 because the petitioner, unlike in this case, had “not pointed to authority showing that the 27 remedy for a violation of [§ 241.4] (if such a violation has occurred) is release from detention.”). 28 1 ICE’s own regulations and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. This compels 2 ||[the petitioner’s] release.”). This Court reaches the same conclusion. ICE’s failure to 3 ||comply with both

and § 241.13 violated Petitioner’s due process rights. 4 ||See Diaz,

, at *7 (“DHS’s failure to follow its own procedural 5 ||regulations may constitute a due process violation.”); M.S.L.,

, at *11 6 || (“ICE’s failure to provide [the petitioner] with a timely Notice of Revocation or conduct 7 || an informal interview until nearly a month after taking her into custody is a grave violation 8 || of [the petitioner’s] due process rights in that they deprived her both of meaningful notice 9 ||and an opportunity to be heard.”). 10 Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. In light of the disposition herein, the Court 11 || declines to address the remaining grounds in the Petition for seeking release.° 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 14 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 15 subject to his preexisting Order of Supervision. 16 2. Petitioner’s TRO Motion (Doc. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 |} DATE: November 6, 2025 19 Za Borredes, 0 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 > Petitioner requested a hearing on any material, disputed facts. (Doc. 1 at 21.) Respondents did not address the need for a hearing, despite the Order to Show Cause 27 || requiring them to “mak[e] a recommendation regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing 28 on the Petition.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) Because the Court does not rely on any disputed facts in resolving the Petition, it finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. 11