Cyrus Hazari v. County of Santa Clara, et al.

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION CYRUS HAZARI, Case No. 5:19-cv-04392-BLF Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., DISQUALIFY AND MOTION FOR Defendants. CHANGE OF VENUE 13 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Cyrus Hazari’s combined motion to disqualify the undersigned and motion for change of venue. ECF No. 130 (“Mot.”). The matter is suitable for decision without a oral hearing and does not require a response from Defendants. See Civ. L.R. 7- 1(b). The motion is DENIED.

17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Mr. Hazari instituted this action by filing a complaint against the County of Santa Clara on July 31, 2019, asserting eighteen claims for, inter alia, “EQUAL PROTECTION,” FRAUD,” and “VANDALISM.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 276–93. In the complaint, Mr. Hazari alleged that the County and other Defendants carried out a conspiracy to deny him a residential building permit and, more broadly, to harass him. Id. ¶¶ 67–68.

23 After twice extending Mr. Hazari’s deadline to serve Defendants, see ECF Nos. 8, 12, on February 25, 2020, the Court granted his administrative motion for disability accommodations and stayed proceedings for 90 days. ECF No. 16. The Court granted his second administrative motion for disability accommodations and extended the stay for an additional 90 days on June 10, 2020, see ECF No. 25, as well as his third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth motions, each the Court granted Mr. Hazari’s tenth administrative motion for disability accommodations and extended the stay for a year. ECF No. 75.

3 On March 10, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Hazari’s eleventh administrative motion, explaining that Mr. Hazari’s contention that his disability prevents him from prosecuting his case is contradicted by his rapid, prolix filings in this case. ECF No. 87 at 2; see also ECF No. 93 (order denying motion for reconsideration). On April 14, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Hazari’s motion to disqualify the undersigned because the motion was “based on his disagreement with the Court’s order denying his request to stay the case.” ECF No. 98 at 3. The Court dismissed the complaint on July 1, 2025, for failure to state a claim: In recognition of Mr. Hazari’s medical issues, the Court gave him ninety days to amend instead of the standard fourteen days. ECF No. 122 at 8.

12 Instead of filing an amended complaint, Mr. Hazari filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 127. Defendants subsequently filed an administrative motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute, see ECF No. 128, which the Court denied in recognition of Mr. Hazari’s pro se status. ECF No. 129. The Court extended the deadline to file an amended complaint to November 4, 2025. Id. at 2. Mr. Hazari filed the present motion instead of an amended complaint.

18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Section 455(a) states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Section 455(b) states that the judge “shall also disqualify [her]self . . . [w]here [she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” The same substantive standard applies to each subsection. See United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged “that section 455(a) claims are fact driven, and as a result, the analysis of a particular section 455(a) claim must be guided, not by comparison to similar situations addressed by prior jurisprudence, but rather by an independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances of 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[A] judge has ‘as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as [she] does to recuse when the law and facts require.’” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995)). “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. 07-cv-00915-JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N. D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2007).

7 A district court may, in the interest of justice, transfer any civil action “to any other district or division where it might have been brought” for the convenience of the parties and of the witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To determine if a transfer of venue is appropriate under § 1404(a), courts apply a two-part test. First, courts consider whether the case could have been brought in the proposed transferee district. Second, if the case could have been brought in the transferee district, courts determine if the case should be moved to that forum for convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1985); Ponomarenko v. Shapiro, 287 F. Supp. 3d 816, 833 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Mr. Hazari argues that disqualification is appropriate because the undersigned has “tortured the plaintiff, continued to coerce and intimidate his unaccommodated and unequalized [sic] participation despite considerable authorities and analysis which he provided to the record, appealing to her reason and condemning by inevitability of findings of law [sic], her unlawful and unethical conduct by repeated educational coverage of applicable law and precedents.” Mot. at 2.

21 In the Court’s order denying Mr. Hazari’s first motion to disqualify, the Court explained to Mr. Hazari that disagreement with the Court’s ruling on a motion is not a ground for disqualification. ECF No. 98 at 3 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)). Mr. Hazari further argues that the Court’s orders granting his original complaint and denying his motion for a preliminary injunction were issued with “intent to cause the plaintiff serious pain and suffering.” Mot. at 3, 7. This argument amounts to no more than disagreement with the Court’s orders and again does not support biased or prejudiced, or that her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, disqualification is || not appropriate.

3 Mr. Hazari also argues that these proceeding should be transferred to the U.S. District || Court for the Northern District of New York, Mot. at 16, to promote “judicial efficiency by avoiding bias-related continuances and motion practice,” id. at 10. Mr. Hazari has not established || that this action could be brought in the Northern District of New York, or any other judicial district for that matter. Transfer of venue is thus inappropriate.

8 For the reasons described above, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion is DENIED. In the interest of allowing this case to go forward on the merits, the Court will again || grant a limited period of time to file an amended complaint. Mr. Hazari SHALL file an amended 11 complaint no later than fourteen days after the date of this order. Mr. Hazari is advised that the || Court will not extend the deadline again absent a showing of good cause and that failure to file an 13 amended pleading will result in dismissal with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 Dated: November 6, 2025 ETH LABSON FREEMAN 18 United States District Judge