2 3

4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 JODETTE RENEE DENNIS, Case No. 1:24-cv-01520-EPG 13 Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 14 v. SECURITY COMPLAINT 15 FRANK BISIGNANO, (ECF Nos. 1, 13, 15). COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an 19 unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding her 20 application for supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to entry of 21 final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of

(c), 22 with any appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 9). 23 Plaintiff presents the following issues: 24 1. The ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because 25 he failed in his duty to complete the record and obtain an opinion of Plaintiff’s mental RFC from a medical professional. 26 2. The ALJ’s RFC determination is unsupported by substantial evidence as he 27 failed to properly assess the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating provider, Dr. Do, in accordance with the prevailing rules and regulations. 28 2 Having reviewed the record, the administrative transcript, the parties’ briefs, and the 3 applicable law, the Court finds as follows. 4 I. ANALYSIS 5 a. Whether the RFC determination was Supported by Substantial Evidence 6 Without an Updated Medical Opinion 7 Plaintiff challenges the RFC formulated by the ALJ “the record before the ALJ contained 8 no opinions of Plaintiff’s functional limitations from a medical professional.” (ECF No. 13, p.6). 9 In its response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly considered the evidence 10 and reached a reasonable conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s mental limitations. (ECF No. 15, p. 4). 11 A claimant’s RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20

(a), 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, 13 § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the 14 capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs”). “In 15 determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, 16 including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain, 17 that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 18 Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 19 ALJ has a duty to develop the record “only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record 20 is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari,

, 21 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter,

(9th Cir. 2001)). 22 The ALJ, not a doctor, “is responsible for assessing” a claimant’s RFC.

416.946(c) (“the administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional 24 capacity”). An ALJ is presumed “capable of independently reviewing and forming conclusions 25 about medical evidence.” Farlow v. Kijakazi,

, 488 (9th Cir. 2022). See also Bufkin 26 v. Saul,

, 579 (9th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“ALJs need not seek the opinion of 27 a medical expert every time they review new medical evidence and make a RFC determination.”). 28 In reviewing findings of fact with respect to RFC assessments, the Court determines 2 evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales,

(1971), 3 but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

(9th Cir. 4 1975). Substantial evidence is “an extremely deferential standard.” Thomas v. CalPortland Co., 5

(9th Cir. 2021). “It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 6 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson,

(internal citation 7 omitted). 8 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC was not supported by substantial evidence because the 9 ALJ did not have an updated medical opinion that would explain “how Plaintiff’s unique 10 impairments resulted in functional limitations” (ECF No. 13, p.7). Furthermore, Plaintiff contends 11 that the ALJ was not qualified to draw conclusions from the medical evidence in the record when 12 determining Plaintiff’s mental functional limitations by focusing on the lack of objective findings 13 in the record because the Plaintiff’s mental illness “did not lend itself to such findings. (ECF No. 14 13, pp. 6-7). 15 As described above, the ALJ may draw certain conclusions from the medical evidence 16 without obtaining a medical opinion. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ required a 17 medical opinion to interpret the medical evidence presented. For example, the ALJ reviewed the 18 following clinical observations about Plaintiff’s mood and affect, which did not require a medical 19 opinion to interpret: [T]he objective clinical evidence shows treatment providers have regularly observed the 20 claimant to present as a cooperative individual with a euthymic mood and affect, which is 21 consistent with an individual capable of engaging in occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors (Exhibits B-5F, 4, 7, 10, 21; B7F, 22; B-19F, 22 3, 6, 8, 10, 14, 19, 28). Furthermore, the claimant has never been fired from a job due to having problems getting along with others in the workplace, and she reported getting 23 along “just fine” with persons in positions of authority, such as supervisors and bosses 24 (Exhibit B-12E, 6). And, even during office visits during which the claimant has displayed a guarded, worried, sad, and depressed mood and affect, treatment providers noted the 25 claimant was nevertheless cooperative, appropriate, and established good rapport with her provider (Exhibit B5F, 18-21). 26 (A.R. 31 citing A.R. 514, 636, 639, 642, ,650 651, 652, 653, 814, 1023, 1026, 1028, 1030, 1034, 27 1039, 1048). Similarly, the ALJ reviewed the descriptions of Plaintiff by treatment providers, 28 [T] he medical evidence shows treatment providers describe the claimant as an 2 “attentive,” alert, and oriented individual with normal concentration abilities (Exhibits B- 3 5F/, 4, 21; B- 7F, 20-22; B-19F, 11). The medical evidence from the period at issue further shows treatment providers have regularly observed the claimant to exhibit logical 4 and goal-directed thought processes (Exhibits B-5F, 4, 7, 10, 21; B-7F, 22; B-10F, 11, 20, 23, 27, 30; B-19F, 3, 6, 8, 10, 14, 19, 28). Further, treatment notes from 2023 and 2024, 5 show that the claimant continued to have mental health stability with medication 6 management (Exhibit B-23F). As such, the substantial evidence is consistent with an individual capable of sustaining sufficient attention to persist at simple tasks throughout 7 the day provided there are no strict time deadlines or high quota demands. 8 (A.R. 32, citing A.R. 636, 639, 642, 653, 812-814, 843, 852, 855, 859, 862, 1023, 1026, 1028, 9 1030, 1031,1034, 1039, 1048, 1201-1256). 10 The ALJ also relied on descriptions of Plaintiff’s activities, which similarly did not 11 require a medical opinion to understand: Despite her allegations, the claimant admitted in her disability filings that she is capable of 12 performing a variety of daily tasks that require one to understand, remember, and apply 13 learned information, such as operating a motor vehicle to navigate public roadways in order to shop for necessities in stores, pay bills, and prepare simple meals (Exhibit B- 14 12E). At the hearing the claimant similarly admitted that since her alleged onset date, she 15 helped care for her uncle until he passed away in 2023. She admitted that she could cook meals, clean windows, vacuum, and empty the trash. She stated that she watches shows 16 during the day, takes care of plants, cares for animals, shops in stores, cooks, dinner, and attends church. The claimant’s admissions and reported activities demonstrate the 17 claimant was and is less limited than she alleged. 18 (A.R. 30). 19 Notably, although Plaintiff cites cases for the proposition that “an ALJ, as a layperson, is 20 not qualified to interpret raw data in a medical record,” Plaintiff does not point to any specific 21 raw data that it believes required a medical opinion to interpret. 22 Additionally, the ALJ reviewed the medical opinions from prior administrative findings, 23 as follows: 24 At the initial state agency level, in April 2019, Anna Franco, Psy.D., found the claimant had non- severe depression and PTSD because the medical evidence established no 25 limitations understanding, remembering, and applying information, mild limitations interacting with others, mild limitations concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, 26 and mild limitations adapting and managing themselves (Exhibits B-A3). W. Jackson, 27 M.D., found the claimant had severe degenerative disc disease and hypertension that limited her to the performance of medium work with frequent stooping and crouching, and 28 occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds (Exhibit B-3A). At the state agency agreed with and affirmed the medical findings and determinations below in full (Exhibit 2 B-5A). 3 (A.R. 32). Although the ALJ found these opinions to be only somewhat persuasive for the 4 reasons set forth in the opinion, they did provide another source of medical opinion evidence in 5 the record. 6 Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence even 7 without an updated medical opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations. 8 b. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion evidence of Dr. Do 9 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess the opinion of Plaintiff’s 10 treating provider, Dr. Do, and as a result the RFC determination is unsupported by substantial 11 evidence. (ECF No. 13, p.7). 12 Plaintiff applied for benefits in January 2020, so certain regulations concerning how ALJs 13 must evaluate medical opinions for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, govern this case. 20

.1520c, 416.920c. (A.R. 17). These regulations set “supportability” and 15 “consistency” as “the most important factors” when determining an opinion’s persuasiveness. 20

.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Although the regulations eliminate the “physician 17 hierarchy,” deference to specific medical opinions, and assignment of specific “weight” to a 18 medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions” 19 and “how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.”

.1520c(a)- 20 (b); 416.920c(a)-(b). Moreover, “the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be 21 supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi,

(9th Cir. 2022). In 22 conjunction with this requirement, “[t]he agency must ‘articulate . . .. how persuasive’ it finds ‘all 23 the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source,

.1520c(b), and ‘explain 24 how [it] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings,

§ 25 404.1520c(b)(2).” Woods,

. 26 The ALJ addressed Dr. Do’s opinion in the following section: 27 28 limited to performing less than the full range of sedentary work, including 2 standing/walking for less than 2 hours total during 8-hour workday, sitting for about 2 hours total during an 8-hour workday, and would miss 3 days of work per month (Exhibit 3 B-21F). Dr. Do’s opinions are minimally persuasive, in part because Dr. Do did not provide any objective support for his various opinion statements. Furthermore, at the time 4 Dr. Do rendered those opinions, he had a limited treatment relationship consisting of only 5 3 telephonic office visits, and Dr. Do’s clinic notes do not lend any objective clinical support for his opinion statements. Furthermore, Dr. Do’s opinions are inconsistent with 6 exam findings from other providers describing the claimant as an individual who displays grossly intact neurological functioning, full 5/5 motor strength, and full range of motion 7 with the extremities (Exhibit B-6F, 5, 10, 14, 18, 23, 28, 31, 34, 37, 41, 45, 49, 52). For 8 these reasons, Dr. Do’s opinions are minimally persuasive. 9 (A.R. 33). 10 As an initial matter, the ALJ properly addressed how it considered the supportability and 11 consistency factors when assessing the persuasiveness of Dr. Do’s opinion. The ALJ addressed 12 the support for Dr. Do’s opinions, including the limited treating relationship with Plaintiff and 13 lack of objective clinical support. The ALJ also addressed the consistency between Dr. Do’s 14 opinions and exam findings from other providers. 15 Plaintiff challenges one part of this opinion by claiming that Dr. Do specifically provided 16 objective support for his assessment of the Plaintiff, noting that Plaintiff had a “prominence of 17 fingers joints with bony deformities and a history of orthopedic conditions contributing to her 18 current physical limitations.” (Id.). 19 However, as the Commissioner points out, “bony deformities in Plaintiff’s finger joints 20 was not relevant to Dr. Do’s opinion that Plaintiff had significant limitations in sitting, standing, 21 and walking.” (ECF No. 15, at p. 6). The Court also agrees with the Commissioner that merely 22 noting that Plaintiff has a history of orthopedic conditions does not constitute objective clinical 23 support for Dr. Do’s conclusions. (ECF No. 15, at p. 6). 24 Plaintiff next argues that Dr. Do’s three telephonic visits were still more than the state 25 agency consultants, who did not examine Plaintiff. (ECF No. 13, at p.8-9). However, it was 26 reasonable for the ALJ to consider this limited contact with Plaintiff in assessing Dr. Do’s 27 opinion, among other reasons, especially where that opinion was inconsistent with other exam 28 findings. 1 Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Do’s opinion was consistent with medical records dated from 2 | 2021-2023 that were not cited by the ALJ. (ECF No. 13, at p. 9). However, the Court need not 3 | reweigh the medical evidence, especially where Dr. Do’s opinion does not cite to or rely on any 4 | specific document in his medical source statement. Moreover, elsewhere the ALJ discusses the 5 | later treatment notes that Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have addressed: 6 However, physical exam findings show treatment providers have observed the claimant to present as an alert and oriented individual who displays grossly intact neurological 7 functioning, full 5/5 motor strength, and full range of motion with the extremities (Exhibits B-6F, 5, 10, 14,18, 23, 28, 31, 34, 37, 41, 45, 49, 52; B-17F; B-18F; B-19F). 8 Treatment notes in 2023 show infrequent complaints, but a finding of COPD in December 9 2023, as the claimant had moderate emphysematous changes (Exhibit B-22F). ALR. 31). 10 | S ) Wl Accordingly, the Court finds that the RFC determination was supported by substantial b evidence and the ALJ did not err in its determination of the persuasiveness of Dr. Do’s opinion. B I. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 Based on the above reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 1s affirmed. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social 16 Security and to close this case. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 | Dated: _ September 29, 2025 [sJ ee heey UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28