Rogelio TORRES VELASQUEZ v. Kristi NOEM, et al.

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Rogelio TORRES VELASQUEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-3046-AGS-DEB 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE v. Kristi NOEM, et al., 7 Respondents.

9 Petitioner Rogelio Torres Velasquez seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of those Rules to any “habeas corpus petition”).

15 In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 19 Torres Velasquez alleges that he’s been in immigration custody since “August 26, 2025.” (ECF 1, at 2.) He claims to be subject to mandatory detention and “categorically ineligible for a bond hearing under” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and he has thus been denied bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. (ECF 1, at 2, 10.) This is because a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in “Matter of Yajure Hurtado” held that “noncitizens who entered without inspection and were later apprehended in the interior are categorically ineligible for bond hearings.” (ECF 1, at 13.) Petitioner charges that detention based on Yajure Hurtado “violates the plain text of the INA, decades of longstanding agency practice, and the constitutional guarantees of Due Process.” (Id. at 2.)

1 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally ||identical cases across the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the ||merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25- || cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[T]he Court || concludes that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section || 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); ||see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1 ||(W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Every district court to address this question has concluded |/that the government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory ||interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); Quispe v. || Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1471-AJT-LRV, 2025 WL 2783799, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, |}2025) (“Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary framework, not || § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures, as at least thirty federal district courts around || the country, including two in this Circuit, have concluded when faced with habeas petitions || from comparably situated petitioners.”).

17 By November 26, 2025, respondents must answer the petition. Any reply by || petitioner must be filed by December 10, 2025. The Court will hold oral arguments on the || petition on December 17, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.

20 || Dated: November 12, 2025 2 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge