1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STANLEY H. SOLVEY, Case No. 2:24-cv-1756-DC-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CDCR, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Stanley H. Solvey, a state prisoner, brings this action against nine defendants, all medical 19 personnel, and alleges numerous violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He 20 also raises state law claims related to these violations. The claims raised, however, are not 21 sufficiently related to proceed together. I will dismiss the first amended complaint, ECF No. 33, 22 with leave to amend so that plaintiff may bring only related claims. I will also deny defendants’ 23 request for screening of the complaint as moot. ECF No. 35. 24 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 25 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 26 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 27 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 28 1 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 2 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 3 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 5 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). The plausibility standard does not 6 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 8 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 9 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr.,

, 10 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 11 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.,

, 1264 12 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 13 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 15 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 16 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr.,

(9th Cir. 2017). 17 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 18 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

, 19 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents,

(9th Cir. 1982)). 20 II. Analysis 21 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges four different violations of his Eighth Amendment right to 22 medical care: 23 First, he alleges that, in November 2022, defendant Anand Mehta, a physician, decreased 24 his insulin prescription without consulting an endocrinologist, resulting in inflammation, nerve 25 pain, and eyesight issues from inadequately controlled diabetes. ECF No. 33 at 10-11. Mehta 26 allegedly then cancelled plaintiff’s medical appointments in February and March 2023, leaving 27 him to suffer the aforementioned maladies. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that Mehta decreased his 28 insulin in retaliation for grievances filed against other medical providers. Id. at 14. 1 Second, he claims that, on February 7, 2023, defendant George, a registered nurse, failed 2 to summon medical care for him after he complained of nerve pain in his feet. Id. at 15. He 3 claims that after he complained about this encounter in a grievance, George retaliated against him 4 by not scheduling an appointment for him to receive hearing aids. Id. 5 Third, he claims that, on February 19, 2023, defendant Mendoza, a registered nurse, tried 6 to persuade him to use another inmate’s insulin needle, putting him at risk of contracting 7 hepatitis. Id. at 16-17. 8 Fourth, plaintiff alleges that defendant Royal, a medical assistant, declined to adequately 9 increase his insulin and abruptly ended a healthcare visit on March 7, 2023, after learning that he 10 had filed multiple grievances against defendant Mehta. Id. at 19. He claims that the curtailment 11 of the appointment also resulted in stomach pain from irritable bowel syndrome that went 12 undiagnosed for months. Id. at 20. 13 Then, with respect to defendants Gates, McDaniel, Ferris, and Flores, plaintiff alleges 14 only that they were aware, by way of grievances that he filed, that his medical needs were not 15 being met. Id. at 21. 16 Plaintiff alleges that each of these eight named defendants, excluding the California 17 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation itself, were part of a conspiracy to withhold 18 adequate medical treatment in retaliation for his lawsuits and prison grievances. Id. at 22. He 19 claims that the conspiracy originated in November 2022 and that these individuals had meetings 20 at which they planned their retaliatory actions. Id. 21 The various medical claims raised by plaintiff cannot proceed against multiple defendants 22 in the same action. See George v. Smith,

(7th Cir. 2007). They implicate 23 different and unrelated medical encounters; whether defendant Mehta wrongfully decreased his 24 insulin prescription in November 2022 is a separate question, factually and legally, from whether 25 defendant Mendoza tried to force him to use a contaminated needle in February 2023. Allowing 26 these disparate claims to proceed together would turn the action into an unwieldy mess at every 27 stage of the litigation. Moreover, litigants are not permitted to skirt filing fees for what should be 28 multiple cases by packing all their claims into a single bloated action. I recognize that plaintiff 1 | attempts to join these disparate allegations by claiming that they were all part of a campaign of 2 | retaliation against him for filing prison grievances and lawsuits against healthcare providers. 3 | ECF No. 33 at 22. He offers no specific allegations as to how he knows that all the defendants 4 | were engaged in this broad campaign, however. Moreover, courts have rejected attempts by 5 | litigants to join unrelated claims in this manner. See, e.g., Walker v. Kernan, No. 2:17-cv-1764 6 | KJM-DB (P), 2019 US. Dist. LEXIS 134668, *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2019) (“Simply alleging a 7 || ‘conspiracy’ does not transform unrelated claims into related claims.”). 8 I will give plaintiff an opportunity to amend so that he may bring only related claims. He 9 | is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. 10 | Maricopa County,

, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended complaint 11 | should be titled “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. 12 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 13 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, ECF No. 33, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 14 2. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended 15 | complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice. 16 3. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may 17 | result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed 18 || with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 19 4. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order. 20 5. Defendants’ request for screening of the first amended complaint, ECF No. 35, is 21 | DENIED as moot. 22 73 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ( q Sty — Dated: _ October 7, 2025 ow—— 25 JEREMY D,. PETERSON 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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