1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 SERGEI STOLIAROV et al., Case No.: 3:25-cv-01095-RBM-JLB

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 11 v. MOTION TO DISMISS FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) 12 UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES, UR M. 13 [Doc. 13] JADDOU,

14 Defendants. 15 16 17 On April 30, 2025, Plaintiffs Sergei Stoliarov, Olga Stoliarova, Egor Stoliarov, Gleb 18 Stoliarov, Daria Stoliarova, and Varvara Stoliarova (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding 19 pro se, filed a Complaint seeking to expedite the processing of their applications for 20 adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents (“Complaint”). (Doc. 1.) On September 21 22, 2025, Defendants United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and 22 Director of USCIS Ur M. Jaddou (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss 23 with a noticed hearing date of November 17, 2025 (“Motion to Dismiss”). (Doc. 13). 24 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ deadline to file an opposition in response to Defendants’ Motion 25 to Dismiss was therefore on November 3, 2025. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e) (“[A] party 26 opposing a motion . . . must file that opposition or statement of non-opposition . . . no later 27 than fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the noticed hearing date.”). No opposition has 28 been filed to date. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is therefore considered unopposed. See 1 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(f)(3)(c) (providing that the failure to oppose a motion “may constitute 2 a consent to the granting of a motion or other request for ruling by the court.”); Ghazali v. 3 Moran,

, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of an unopposed motion to 4 dismiss under local rule by deeming a pro se litigant’s failure to oppose as consent to 5 granting the motion). 6 I. DISCUSSION 7 In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ applications for 8 adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents were approved therefore rendering their 9 Complaint moot. (Doc. 13 at 2.) The Court finds dismissal for lack of subject-matter 10 jurisdiction is appropriate on this basis. 11 An action becomes moot when “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the 12 parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529

, 287 (2000) (citation omitted). “The basic question in determining mootness is 14 whether there is a present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.” Ruiz v. 15 City of Santa Maria,

, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. 16 Gordon,

(9th Cir. 1988)). Indeed, an action “should . . . be dismissed 17 as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a [federal court] cannot grant ‘any 18 effectual relief.’” Calderon v. Moore,

(1996) (citation omitted). 19 In this case, the only relief Plaintiffs seek in their Complaint is an order requiring 20 Defendants to adjudicate their applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent 21 residents. (Doc. 1 at 8.) However, on August 28, 2025, Defendants approved and thereby 22 adjudicated Plaintiffs’ applications. (Doc. 13 at 2; see Doc. 13-1 at 5–10.) Because 23 Plaintiffs have already received their requested relief, there is no longer a case or 24 controversy for the Court to resolve. Plaintiffs’ claims are therefore rendered moot. See 25 Aguirre v. S.S. Sohio Intrepid,

, 1189 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Where the question 26 sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments subsequent to the filing of the 27 complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented.”). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 28 therefore GRANTED. l I. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is 3 || GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to 4 || close this case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 |} DATE: November 18, 2025 7 gat Basmals, Micteryy 8 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ'MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28