1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL C. STERNBERG, et al., Case No. 24-cv-04271-AMO

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 CINDY HENDRICKSON, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 40, 46 Defendants. 11

12 13 Self-represented Plaintiff Michael C. Sternberg, on behalf of himself and his two children, 14 E.W. and N.W.,1 sues, among other defendants, attorneys Magdalena Chattopadhya, Gina 15 Policastri, and their respective law firms, Magdalena Law Group, and Lonich Patton Ehrlich 16 Policastri (together, the “Defendants”),2 for conduct that allegedly occurred in the course of the 17 legal representation they provided in connection with child custody proceedings concerning E.W. 18 and N.W. In the operative complaint, Sternberg assert claims against Defendants for violation of 19 his 1st and 14th amendment rights under

, for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 20 § 2201, and for conspiracy and fraud. Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. No. 20) at 33-34. Defendants 21 move to dismiss. Policastri & LPEP Motion to Dismiss (“LPEP MTD”) (Dkt. No. 40); 22 Chattopadhya & Magdalena Law Group Motion to Dismiss (“MLG MTD”) (Dkt. No. 46). For the 23

24 1 The claims of E.W. and N.W. were dismissed without prejudice by separate order. See Dkt. Nos. 78, 80. Accordingly, this order only applies to the claims Sternberg asserts in his own right 25 against Defendants.

26 2 Sternberg asks that Attorneys Jason Sommer and Alex Graft be referred to the Standing Committee on Professional Conduct. The Court declines to do so based on the assertions in 27 Sternberg’s opposition briefs. See Response to Policastri & LPEP Motion to Dismiss (“LPEP 1 reasons set forth below, the motions are GRANTED. 2 As a general matter, the allegations in the operative complaint are deficient. For example, 3 while Sternberg asserts Section 1983 claims against Defendants, such claims are not actionable 4 against “lawyer[s] in private practice who w[ere] not acting under color of state law.” 5 See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Ct.,

(9th Cir. 2003). The 6 conclusory allegations of conspiracy and collusion in the operative complaint, including the 7 allegations that Defendants worked “in cahoots with opposing counsel and the corrupt judges of 8 the Santa Clara County Superior Court” and “worked hand in glove with the judges who violated 9 [his] rights,” see Compl. at 33-34, are insufficient to establish otherwise. See Simmons,

at 1161 (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the lawyer was conspiring with state officers to 11 deprive him of due process are insufficient.”). 12 Sternberg’s conspiracy claim is also insufficiently pleaded. As a preliminary matter, the 13 operative complaint does not specify the legal basis for Sternberg’s conspiracy claim. See 14 generally Compl. Sternberg’s opposition briefs, however, address conspiracy under Section 1983, 15 and the Court construes the claim accordingly. LPEP Opp. at 3, 4; MLG Opp. at 8. Analyzed 16 under Section 1983, Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is not viable because “a conspiracy to violate 17 constitutional rights must be predicated on a viable underlying constitutional claim[,]” Steel v. City 18 of San Diego,

(S.D. Cal. 2010), which as discussed above, Sternberg 19 has not adequately pleaded. Nor has Sternberg alleged facts to support an inference that state 20 officials and Defendants “reached an understanding” to deprive Sternberg of his constitutional 21 rights, and that Defendants were “willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its 22 agents.” See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,

(1970). 23 Sternberg’s fraud claim also fails. Sternberg’s allegations that “Policastri lied to [him] 24 about the nature of [a] hearing, and that she had objected to the alteration of [a] stipulation[,]” 25 Compl. ¶ 119, that he “relied on [Defendants’] false representations that they would vigorously 26 represent [his] interests in [his] family case,” id. at 33, and that they “defrauded [him] out of over 27 $200,000,” id. at 34, do not provide “ ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct 1 R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 2 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 3 || person's mind may be alleged generally.”’). 4 Given these threshold pleading deficiencies, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to 5 dismiss without reaching the parties’ remaining arguments’ and DENIES AS MOOT the LPEP 6 || Defendants’ request for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 41. Because Sternberg represents that “[t]here 7 are... numerous other facts [he] can allege,” LPEP Opp. at 6, MGL Opp. at 11, the Court 8 || GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND so that Sternberg has an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in 9 || his current complaint. The Court will set a deadline for the second amended complaint once all 10 || motions to dismiss, including any forthcoming motion to dismiss by defendants who Sternberg has 11 not yet served, are resolved. Other than curing the deficiencies discussed in the dismissal orders 12 || issued in this case, the second amended complaint may not plead new substantive allegations, 5 13 name new defendants, or assert new claims without the defendants’ consent or leave of Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: November 18, 2025 16 ol □

8 ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 3 This includes the MLG Defendants’ arguments that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this suit 07 and that the Court should abstain under Younger v. Harris,

(1971) due to parallel state and federal proceedings, which are better addressed after Sternberg has an opportunity to properly 28 allege the factual basis of his claims. See MLG MTD at 12, 14.