1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FIDEL AROSTEGUI-CAMPO, Case No.: 25-CV-3064 JLS (MMP)

12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 14 KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the FOR TEMPORARY Department of Homeland Security, et al., 15 RESTRAINING ORDER Respondents. 16 (ECF Nos. 1, 3) 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Fidel Arostegui-Campo’s Petition for Writ 19 of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

(“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) and Motion for 20 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO,” ECF No. 3). Also before the Court is Respondents 21 Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), Pamela Bondi’s 22 (Attorney General of the United States), Todd Lyons’s (Acting Director of Immigration 23 Customs Enforcement), Jesus Rocha’s (Acting Field Director, San Diego Field Office), 24 and Christopher LaRose’s (Senior Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center) (collectively, 25 “Respondents”) Return in Opposition to the Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 9), and 26 Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 10). See generally Docket. For the reasons 27 set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 28 1 (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining 2 Order (ECF No. 3). 3 BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner, a Cuban national, has been detained by the United States Department of 5 Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement division at the Otay Mesa 6 Detention Facility since October 21, 2025. Pet. at 5. Petitioner entered the United States 7 around 19701 as a refugee with his mother.

. On January 29, 1987, following a 8 conviction of a controlled substance offense, an Immigration Judge ordered him deported 9 to Cuba.

After being unable to remove Petitioner to Cuba, Petitioner was released. 10 Ret. at 2. Petitioner was convicted of multiple subsequent offenses and sentenced to state 11 custody.

Petitioner was transferred to immigration custody on October 27, 1993, and 12 later released on January 26, 1994, on an Order of Supervision as ICE was unable to remove 13 him to Cuba.

On April 20, 1995, “ICE re-detained Petitioner due to a criminal violation 14 of his parole and transferred him to state custody on September 13, 1995.”

Petitioner 15 was released from state custody in 1998.

On March 8, 2000, Petitioner was convicted 16 of another controlled substance offense and sentenced to state imprisonment.

17 Following his release, ICE re-detained Petitioner on September 11, 2003, and on February 18 6, 2004, again released him on an Order of Supervision due to failed repatriation efforts to 19 Cuba.

20 In the twenty-one years since his last release, Petitioner has reported to immigration 21 officials every year, never missed an appointment, and never violated the terms of his 22 supervision. Pet. at 4. Petitioner is married and has an eleven-year-old son.

Petitioner 23 is employed, the sole income-producer of his family, and is a member of his neighborhood 24 watch and the trade show union.

On October 21, 2025, Petitioner reported to ICE for 25 his yearly check-in and was detained.

The only explanation being that his re-detention 26

27 28 1 The Petition lists 1970 as the date of entry. Pet at 4. The Return lists 1971 as the date of entry. Ret. at 1 was “due to the administration.”

Petitioner was given a Notice of Revocation of 2 Release with the standard language, “This decision has been made based on a review of 3 your official alien file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your 4 case.” Ret. at 32 Ex. 4. Respondents state that at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention he 5 was “interviewed about his legal status to remain in the United States and was verbally 6 informed that his Order of Supervision was being revoked and that he was being detained 7 to execute his final order of removal.”

. Respondents allege that “ICE has been 8 working diligently to effectuate his removal.”

However, Cuba has denied accepting 9 Petitioner.

Respondents state that “ICE identified Mexico as a third country where 10 Petitioner may be removed,” but “[w]hile in the process of pursuing removal efforts to 11 Mexico, ICE was notified of the Court’s order preventing Petitioner’s removal.”

. 12 Respondents further allege that, due to ICE’s prior success obtaining Mexico’s acceptances 13 in similar cases, “ICE expects that Mexico will accept Petitioner for third country 14 resettlement within a day of the request.”

Therefore, the declaring officer concludes 15 that “there is a significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 16

17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 19 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 20 his confinement pursuant to

. See

(a). The sole judicial 21 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 22 court of appeals. See generally

; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 23

, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act,

Stat. 24 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 25 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 26 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 27

, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 28 1

(2018); Alvarez v. Sessions,

, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2 2018) (citations omitted). 3 DISCUSSION 4 When an alien has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a 5 final order of removal has been entered, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending 6 the government’s efforts to secure their removal. See

(a)(1). This ninety- 7 day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the removal 8 period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably 9 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does not permit 10 indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis,

(2001). A six-month period 11 of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” 12

. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to “provide[] 13 good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 14 foreseeable future.”

If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts to the 15 Government to rebut that showing.

“[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the period 16 of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable 17 future’ conversely would have to shrink.”

“[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably 18 foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.”

. In that 19 case, the alien’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of conditioned 20 release, including an order of supervised release.

. 21 Once ICE releases a non-citizen on supervised release, “ICE’s ability to re-detain 22 that noncitizen is constrained by its own regulations.” Nouri v. Herrera, SA CV 25-1905- 23 JFW(DBT),

, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (internal 24 citation omitted). ICE may re-detain a non-citizen released on an Order of Supervision “if, 25 on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood 26 that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. 27 § 241.13(i)(2). ICE may also re-detain if the non-citizen “violates any of the conditions of 28 release.” § 241.13(i)(1). If ICE chooses to re-detain, the non-citizen must “be notified of 1 the reasons for revocation” and be afforded “an initial informal interview promptly after 2 [his] return to . . . custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for 3 revocation stated in the notification.” § 241.13(i)(3). The non-citizen may “submit any 4 evidence or information that [he] believes shows there is no significant likelihood [he may] 5 be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that [he] has not violated the order of 6 supervision.” Id. 7 Here, Petitioner was ordered removed in 1987. Pet. at 4. Petitioner was released on 8 an Order of Supervision several times, most recently in February of 2004, presumably, 9 because his removal was not foreseeable. Ret. at 1–2; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700 10 (“[I]f removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention 11 unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.”). Petitioner was re-detained by ICE 12 agents at his annual ICE check-in on October 21, 2025. Pet. at 5. The only notice Petitioner 13 received regarding the reasons for his re-detention was a form revocation letter and a 14 statement from the ICE officer that “it was due to the administration.” Id.; Traverse at 7; 15 see also Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2391 BTM (BLM),

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 16 Oct. 27, 2025) (holding that this “notice must be in writing and contain all the reasons for 17 the revocation of the alien’s release”). This notice simply states that the revocation was 18 “based on a review of your official alien file and a determination that there are changed 19 circumstances in your case.” Traverse at 7. This plain statement is insufficient to provide 20 notice. See, e.g., Xayakesone v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2995-JES-BJW,

, at 21 *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding notice insufficient when it stated that the “decision 22 has been made based on a review of your official alien file and a determination that there 23 are changed circumstances in your case”); Rokhifirooz v. Larose, No. 25-cv-2053-RSH- 24 VET,

, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (same). 25 Further, while ICE agents did conduct an interview immediately after detaining 26 Petitioner, this interview could not have provided Petitioner with “an opportunity to 27 respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification,”

(i)(3), 28 because there was no notification. See Nouri,

, at *11 1 (“Petitioner cannot be expected to ‘respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the 2 notification’ when the [n]otice does not actually state any reasons for revocation.”); 3 Rasakhamdee v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2816-RBM-DEB,

, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 4 Nov. 6, 2025) (finding an identically worded written notification insufficient as “ICE’s 5 conclusory explanations for revoking [p]etitioner’s release did not offer him adequate 6 notice of the basis for the revocation decision such that he could meaningfully respond at 7 the post-detention informal interview”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 8 “Petitioner must be told what circumstances had changed or why there was now a 9 significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond to the reasons and 10 submit evidence in opposition.” Sarail A. v. Bondi, ---- F. Supp. 3d ----,

, 11 at *10 (D. Minn. 2025). 12 “Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations.” Hoac v. 13 Becerra, No. 25-cv-1740-DC-JDP,

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) 14 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 US. 260, 268 (1954)) (finding a 15 likelihood of success where petitioner was not provided an informal interview). “[W]hen 16 ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and 17 the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 18

, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court finds that, 19 in violation of ICE’s regulations, the revocation of his supervised release without notice or 20 an informed interview justifies GRANTING the Petition. See, e.g., Hoac,

1993771, at *4 (granting a TRO where ICE failed to follow § 241.13(i)(3) procedures); 22 Phakeokoth v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2817 RBM (SBC),

, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 23 Nov. 7, 2025) (same); Nouri,

, at *11 (same); Tran, 2025

, at *4 (granting a habeas petition on the same grounds); Truong,

2988357, at *6 (same); Nguyen v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2792 LL (VET),

, 26 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (same). 27 Additionally, even if the procedural requirements were met, the Court is not 28 persuaded that Respondents have showed a change in circumstances such that there is now 1 a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. 2 First, Petitioner has been subject to a final order of removal for thirty-eight years, and in 3 those thirty-eight years, there has been no progress on securing his removal. Traverse at 4 6. 5 Second, Respondents failed to secure travel documents, or alleged potential for 6 travel documents, for Petitioner before his re-detention. In the several times that Petitioner 7 has been detained, the most recent ending in 2004, he was released because his removal 8 was not reasonably foreseeable,

and Respondents present no evidence that this has 9 changed. Petitioner has been rejected by his native country of Cuba and, while 10 Respondents allege that Mexico likely will accept Petitioner, Petitioner alleges fear of 11 removal to Mexico. Traverse at 6, 13–15. Petitioner argues, supported by a Declaration 12 of Officer Martin Parsons, that Mexico will accept third-country deportees “only if [they] 13 would willingly go to Mexico.”

at 26 Ex. D. While it is possible that Petitioner may 14 be removed to Mexico in the future, this post-hoc rationalization cannot form the basis of 15 “changed circumstances” for the purpose of re-detention. See Phakeokoth,

3124341, at *5 (finding that changed circumstances did not exist at the time of petitioner’s 17 arrest because the government obtained travel documents weeks after his re-detention); 18 Truong,

, at *1–6 (same); Vinh Duong v. Charles, No. 25-cv-1375-SKO, 19

, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (same). 20 Third, the empty statement by the declaring officer that “there is a significant 21 likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” is insufficient to satisfy 22 Respondents’ burden. Ret. at 3; Hoac,

, at *4 (rejecting the 23 government’s argument that ICE’s intent to apply for travel documents constituted changed 24 circumstances because they failed to provide “any details about why a travel document 25 could not be obtained in the past, nor have they attempted to show why obtaining a travel 26 document is more likely this time around”). 27 28 1 Therefore, because Respondents have failed to follow their own regulations in re- 2 ||detaining Petitioner and have failed to demonstrate that his removal is reasonably 3 || foreseeable, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 4 CONCLUSION 5 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 6 || Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner 7 || from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision. The Court 8 || ORDERS that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without following the procedures 9 out in

) and other implementing regulations. The Parties are 10 |} ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by November 28, 2025, confirming that Petitioner 11 been released. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary 12 || Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). The Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: November 25, 2025 15 psi L. Lo meeaitie- 16 on. Janis L. Sammartino 7 United States District Judge

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