1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 CYRUS HAZARI, Case No. 5:19-cv-04392-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 9 v. [Re: ECF No. 132] 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Before the Court is Defendants’ administrative motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute 14 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-11. ECF No. 132 (“Mot.”). For the reasons set forth below, the 15 motion is GRANTED. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Pro se Plaintiff Cyrus Hazari initiated this action by filing a complaint against the County 18 of Santa Clara and other individual Defendants on July 31, 2019, alleging that Defendants carried 19 out a conspiracy to deny him a residential building permit and more broadly to harass him 20 personally. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 67–68. For more than six years after filing the complaint, Mr. Hazari 21 has repeatedly delayed prosecution of this action. Initially, Defendants did not object to lengthy 22 and repeated stays, which the Court granted based on Mr. Hazari’s medical condition. However, 23 in 2025, Defendants did object to continued postponement of the case, and after weighing the 24 Parties’ positions, the Court denied a further stay. ECF No. 87. 25 The Court docket reflects that on October 21, 2019, Mr. Hazari requested a six-month 26 extension of the deadline to serve Defendants due to his medical condition, even though he would 27 not in any case be permitted to personally serve Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil 1 deadline from October 30, 2019, to December 30, 2019. ECF No. 8. On December 17, 2019, the 2 Court again extended the deadline to serve Defendants from December 30, 2019, to February 28, 3 2020, and referred Mr. Hazari to the Court’s Disability Access and Accommodation Coordinator 4 and Federal Pro Se Program. ECF No. 12. 5 On February 21, 2020, Mr. Hazari returned an executed summons, see ECF No. 15, and 6 filed a 405-page “Administrative Motion for Disability Accommodation,” see ECF No. 14. 7 Acknowledging that he could not “cite law or precedent for this motion,” Mr. Hazari requested 8 that the Court “apply the appropriate law and precedent as equitable accommodation [sic].” Id. 9 at 2. Because the motion was unopposed, the Court granted the motion and stayed the case for 10 90 days on February 25, 2020. ECF No. 16. Mr. Hazari then filed nine additional administrative 11 motions for disability accommodations, each time demanding that the Court continue the stay 12 without specifying any timeline for prosecution of the case. See ECF Nos. 23, 27, 32, 37, 43, 48, 13 54, 62, 66, 71. The Court granted each administrative motion, continuing the stay for more than 14 four-and-a-half years. See ECF Nos. 16, 30, 34, 45, 62, 69, 73, 75. 15 On February 22, 2025, Mr. Hazari filed his eleventh administrative motion to extend the 16 stay. ECF No. 76. In the motion, Mr. Hazari stated that other state and federal courts had denied 17 similar administrative motions filed by him. Id. at 2–3. The Court ordered Defendants to indicate 18 whether they opposed the motion. ECF No. 77. On March 7, 2025, Defendants filed an opposing 19 brief, arguing that, “[a]s evidenced by Plaintiff’s ongoing filings in both federal and [s]tate courts, 20 he does not lack the ability to prosecute this matter.” ECF No. 82. Within just eight days, 21 Mr. Hazari filed two reply briefs that amounted to nearly 300 pages. See ECF Nos. 79, 85. Based 22 on Mr. Hazari’s “rapid, prolix filings,” the Court found that “the documented disabilities do not 23 impact Plaintiff’s abilities to prosecute this case” and denied the administrative motion on 24 March 10, 2025. ECF No. 87. 25 On March 23, 2025, Mr. Hazari filed a 62-page “Emergency Motion” to set aside the order 26 denying the administrative motion and re-instate the stay, in which he argued that the Court’s 27 March 10, 2025, order “publicly declare[d] that [he] shall be tortured and murdered by [the 1 Mr. Hazari “again demonstrated his capability of prosecuting this case through the rapid, prolix 2 filings in recent days,” the Court denied the motion on March 24, 2025. ECF No. 93. Mr. Hazari 3 continued to do everything but prosecute this action, filing a 125-page motion to disqualify the 4 undersigned, see ECF No. 99, appealing the Court’s denial of the disqualification motion, see ECF 5 No. 116, and declining to appear at the initial case management conference (which was scheduled 6 as a video conference appearance), see ECF No. 108. 7 On July 1, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with leave 8 to amend. ECF No. 122. The Court noted that “[n]ormally, [it] would provide 14 days to amend, 9 but recognizing Plaintiff’s medical issues, [it would provide] an extended period of” 90 days. Id. 10 at 8–9. The Court further cautioned Mr. Hazari that failure to file an amended complaint by 11 October 1, 2025, “will result in a dismissal of the deficient claims with prejudice.” Id. Rather 12 than file an amended complaint, Mr. Hazari filed a 44-page motion for a preliminary injunction on 13 September 29, 2025. ECF No. 125. 14 On October 16, 2025, Defendants filed an administrative motion to dismiss the action for 15 failure to prosecute. ECF No. 128. On October 21, 2025, the Court denied Defendants’ 16 administrative motion without prejudice to re-file if Mr. Hazari failed to file an amended 17 complaint by November 4, 2025. ECF No. 129. Mr. Hazari again declined to file an amended 18 complaint, instead filing a 22-page “motion to change venue” in which he renewed his request for 19 disqualification of the undersigned on November 4, 2025. ECF No. 130. On November 6, 2025, 20 the Court denied Mr. Hazari’s motion. ECF No. 131. “In the interest of allowing this case to go 21 forward on the merits,” the Court again granted Mr. Hazari a 14-day extension to file an amended 22 complaint. Id. at 4. The Court advised Mr. Hazari that “the Court will not extend the deadline 23 again absent a showing of good cause.” Id. 24 On November 6, 2025, Defendants filed the present administrative motion. The Court 25 advised the Parties that if Mr. Hazari “fails to file a complaint complying with the local civil rules 26 and the Court’s Standing Order by November 20, 2025, as allowed by the Court [in its prior 27 order], the Court will grant [the motion] and will instruct the Clerk to close this case.” ECF 1 two documents which collectively amount to 91 pages: (1) an “objection” to the Court’s 2 November 6, 2025, order, which the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration of its Order 3 Denying his Change of Venue and Disqualification, and (2) a “response . . . to show cause,” which 4 the Court construes as an opposition to Defendants’ administrative motion. See ECF No. 134 5 (“Recon. Mot”); ECF No. 135 (“Opp.”). 6 The Court notes that Mr. Hazari has also filed a “request for judicial notice,” in which he 7 attached an “updated complaint that is the subject of a communication with Chief [Judge] . . . of 8 the Ninth Circuit under preparation.” ECF No. 138. The attachment contains some of the same 9 allegations as the original complaint that he filed in this action but also names the undersigned (as 10 well as most of the active judges of Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) as a defendant. See id. 11 at 13. From what the Court can gather, the filing appears to be a draft complaint to be filed in a 12 separate action and not the amended complaint that was the subject of prior orders in this action, 13 which specified the subject of amendment and limited addition of parties or claims without leave 14 of the Court. See ECF No. 122 at 8. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Trial courts have inherent power to reconsider, set aside, or amend interlocutory orders at 17 any time prior to entry of a final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The substantive standard 18 governing reconsideration of an interlocutory order is the same as that which governs motions to 19 alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Motions for 20 reconsideration are disfavored and “should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 21 unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if 22 there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” McDowell v. Calderon,

, 23 1254 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a] 24 motion for reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 25 time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.’” Marlyn 26 Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.,

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 27 Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop,

, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). 1 reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration may be made on three grounds: (1) a material 2 difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the court, which, in the exercise 3 of reasonable diligence, the moving party did not know at the time of the order for which 4 reconsideration is sought; (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a 5 manifest failure by the court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments. Civ. L.R. 7- 6 9(b). The moving party may not reargue any written or oral argument previously asserted to the 7 court. Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows for the involuntary dismissal of an action 9 “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” The text of 10 Rule 41(b) refers to a defense motion for dismissal, however, the Rule also permits a court to sua 11 sponte dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order. See Link 12 v. Wabash R.R. Co.,

, 630–31 (1962). A plaintiff’s failure to take any action in 13 response to a Court’s prior dismissal with leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6) is considered a 14 failure to comply with a court order. Yourish v. Calif. Amplifier,

, 986 (9th Cir. 15 1999). 16 A dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) “‘must be supported by a showing of unreasonable 17 delay.’” Omstead v. Dell, Inc.,

(9th Cir.2 010) (quoting Henderson 18 v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1986)). In addition, before imposing dismissal as a 19 sanction, “the district court must consider five factors: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious 20 resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 21 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 22 availability of less drastic alternatives.’” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 A. Reconsideration Motion 25 Mr. Hazari begins his Reconsideration Motion by representing that “[t]his statement is 26 filed in compelled response to ECF-131 without accepting [the undersigned’s] authority or 27 jurisdiction, as she has been disqualified (ECF-97, 130) and enjoined (ECF-102, 103, 104, 125) by 1 and appropriately applied by the plaintiff.” Recon. Mot. at 2. To the extent Mr. Hazari seeks to 2 lodge a jurisdictional challenge, the undersigned has not been disqualified or recused—although 3 Mr. Hazari has twice moved for disqualification, the Court denied both motions. See ECF 4 Nos. 98, 131. Relatedly, Mr. Hazari’s motions for injunctive relief—which would be enforceable 5 against Defendants, not the Court—were also denied. See ECF Nos. 105, 129. 6 On the merits, Mr. Hazari raises a variety of vague, difficult-to-follow arguments. From 7 what the Court can glean from the face of Mr. Hazari’s brief (which “is generated through 8 multiple trained AI,” Recon. Mot. at 1 n.1), the Reconsideration Motion is based on two primary 9 arguments. First, Mr. Hazari appears to argue that the Court’s order directing him to prosecute 10 this action by filing an amended complaint constitutes torture because of his medical disabilities. 11 Second, Mr. Hazari suggests that, by virtue of making any ruling that is favorable to Defendants, 12 the undersigned has demonstrated impermissible partiality to Defendants that warrants recusal. 13 Neither of these arguments is persuasive, and, to the extent that either would constitute grounds 14 for reconsideration, the Court concludes that Mr. Hazari has not presented a sufficient factual basis 15 to support them. 16 Mr. Hazari first argues that the Court’s orders have “deliberately coerced the plaintiff to 17 produce information incessantly[] . . . without disability accommodation,” such that “[c]ontinued 18 proceeding under [the undersigned’s] control therefore present a foreseeable, preventable risk of 19 death.” Recon. Mot. at 3. Mr. Hazari goes on to explain that torture is prohibited by principles of 20 international law. See, e.g., id. at 28–29. The problem with Mr. Hazari’s argument is that it relies 21 on the assumption that requiring him to prosecute this action—which he himself initiated against 22 Defendants—constitutes torture. It does not. Courts have inherent authority to manage their 23 dockets to ensure a fair and impartial forum for all parties that come before them. Thus, “[t]he 24 authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action . . . because of his failure to 25 prosecute cannot seriously be doubted,” with “roots in judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur 26 entered at common law.” Link,

; see also Carey v. King,

, 1440 27 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 argument is also belied by the record before the Court. The Court has given Mr. Hazari every 2 opportunity to comply with its orders so that this action could proceed to resolution on the merits. 3 Despite not being required to provide any accommodations for Mr. Hazari at all, the Court has 4 repeatedly extended the deadline for Mr. Hazari to file an amended complaint. See ECF No. 122 5 (providing 90 days to file amended complaint), ECF No. 129 (granting 14-day extension), ECF 6 No. 131 (granting 14-day extension). Rather than using that time to file an amended complaint, 7 Mr. Hazari has instead elected to file hundreds of pages of unrelated briefing. While the Court is 8 sympathetic to Mr. Hazari’s medical condition, it would be manifestly unfair to indefinitely 9 subject Defendants to these proceedings, as Mr. Hazari apparently demands. See Fid. 10 Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1978) (“It is a well 11 established rule that the duty to move a case is on the plaintiff and not on the defendant or the 12 court.”). 13 Mr. Hazari next argues that the Court’s November 6, 2025, order “represents the most 14 egregious violation of judicial independence in this case” by denying the disqualification motion 15 “despite overwhelming evidence of systematic bias, torture, and constitutional violations.” Recon. 16 Mot. at 37. According to Mr. Hazari, any ruling by the Court in Defendants’ favor is evidence of 17 “[c]oordination with defendants and their attorneys, and other judges, in constitutional violations.” 18

. The argument is without merit. That any judicial ruling will necessarily be in one 19 party’s favor is merely a consequence of our adversarial legal system. The fact that Mr. Hazari 20 disagrees with the Court’s prior rulings is not evidence of judicial bias. See, e.g., Mayes 21 v. Leipziger,

(9th Cir. 1984); Villars v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-04239-RS,

2597535, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025). 23 B. Administrative Motion to Dismiss 24 Mr. Hazari has repeatedly and without justification failed to comply with the Court’s 25 July 1, 2025, order to file an amended complaint. The Court finds that Mr. Hazari’s unjustified 26 failure to file an amended complaint—especially considering his affirmative election to file 27 voluminous, unrelated filings instead of complying with the Court’s orders—qualifies as 1 146107, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016). In his Opposition Brief, Mr. Hazari raises many of the 2 same arguments as his Reconsideration Motion, many of them irrelevant. See, e.g., Opp. at 40 3 (accusing the undersigned of attempted murder). To the extent that Mr. Hazari argues that 4 || requiring him to comply with a court-imposed deadline is “coercive,” he fails to factually 5 substantiate the charge. Jd. at 14. 6 Four of the five Henderson factors strongly favor dismissal. In connection with the first 7 || factor, Mr. Hazari’s inaction has stalled the case for more than six years. Mr. Hazari not only 8 || failed to file an amended complaint within the allotted time but instead affirmatively chose to file 9 unrelated briefs and motions, even after the Court extended his deadline three times. With respect 10 to the second factor, Mr. Hazari’s conduct has interfered with the Court’s need to manage its 11 docket because he has repeatedly ignored the Court’s orders by not filing the amended complaint 12 || within the time allotted despite notice of imminent dismissal. As to the third factor, failure to 5 13 dismiss this action would prejudice Defendants who are entitled to a resolution of Mr. Hazari’s 14 || claims after demonstrating that those claims lack merit. The fourth factor—the public policy 3 15 || favoring disposition of cases on their merits—does not favor dismissing the action. Finally, as to 16 || the fifth factor, the Court sees little point to imposing less severe sanctions because Mr. Hazari has 3 17 shown no interest in complying with this Court’s orders or in prosecuting this action. The Court’s 18 notice to the Parties on November 6, 2025, expressly warned Mr. Hazari about the potential for 19 || imminent dismissal. “The failure of the plaintiff eventually to respond to the court's ultimatum— 20 || either by amending the complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not do so—is properly 21 || met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc.,

, 22 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). 23 || IV. ORDER 24 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED 25 || WITH PREJUDICE. 26 Dated: December 1, 2025

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 28 United States District Judge