1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ADAM HENDRIX, Case No. 25-cv-09674-CRB

10 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 11 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 LEONARDO GARCIA, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 Plaintiff Adam Hendrix, proceeding pro se, brought an action against a host of 15 different defendants. Compl. (dkt. 1). After filing the instant action, Hendrix filed an 16 emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). Mot. (dkt. 2). His 17 motion—composed of two sentences and without any argument—is so devoid of detail 18 that the Court cannot identify the grounds for the injunctive relief sought. See Mot. Since 19 Hendrix’s complaint is highly confusing and does not present a short and plain statement 20 of Hendrix’s claims, the Court fails to divine the bases for Hendrix’s relief in the 21 pleadings, too. See Compl. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Hendrix’s motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff Adam Hendrix1 alleges two injuries: (1) the entry of a no-contact order in 24 Illinois without subsequent review and (2) the denial of County Adult Assistance Program 25 (“CAAP”) benefits in San Francisco. 26 For the first injury, Hendrix sued Leonardo Garcia, the one who requested the no- 27 1 contact order; Officer Peter Ahern, a policeman in Mundelein, Illinois; the Mundelein 2 Police Department; Lake County; Judges Melius, Reginald Mathews, and Daniel Fisz of 3 Illinois; and Judge Mansh Shah of the United States District Court for the Northern District 4 of Illinois. Hendrix alleges the no-contact order—and its subsequent versions—were 5 “VOID AB INITIO for lack of personal jurisdiction and were obtained through fraud and 6 perjury.” Compl. at 2. Hendrix does not explain what fraud or perjury occurred. He then 7 alleges Officer Ahern “under color of law” advised Garcia to obtain the order, which was 8 the start of an alleged conspiracy against Hendrix. Id. When asking for the no-contact 9 order, Garcia allegedly misrepresented facts to Judge Melius to “secure” a TRO. Id. 10 Judge Mathews later denied Hendrix “the right to present evidence or speak at the full 11 hearing.” Id. Despite removal to federal court, Judge Fisz extended the no-contact order 12 by an additional 2,000 ft. Id. Judge Shah then “improperly dismissed the removed case 13 and refused mandatory federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 3. Hendrix alleges this series of 14 violations caused a loss of his “First Amendment right to protest on public property.” Id. 15 at 2. 16 For the San Francisco injury, Hendrix named as defendants the City and County of 17 San Francisco; Jennifer Williams, Ruth Jordan, and Brian Ly who were apparently part of 18 the CAAP program; Governor Gavin Newsom; and Larkin Street Youth Services. Id. at 1– 19 2. Hendrix’s sole allegation for this injury is that the named defendants “failed to provide 20 required reasonable disability accommodations, resulting in wrongful termination of 21 benefits in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 3. 22 Hendrix lists his claims, which do not clarify which defendants are implicated, as 23 follows: 24 • Violation of the First Amendment 25 • Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 26 • Fraud upon the Court 27 • Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights (

) 1 • Request for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief 2 • Damages under

3 Compl. at 2. 4 Shortly after Hendrix filed his complaint, he filed a motion for a TRO. See Mot. 5 The motion only consists of two sentences: “Plaintiff respectfully moves this honorable 6 court to grant this motion for emergency TRO & motion to seal confidential [sic] address 7 information protected by the Safe at Home Program. Plaintiff also requests that the 8 defendants be served by the sheriffs [sic] office.” Mot. at 1–2. Hendrix also filed an 9 emergency declaration claiming, among other things, that he is suffering from irreparable 10 harm from loss of CAAP benefits and that he faces “immediate financial collapse.” 11 Emergency Declaration (dkt. 9). 12 After granting Hendrix’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, Magistrate Judge 13 Lisa Cisneros submitted a recommendation to dismiss the complaint and deny the motion 14 for a TRO. Magistrate Order (dkt. 7). Judge Cisneros granted Hendrix’s request in his 15 TRO motion to seal confidential information implicating his address.

. Hendrix 16 has until December 10, 2025 to object to the report and recommendation.

. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A TRO is an “extraordinary remedy” that should be awarded only upon a clear 19 showing that the party is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 20 Inc.,

(2008). The party seeking a TRO must establish: (1) a likelihood of 21 success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief; (3) 22 that the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the 23 public interest. See

. The “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits ‘is the most 24 important Winter factor.’” Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.,

(9th 25 Cir. 2017) (quoting Garcia v. Google, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2015)). And the 26 Ninth Circuit has held that courts should liberally construe motion papers from pro se 27 litigants. Thomas v. Ponder,

(9th Cir. 2010). Il. DISCUSSION Because Hendrix’s motion is devoid of argument and his complaint fails to clarify ° his position, the Court denies his motion for a TRO. ° For starters, Hendrix’s motion lacks both the substantive and procedural requirements to seek temporary injunctive relief. When seeking a temporary restraining ° order in this District, parties must include a copy of their complaint, a separate ° memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion, a proposed order and ’ order to show cause, supporting documents, and a declaration certifying that notice to the opposing party was given or the reasons why it was not. Civ. L.R. 65-1. The only ° substantive document before the Court is Hendrix’s complaint. His actual motion fails to put forth any argument for why a TRO is warranted here.

" While the Court understands the difficulties of pro se litigants, Hendrix’s failure to E comply with procedural requirements—combined with confusing and vague allegations in S 4 his complaint—has left the Court unable to review the merits of his motion. The only 3 15 Winter factor the Court could even begin to consider is irreparable harm, since Hendrix claims he is in financial distress in his emergency declaration. See Emergency Declaration. But even that declaration is conclusory and does not indicate any defendant’s = role in causing the harm. See GSI Tech., Inc. v. United Memories, Inc., No. C 13-1081 4 6 PSG,

, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2013) (denying injunctive relief, in part, because the plaintiff had “not established that the irreparable harm it complain[ed] of was fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions). As a result, the Court must deny Hendrix’s motion because Hendrix has failed to make a clear showing that he is entitled to temporary injunctive relief. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Hendrix’s motion for a TRO. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 2, 2025 L 5 □□ 27 CHARLES R. BREYER 38 United States District Judge