1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 CHRISTIAN CALDERON, ) Case No. CV 24-08206-DMG (JDE) ) 13 Petitioner, ) ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS 14 v. ) AND RECOMMENDATION OF ) 15 KEVIN HIXON, Warden, ) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE ) JUDGE 16 ) Respondent. ) 17

18 19 Pursuant to

, the Court has reviewed the records and files 20 herein, including the Petition [Doc. # 1), the Order to Show Cause issued by 21 the assigned magistrate judge [Doc. # 4, “OSC”], Petitioner’s Response to the 22 OSC [Doc. # 5], the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge 23 [Doc. # 7, “Report”], and Petitioner’s Objection to the Report [Doc. # 9]. 24 The Report recommends denial of the Petition and dismissal of this 25 action with prejudice because the Petition is untimely. [Doc. # 7]. Petitioner’s 26 Objection to the Report [Doc. # 9] does not warrant a change to the Report’s 27 findings or recommendations. 28 As an initial matter, Petitioner concedes that, regardless of whether he is 1 entitled to statutory tolling for his third state habeas petition, his federal 2 Petition still “was not timely filed within the margin authorized under the 3 AEDPA’s limitation.” [Doc. # 9-1 at 1-2]. 4 Nonetheless, Petitioner objects that is entitled to consideration for a 5 “Retroactive Change of Law Condition.” [Doc. # 9-1 at 2]. Petitioner cites 6 Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S.835, 840–41 (2003) (per curiam), in which the 7 Supreme Court held that a change in state law, as part of an “evolutionary 8 process,” entitled a criminal defendant to a determination as to whether the 9 law had been correctly interpreted at the time of his conviction. Here, 10 however, Petitioner does not allege an evolutionary process in state law at the 11 time of his conviction. Instead, he alleges that he is entitled to the retroactive 12 application of a supposed change in state law regarding murder, which 13 occurred after his conviction in 2016. [Doc. # 1 at 8; Doc. # 5 at 6; Doc. # 9-1 14 at 2-3]. Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on Bunkley is unavailing. See Bunkley, 538 15 U.S. at 840 (recognizing that “retroactivity [was] not at issue” in the case) 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Fiore v. White,

(2001) (per 17 curiam)). 18 Relatedly, Petitioner objects that changes in state law prompts a “Liberty 19 Interest and private assertion to request from the Federal District Court 20 consideration on whether the State Court failed to apply the retroactive 21 relief[.]” [Doc. # 9-1 at 3]. This request for consideration of the merits does 22 not overcome the Report’s threshold finding that the Petition is untimely. As 23 the Report explained in detail, changes in state law do not entitle Petitioner to 24 a later limitations starting date or equitable tolling. [Doc. # 7 at 7-8, 12]. 25 Moreover, the supposed changes in state law on which Petitioner relies are 26 inapplicable to his case. [Doc. # 9-1 at 3 (citing In re Lopez,

, 27 579 (2023) (aiding and abetting); and In re Ferrell,

, 600 (2023) 28 (second-degree felony murder)]. Unlike the defendants in those cases, 1 || Petitioner was convicted as an actual perpetrator of first-degree premeditated 2 ||murder. [Doc. # 7 at 2 (citing People v. Cordero, et al.,

(Cal. 3 ||Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2018)|. Thus, Petitioner has not overcome the Report’s 4 || finding that the Petition is untimely and that he has failed to demonstrate 5 sufficient grounds for tolling. Having engaged in a de novo review of those 6 || portions of the Report to which objections have been made, the Court concurs 7 || with and accepts the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered 9 || denying the Petition and dismissing this action with prejudice. 10 11 |} DATED: November 4, 2025 1 Melly Dn. ha 13 . DOLLY M. GEE 4 Chief United States District Judge

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