1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 PAWL WASHELESKI, Case No. 25-cv-05231-EKL

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND AND TERMINATING MOTION TO DISMISS 10 CITY OF CAMPBELL, Re: Dkt. Nos. 3, 10 Defendant. 11

12 13 Before the Court is a motion to remand this case to Santa Clara County Superior Court 14 filed by self-represented Plaintiff Pawl Washeleski. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and 15 the relevant authority, the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. 16 See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motion to remand is GRANTED, and the 17 City of Campbell’s motion to dismiss is TERMINATED as moot. 18 I. LEGAL STANDARD 19 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 20 Am.,

(1994). When a case is originally filed in state court, “[a] defendant may 21 remove [it] to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.” 22 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA,

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing

). The 23 removing party has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Holcomb v. Bingham Toyota, 24

, 110 (9th Cir. 1989). “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging 25 removal.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2009). 26 A case filed in state court may be removed if the federal court would have had original 27 jurisdiction over it.

(a). Federal courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil 1 The presence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, 2 which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the 3 face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

, 4 392 (1987); see also Duncan v. Stuetzle,

, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t must be clear 5 from the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint that there is a federal question.”). The 6 well-pleaded complaint rule “makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid 7 federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar,

. 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 On April 24, 2025, Washeleski filed this case in Santa Clara County Superior Court 10 asserting claims under California law. See Notice of Removal at 1, ECF No. 1. Specifically, 11 Washeleski asserted claims for: (1) violation of due process under the California Constitution; 12 (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) abuse of process; and (4) civil conspiracy to 13 violate rights. Notice of Removal Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 1 (“Original Compl.”). On May 6, 2025, 14 Washeleski filed an amended complaint. Notice of Removal Ex. B, ECF No. 1 (“Am. Compl.”). 15 The stated purpose of the amended complaint was “to name additional defendants,” and for “[a]ll 16 prior allegations and claims stated in the original complaint [to] remain unchanged.” Id. at 1; see 17 also id. at 2 (seeking to “add the newly named defendants,” and requesting that “all claims stated 18 in the original complaint be preserved and enforced against all parties”). 19 On June 20, 2025, Defendant City of Campbell (“City”) removed the case to federal court 20 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.1 Notice of Removal at 2. The City contends that the 21 amended complaint raises a federal question because it states that “[a]ll factual and legal 22 allegations contained in the original complaint, including but not limited to violations of due 23 process, equal protection, ADA rights, and civil rights under

and 1985, are 24 incorporated by reference.”

. This statement is confusing because, as the City 25 acknowledges, “the original complaint did not make a claim under

and 1985” – 26 or any other federal law. Opp. at 4 n.1, ECF No. 13. 27 1 In his motion to remand, Washeleski contends that he did not intend to assert new claims 2 under federal law in his amended complaint. He explains that “the claims pled in the state court 3 action remain rooted in California law and the California Constitution, and the federal references 4 were cited solely to provide context, not as standalone causes of action requiring federal 5 adjudication.” Mot. at 1, ECF No. 3. In his reply, Washeleski elaborates that his complaint 6 “mentions federal law solely to provide context for the state-based violations alleged, not to create 7 an independent federal cause of action.” Reply at 1, ECF No. 15; see also

(“Plaintiff’s 8 references to

and 1985 are illustrative of the broader civil rights violations but 9 are not pled as standalone federal causes of action.”). 10 The Court finds that it is not clear from the face of the amended complaint that Washeleski 11 has raised a federal question. See Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. The only enumerated causes of action 12 arise under state law, see Original Compl. at 2, and the amended complaint does not expressly add 13 any new claims. To the contrary, the amended complaint provides that the “claims stated in the 14 original complaint remain unchanged.” Am. Compl. at 1. Moreover, the passing reference to 15 “violations of due process, equal protection, ADA rights, and civil rights under

16 and 1985” is insufficient to raise a federal question. The amended complaint does not seek to add 17 claims for these purported violations, nor does it contain any allegations that would support such 18 claims. Washeleski is the master of his complaint, and it is his prerogative to “avoid federal 19 jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law” if he chooses. Caterpillar,

. 20 Alternatively, even if the amended complaint arguably raises a federal question, the Court 21 may construe Washeleski’s motion to remand as a disclaimer of any claims arising under federal 22 law, or a motion to amend to remove what the City has construed as federal claims. See, e.g., 23 California ex rel. Harrison v. Express Scripts, Inc.,

, 1077 (9th Cir. 2025) 24 (recognizing that disclaimers of federal claims are “a mechanism available to plaintiffs who wish 25 to limit their complaints and avoid federal jurisdiction”); Doe v. Stanford Health Care, No. 5:24- 26 cv-09359-BLF,

, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2025) (granting leave to amend to 27 remove federal claims). Washeleski clearly and unequivocally disavows any intent to bring claims 1 “should be freely granted ‘when justice so requires.” Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127 (9th 2 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)); see also Watison v. Carter,

, 3 1117 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 The City argues that Washeleski’s disclaimer of claims under federal law is “immaterial 5 || because the ‘propriety of removal is determined solely on the basis of the pleadings filed in state 6 || court.’” Opp. at 4 (quoting Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

, 976 (9th Cir. 7 || 2006)). The City is correct that the Ninth Circuit previously held that “post-removal amendments 8 || to the pleadings cannot affect whether a case is removable.” Williams, 471 F.3d at 976. But the 9 Supreme Court recently “overruled [the Ninth Circuit’s] prior precedent holding that post-removal 10 amendments do not undermine federal jurisdiction.” Faulk v. JELD-WEN, Inc.,___ F.4th ___, 11 || No. 24-4078,

, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2025). In Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. 12 Wullschleger, the Supreme Court held that “[wJhen a plaintiff amends her complaint following her 13 suit’s removal, a federal court’s jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint says.”

|| 22,30 (2025). Thus, a proper post-removal amendment can divest a federal court of jurisdiction, 3 15 thereby requiring remand to state court. /d. at 35. Although the Court does not find it necessary, a 16 || Washeleski could amend his complaint to remove any doubt that he seeks to proceed solely on 3 17 state-law claims, divesting the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See

18 In sum, the Court holds that remand is required because the amended complaint does not 19 || raise a federal question on its face, and there is no other basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 20 || Alternatively, leave to amend to remove the purported federal claims would be appropriate here. 21 || I. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, Washeleski’s motion is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED 23 || to Santa Clara County Superior Court. The City’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, is 24 || TERMINATED as moot. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: December 3, 2025

Eumi K. Lee 28 United States District Judge