1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 ERIKA LLAMAS, 10 Case No. 25-cv-08012-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 REMAND EVERON, LLC, 13 Defendant. 14

15 16 Defendant Everon, LLC, removed this putative class action from state court, contending a 17 reasonable estimate of named plaintiff Erika Llamas’s purported actual damages is $64,773.36, 18 which, when combined with a reasonable estimate of the total attorney fees at stake of $198,655, 19 easily exceeds the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold for removal jurisdiction based on 20 diversity. The hearing on Llamas’s motion to remand was vacated. The parties were asked to 21 provided further briefing on the question of whether the total amount of attorney fees potentially 22 recoverable on behalf of a certified class should count towards the diversity jurisdictional 23 minimum, or whether only the pro rata attorney fees attributable to the named plaintiff should be 24 considered. 25 While the class size is not specified in the complaint here, the only reasonable inference 26 from the complaint is that the number of members in putative class far exceeds 20.1 Assuming a 27 1 class size of only 20 members, or fewer, the jurisdictional minimum for removal would not be 2 satisfied, even crediting Everon’s calculation of $64,773.36 as the amount of other damages in 3 controversy, unless the potential attorney fees are not allocated among class members.2 4 The order for further briefing directed the parties to address the analysis and holding in 5 Green v. Flowers Bakeries Sales of Norcal, LLC, No. 25-CV-06679-JSC,

, at 6 *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (“Defendant’s cited wage and hour cases in which courts estimated 7 future attorneys’ fees to be above $75,000 are not persuasive because they did not apportion 8 attorneys’ fees among all class members as Ninth Circuit law requires.”). Everon’s supplemental 9 briefing does not argue there is a basis for removal jurisdiction under diversity if the potential 10 attorney fee claim must be apportioned among the putative class members. Rather, Everon 11 contends Green was wrongly decided and/or should not be followed here. 12 As a district court case, Green is not controlling authority. It is, however, persuasive. 13 Everon insists Green should not be seen as good law because it relied on Ninth Circuit authority 14 that ultimately can be traced back to Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.,

(1973), a case 15 superseded by subsequent legislation. See Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 16

(2005) (“We hold that [28 U.S.C.] § 1367 by its plain text overruled . . . 17 Zahn.”). 18 The specific holding in Zahn that is no longer good law, however, was:

19 Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be 20 dismissed from the case—one plaintiff may not ride in on another’s 21 coattails. 22

(citation omitted). 23 Everon contends that because under present law only the named plaintiff must satisfy the 24

25 2 With a class of twenty members the attorney fees attributable to each class member would be 26 $9,932.75. Adding that number to the named plaintiff’s supposed damages of $64,773.36 would result in an amount in controversy of no more than $74,706.11, slightly under the jurisdictional 27 minimum. A larger class would only lower the named plaintiff’s share of any fee award. 1 amount in controversy, there is no reason to apportion fees across a putative class. Everon further 2 argues that especially because there is no certainty that a class will ever be certified, all of the 3 potential attorney fees should be considered part of the amount in controversy under the claims of 4 || Llamas, the named plaintiff. 5 At the outset, is not clear the total amount of attorney fees in controversy would be the 6 || same regardless of whether this were an individual action or a class action. Even assuming as 7 much, however, it does not follow that the fee claim should not be apportioned across the putative 8 class, merely because the law no longer requires only the named plaintiff’s claim to satisfy the 9 || jurisdictional minimum in diversity cases. Exxon concluded Zahn was no longer good law in light 10 || of the statutory expansion of supplemental jurisdiction to reach claims of putative class members 11 that might not individually meet the dollar threshold. See, Exxon,

. Nothing in that 12 || holding implies a named plaintiff may claim attorney fees potentially recoverable by the whole 5 13 class to satisfy the amount in controversy as to his or her own claims. Thus, the fact that this 14 action might never be certified does not support a different result. 3 15 Again, Everon does not contend there is a basis for removal if the attorney fee claim must 16 || be apportioned, as held in Green. Because the principles set out in Green and the authority on 5 17 || which it relied are not undermined by the statutory change regarding supplemental jurisdiction 18 over the claims of putative class members, Llama’s motion to remand must be granted. This action 19 || is hereby remanded to Alameda Superior Court. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 Dated: December 4, 2025 24

25 RICHARD SEEBORG _ Chief United States District Judge 26 27 *8 . CASE No. 25-cv-08012-RS