1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MARY SWENSON, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01398-RBM-MSB

11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12 v. (1) SCREENING AMENDED 13 JOHN KUEHNI and BLEND REALTY, COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 14 Defendants. U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) [Doc. 13]

15 (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 16 MOTION TO REINSTATE DISMISSED MOTIONS 17 [Doc. 14] 18

19 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Mary Swenson’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to 20 Reinstate Dismissed Motions. (Doc. 14.) The filing makes several requests: (1) “fee 21 waiver for amendment and corrective rule 60 divorce;” (2) “demand for ID documents and 22 records unsealed;” (3) “there has been no discovery since Jan 2021 despite multiple 23 requests;” (4) “Plaintiff seeks permission to electronically file + access to PACER system 24 for due process;” (5) “[counsel] requested due to the disability caused and the 753 liens 25 attached to my trust and person;” and (6) “Judge Montenegro should remove herself. She 26 is clearly biased. Again, no protection from TRO extortion or financial death.” (Id. at 2.) 27 The Court construes these requests as a Motion to Electronically File Documents 28 (“E-file Motion”); a Motion to Appoint Counsel; and a Motion to Recuse. For the reasons 1 set forth below, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) (Doc. 13) is 2 DISMISSED with leave to amend; Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse is DENIED; and 3 Plaintiff’s E-file Motion and Motion to Appoint Counsel are DENIED AS MOOT. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiff filed her original Complaint on June 2, 2025 claiming “loss of ID, 6 substantive property rights, 63 year familial trafficking” against Defendants John Kuehni 7 and Blend Realty. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Against Defendant Blend Realty, Plaintiff alleged, “I had 8 property in San Diego with 953 liens on 3810 Cadden Way, San Diego, CA 92117 on Mary 9 Scott Living Trust my birthname opposed by Blend Realty.” (Id. at 2.) Against Defendant 10 John Kuehni, Plaintiff alleged, “Kuehni filed for default eviction, took $77k in sanction, 11 $23k in fees and fines.” (Id.) The same day, Plaintiff filed an in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 12 Application stating that: she does not have any source of income other than $1,750 in 13 disability and $23 in food stamps; she has negative balances in her checking and savings 14 accounts and that someone “stole all contents” of “both MN/CA home;” and she has two 15 children that rely on her or her spouse for support and that she has $2,555 per month in 16 monthly expenses. (Id. at 1–5.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP Application and screened 17 the original Complaint pursuant to

. (Doc. 11.) The Court dismissed the 18 original Complaint with leave to amend because it failed to state a claim on which relief 19

20 21 1 Plaintiff filed another document titled “Amended Complaint” on November 18, 2025. (Doc. 17.) It contains a number of exhibits including a document purportedly granting 22 power of attorney to John Kuehni for Violet Ruhland (id. at 2–4, 8–10), a document 23 purportedly granting power of attorney to Anne Orth for Plaintiff (id. at 6–7), and a Notice of Failure to Clear Default filed on May 30, 2023 in the Superior Court of California, 24 County of San Diego. (Id. at 5.) “A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of 25 course.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 26 Because Plaintiff has already amended her complaint (see Doc. 13) and has not moved the 27 Court for leave to amend again, Doc. 17 is improper. As discussed below, the Court will grant Plaintiff one final opportunity to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself, 28 1 may be granted. (Id. at 5.) 2 Plaintiff filed the 126-page Amended Complaint on August 12, 2025. (Doc. 13.) 3 The Amended Complaint lists the Plaintiffs as “Mary Swenson, Daniel + Laura,” and lists 4 the Defendants as “John Kuehni, Susan Ivanscheck, Dothseth, and Cathi Kim / RDRE.” 5 (Id. at 1.) The Amended Complaint alleges RICO violations under

. (Id.) 6 The specific allegations include: “familial trafficking – 3 infants . . . trust conversion MN., 7 OR., CA., AZ. . . identity theft 1963 . . . ongoing social security fraud . . . 50+ years mail 8 laundering and theft. Impersonation. Trust is irrevocable converted to series of quitclaim 9 deeds. . . . unlawful eviction . . . cyber harassment / stalking . . . IP theft . . . sex, labor, 10 domestic servitude . . . obstruction by property theft . . . Minnesota Pipeline by step-family 11 . . . ID stolen in CA by mother. . . . Baby + trust racketeering ends in death, asset/person 12 procurement . . . medical malpractice + divorce, pending TRO . . . fraud on the Court.” 13 (Id. at 1–9.) The Amended Complaint also includes many other attachments, such as: a 14 minute order from a hearing on a restraining order in San Diego County Superior Court 15 (id. at 23); a decree of adoption from Juvenile Court in the State of Minnesota (id. at 26); 16 a “List of address and their APN #’s for 3810 Caden SD” spanning 15 pages of hard-to- 17 discern text (id. at 30–45); a complaint brought in San Diego County Superior Court by a 18 different party on April 2, 2021 (id. at 45–50); and a Motion to Correct Jurisdiction on 19 Minnesota Divorce Default Ruling addressed to this Court but also stating it is from “the 20 10th District Court, County of Anoka, Mn” (id. at 68). 21 The Motion to Correct Jurisdiction on Minnesota Divorce Default Ruling is styled 22 as a “Rule 60 Motion,” but it merely expands upon the disjointed allegations: 23 Interpersonal Violence is closely related to the economic extortion and familial family identity theft and trafficking children and adults experience 24 when domestic abuse occurs. Victims or rather, survivors are subjugated to 25 the will and often up against and entire family system that perpetuates generationally for monetary advantage. . . . This has been a money mule mail 26 scheme for 65 years. The lack of discovery and the taking of original 27 documents, as well as [evidentiary] items indicates money laundering by the family, business theft, deception, character assassination, slander, [libel] and 28 1 associated defamation and perjury in court to obtain an objective or to foster interests in one or more of the trusts associated with 3810 Cadden Way SD, 2 CA 92117 and the Scott family Trust assets and parcels. . . . There were other 3 charges attempted in San Diego that were dismissed by the Real Estate Trafficking Arm via attorneys engaged in RICO however, the TRO issued is 4 barring the grantor who was frauded (Petitioner), her children Daniel and 5 Laura Swenson, as well as the interests of another potential heir Mark Duren aka Donal Joseph Scott Jr. adopted as David Hudson, to hide property in 6 Oregon on adoption. . . . The adultery statute in Minnesota for jurisdictional 7 tampering and is improper as well as discriminatory, Petitioner was subjected to malpractice during a displacement in a converted divorce process. 8

(Id. at 70–72.) 9

10 II. DISCUSSION 11 A. Screening Under

(e) 12 Plaintiff was previously granted leave to proceed IFP. (Doc. 11 at 3–4.) Every 13 complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of

is subject to mandatory 14 screening by the Court under § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127 15 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] 16 complaint that fails to state a claim.”) Under this provision, the Court must dismiss 17 complaints that are (1) frivolous or malicious, (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may 18 be granted, or (3) seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. 19

(e)(2)(B). 20 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 21 jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 22 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2). “The standard for determining whether a 23 plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 24 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 25 failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter,

(9th Cir. 2012). Rule 26 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 27 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) 28 (quotation omitted). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 1 of the Univ. of Alaska,

(9th Cir. 1982). However, the Court may not 2 “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.”

. Nor may the 3 Court accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal conclusions cast in the 4 form of factual allegations. Iqbal,

. 5 “By any measure, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain ‘a short and plain statement’ 6 of either the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction or Plaintiff’s claim for relief. Plaintiff’s 7 [126-page Amended Complaint] is rambling, disjointed, nearly impossible to follow, and 8 rife with legal conclusions.” De La Hoz v. Gov’t of the United States, CASE NO. C18- 9 1370JLR,

, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2018). As it previously indicated, 10 “the Court cannot infer the nature of the dispute or any specific claim” against any of the 11 Defendants. (Doc. 11 at 5.) Additionally, because Plaintiff appears to challenge prior 12 eviction and family law proceedings, the Court is concerned it also lacks subject matter 13 jurisdiction over those causes of action. Plaintiff has not stated “a claim to relief that is 14 plausible on its face” against any of the Defendants. See Iqbal,

. 15 B. Motion to Recuse 16 “The substantive standard for recusal under

and

is 17 the same: Whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that 18 the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. McTiernan, 695

(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Plaintiff states only that the undersigned 20 “should remove herself. She is clearly biased. Again, no protection from TRO extortion 21 or financial death.” (Doc. 14 at 2.) To the extent Plaintiff argues that recusal is necessary 22 because of the undersigned’s previous Order, “prior rulings in the proceeding, or another 23 proceeding, solely because they were adverse are not ordinarily sufficient to require 24 recusal.” In re Golden, Case No.: 22-CV-1234-TWR (NLS),

, at *5 25 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. 26 of Cal.,

, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2005)). To the extent Plaintiff argues that recusal 27 is necessary for another reason, she has not made that reason known. The Motion to Recuse 28 is DENIED. I Hl. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) is DISMISSED 3 || with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint on or before 4 || January 9, 2026. The second amended complaint must cure the deficiencies discussed 5 ||above by providing a short and plain statement of both the basis for the Court’s subject 6 matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff's entitlement to relief. Plaintiff is cautioned that if she 7 || chooses not to file a second amended complaint, or if the second amended complaint does 8 cure the pleading deficiencies, her claims will be dismissed with prejudice and without 9 || further leave to amend. 10 Additionally, Plaintiff's E-file Motion and Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 14) are 11 || DENIED AS MOOT. See Dudash v. Ulloa, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1269-CAB-BLM, 2025 12 || WL 1663395, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2025) (denying a pro se plaintiff's motion for leave 13 electronically file documents as moot upon dismissal of his complaint). 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 DATE: December 5, 2025 ee tariels Martins □ 7 ON. RUTH BERMW@DEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28