1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAURENCE JAY SHAW, Case No. 24-cv-05826-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR BY VIDEOCONFERENCE 9 v. AND DENYING MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 10 EDWIN DARIO MANZANO GARCIA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 85, 86 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court are two motions filed by Defendant Edwin Dario Manzano 14 Garcia: a motion for protective order, Dkt. No. 85, and a motion for leave to appear by 15 videoconference, Dkt. No. 86. The Court finds these matters appropriate for disposition without 16 oral argument and the matters are deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons 17 detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion for leave to appear by videoconference, but 18 DENIES the motion for protective order. 19 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR BY VIDEOCONFERENCE 20 Mr. Garcia requests permission to participate in future hearings and discovery conferences 21 by videoconference. Dkt. No. 86. Mr. Garcia resides in Guatemala, and it would be infeasible for 22 him to travel to the United States to appear at future hearings. See id. Mr. Garcia agrees that he 23 will ensure that he has stable internet, video, and audio capabilities for any such hearings. Id. 24 Plaintiff Laurence Jay Shaw does not appear to oppose this request. The Court finds that Mr. 25 Garcia’s request is generally reasonable under the circumstances. The Court notes that to the 26 extent this case proceeds to trial, it may not be practicable for Mr. Garcia to appear remotely. But 27 the Court need not decide that issue at this time given the early stage of the case. For now, the 1 videoconference. The Clerk is directed to e-mail Mr. Garcia the Zoom videoconference 2 information that he may use for future hearings. Mr. Garcia will be advised in advance of any 3 court hearings how he may participate remotely if different from this Zoom information. 4 II. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 5 Mr. Garcia has also filed a motion for a protective order. Dkt. No. 85. Mr. Garcia argues 6 that Plaintiff has repeatedly interfered with Mr. Garcia’s ongoing business operations by 7 contacting third-party vendors. Id. For example, Mr. Garcia states that Plaintiff “has repeatedly 8 contacted Defendant’s payment processors and distributors, including Shopify, PayPal, Stripe, and 9 Etsy, alleging intellectual-property violations and causing account suspensions and significant 10 business loss.” Id. at 1. Mr. Garcia accordingly requests that (1) all documents produced during 11 discovery be marked as confidential, maintained securely, and used only for this litigation; and 12 (2) the Court prohibit Plaintiff and his agents “from contacting Defendant’s business partners, 13 payment processors, suppliers, distributors, or customers without written Court approval.” See id. 14 at 2. 15 As an initial matter, Mr. Garcia’s requested protective order—which would preclude 16 Plaintiff from speaking with third party vendors—appears to constitute a prior restraint on speech. 17 Prior restraints on free speech under the First Amendment “are subject to strict scrutiny because of 18 the peculiar dangers presented by such restraints” on free speech. See Levine v. United States 19 District Court,

(9th Cir. 1985). Such an order may only be imposed if “(1) the 20 activity restrained poses either a clear and present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a 21 protected competing interest; (2) the order is narrowly drawn; and (3) less restrictive alternatives 22 are not available.”

(citations omitted). Mr. Garcia has not met this standard, and it seems 23 unlikely that he could do so given the nature of this case. Cf. In re Dan Farr Prods.,

590, 591 (9th Cir. 2017) (vacating “protective order” in civil trademark case preventing public 25 statements relevant to merits of case). 26 At bottom, Mr. Garcia is asking the Court to permit him to continue his business 27 operations uninterrupted and prevent Plaintiff from taking any steps to protect Plaintiff’s own 1 motion for temporary restraining order, the parties fundamentally dispute who owns the 2 || intellectual property at issue in this case. See Dkt. No. 73 at 7-8. At this early stage, the Court 3 || cannot say who is likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and will not elevate any party’s 4 |} rights over those of the other. The Court therefore DENIES the motion. Dkt. No. 85. The parties 5 may meet and confer to determine whether they can agree to the Court’s model protective order. 6 Wl. CONCLUSION 7 The Court GRANTS the administrative motion for leave to appear by videoconference, 8 Dkt. No. 86, but DENIES the motion for a protective order, Dkt. No. 85. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: 12/4/2025

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 12 United States District Judge

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