1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MIGUEL SANTIAGO RAMIREZ Case No.: 25-cv-3257-JES-VET

12 Petitioner, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; 15 HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO Director, San Diego Field Office, U.S.

; AND 16 Immigration & Customs Enforcement,

Enforcement & Removal Operations; 17 (2) DENYING COUNT TWO OF THE TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. PETITION AS MOOT. 18 Immigration & Customs Enforcement;

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. 19 [ECF Nos. 1, 2] Department of Homeland Security; 20 PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General; and DAREN K. MARGOLIN, Director, 21 Executive Office for Immigration Review, 22 Respondents. 23 24 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Before the Court is Petitioner Miguel Santiago Ramirez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 2 a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

. ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”). Petitioner 3 seeks habeas relief by asserting that Respondents’ application of

(b)(2), 4 not

(a), with respect to his detention violates the: (1) Immigration and 5 Nationality Act (“INA”); and (2) the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. For the 6 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition and DENIES AS 7 MOOT Count Two of the Petition. 8 I. BACKGROUND 9 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without 10 inspection nearly a decade ago. Pet. ¶¶ 15, 42. Since then, Petitioner has built deep and 11 longstanding ties to his community.

. On September 9, 2025, ICE arrested 12 Petitioner during a traffic stop in Dunkirk, New York.

. Following his arrest, 13 Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings under

(a) and was issued a 14 Notice to Appear. Res. Ex. 1 at 10. Thereafter, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 15 (“ICE”) issued a custody determination to continue Petitioner’s detention without an 16 opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions.

. Petitioner was 17 subsequently transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Facility, where he remains detained 18 pursuant to

(b)(2).

. 19 Since then, Petitioner sought a custody reconsideration hearing before an 20 Immigration Judge (“IJ”).

. On October 3, 2025, an IJ denied Petitioner’s request 21 to be released on bond. Res. Ex. 1 at 15. Specifically, the IJ found that under BIA (“Board 22 of Immigration Appeals”) precedent in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

(BIA 23 2025), the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to redetermine Petitioner’s custody 24 because he entered the country without inspection.

On October 30, 2025, Petitioner 25 filed an appeal of the IJ’s bond decision with the BIA. Res. Ex. 1 at 18-20. 26 In this action, Petitioner contends that he has been illegally detained by DHS and the 27 Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), which have adopted a new 28 interpretation of the INA. Pet. ¶ 5. This interpretation treats all individuals who entered the 1 country without inspection as “applicants for admission,” which subjects them to 2 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1225(b)(2). Id. ¶ 3. Petitioner argues 3 that he has lived in the United States for years, and therefore, Section 1225(b) does not 4 apply to him. Id. ¶ 5. Further, that to the extent he remains in custody, his detention should 5 proceed under Section 1226(a), which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. Id. 6 ¶ 6. 7 Accordingly, Petitioner seeks habeas relief from the Court because his continued 8 detention, resulting from Respondents’ application of Section 1225(b), violates the INA 9 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 12 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 13 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 14 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 15 Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 16 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 17 law.

(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 18 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 19 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,

(2001). Accordingly, challenges 20 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 21 jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis,

(2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538

(2003). 23 Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law 24 ... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or 25 confinement.” Fay v. Noia,

(1963). “The application for the writ usurps 26 the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives 27 prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S.,

1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Jurisdiction and Applicability of Section 1225 vs. 1226 3 The Court finds that the Parties’ arguments with respect to whether the Court has 4 jurisdiction to hear this petition; and Petitioner’s detention is governed by

1225(b)(2) or 1226(a), are analogous—if not identical—to those raised in the Court’s 6 recent decision in Martinez Lopez v. Noem, et al., No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG,

3030457, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the 8 reasoning it stated in Martinez Lopez and incorporates it by reference.

9 Based on the facts of this Petition, the Court finds that: (1)

's 10 jurisdiction stripping provisions do not bar this Court from considering Petitioner's habeas 11 petition; and (2)

(a)—not

(b)—applies to Petitioner. Thus, 12 Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing by an IJ, who may not deny bond 13 on the basis that

(b) governs Petitioner’s detention. 14 B. Procedural Due Process 15 The Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner's due process claim given that 16 the Court will grant the relief he seeks based on its conclusion that Section 1226(a) applies 17 to him. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing, 18 pursuant to

(a), or release him within the time allotted, Petitioner may 19 renew his Fifth Amendment Due Process claim. 20 C. Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class 21 In the Traverse, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing because he 22 clearly falls within the Bautista Bond Eligible Class, which was certified by the Central 23 District of California that found that DHS’s mandatory detention policy is unlawful. Trav. 24 at 2-3; Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F.Supp.3d ----,

, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25 20, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F.R.D. ----,

, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26 25, 2025) (defining the nationwide Bond Eligible Class as “[a]ll noncitizens in the United 27 States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without 28 inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not 1 be subject to detention under

(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the 2 Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.”). 3 The parties are in dispute as to the legal effect of the Bautista decision. Respondents 4 concede that Petitioner appears to be a Bautista class member. They also agree that the 5 Bautista court granted class certification and partial summary judgment—solely to the 6 plaintiffs in that case. Res. at 1. Respondents, however, contend that the Bautista Court did 7 not issue a class-wide declaratory judgment. Id. And in the absence of such a judgment, 8 regardless of whether Petitioner is a Bond Eligible Class member, he is not entitled to the 9 same remedy as the Bautista plaintiffs. Id. 10 Petitioner argues that when that court certified the Bond Eligible Class, it extended 11 the same declaratory relief—that it provided in its Motion for Summary Judgment Order— 12 to the Bond Eligible Class as a whole. Bautista,

, at *9. He argues further 13 that this allows the Court to order Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing 14 governed by Section 1226(a), if it finds that he is a member of the Bond Eligible Class. 15 Trav. at 2-3. 16 The Court need not decide whether Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class 17 or the effect the Bautista decision has on Petitioner, for two reasons. First, the Court has 18 already found that Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under Count One. Thus, any such 19 analysis would be unnecessary. Second, Petitioner initially raised this ground for relief in 20 the Traverse. See

This deprived Respondents of a meaningful opportunity to respond to 21 this argument. The Court, therefore, finds that considering this ground in its analysis of the 22 Petition to be inappropriate. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes,

(9th Cir. 23 1994) (“A Traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.”) see 24 also Zamani v. Carnes,

(9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not 25 consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). Accordingly, the Court 26 exercises its judicial discretion and declines to do so. 27 // 28 // l IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing: 3 (1) The Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition; 4 (2) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Count Two of the Petition; 5 (3) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an 6 individualized bond hearing, under

(a), within ten (10) 7 days of this Order, or otherwise release him from custody, under the same 8 conditions that existed before his detention; and 9 (4) Respondents are ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within ten 10 (10) days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: December 5, 2025

14 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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