1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT ORDONEZ, Case No. 1:22-cv-00985-BAM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES PURSUANT TO 42 13 v. U.S.C. § 406(B) 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL (Doc. 23) SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. Introduction 18 Francesco Benavides (“Counsel”), counsel for Robert Ordonez (“Plaintiff”), filed a 19 motion for authorization of attorneys’ fees pursuant to

(b) on August 16, 2025. 20 (Doc. 23.) Although served with a copy of the motion by certified mail on August 16, 2025, and 21 notified of the right to object within fourteen days, (see Doc. 23 at 1, 8), Plaintiff did not file a 22 response. On September 2, 2025, Defendant Commissioner of Social Security filed a response, 23 indicating that the Commissioner “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request for attorney’s 24 fees under

(b).” (Doc. 25 at 2.) 25 Having considered the motion and record in this case, the Court will grant the motion for 26 authorization of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,700.00. 27 II. Relevant Background 28 Plaintiff, through Counsel, filed this action challenging the denial of social security 1 benefits on August 8, 2022. (Doc. 1.) On June 30, 2023, the Court issued an order granting 2 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanding the action for further proceedings 3 pursuant to sentence four of

(g). (Doc. 19.) Judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s 4 favor. (Doc. 20.) On July 11, 2022, the Court approved the parties’ stipulation to award Plaintiff 5 attorneys’ fees of $7,100.45 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 22.) According 6 to Counsel, because Plaintiff owed a debt subject to a Department of Treasury offset, Counsel did 7 not receive the $7,100.45 in fees. Instead, the Treasury Department took this payment to pay 8 Plaintiff’s child support debt. (Doc. 23 at 1; Doc. 23-5.) 9 On remand, an administrative law judge issued a favorable decision awarding benefits to 10 Plaintiff. (Doc. 23-2.) On July 14, 2025, the agency issued Plaintiff a notice informing him that 11 he was entitled to past-due disability benefits and specified that Plaintiff had total past-due 12 benefits amounting to $59,722.00. (Doc. 23-1 at 5.) The agency also informed Plaintiff that it 13 was withholding $14,943.00 from his past due benefits to pay his representative. (Id.) 14 Counsel now seeks authorization of attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $7,700.00 which 15 is less than 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past due benefits.1 (Doc. 23 at 3.) Plaintiff agreed to pay 16 Counsel a contingent fee of 25% of any past due benefits obtained for work in federal court. 17 (Doc. 25-3.) Counsel contends that the requested fee amount is reasonable considering the 18 contingent nature of recovery and the results achieved. Although Counsel previously was 19 awarded $ 7,100.45 in EAJA fees, Counsel did not receive the award as it was subject to a 20 Treasury Offset. As noted, Plaintiff did not file any objection to Counsel’s request. 21 II. Legal Standard 22 An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant 23 who is awarded benefits:

24 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as 25 part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 26 1 Counsel reports that the attorney who represented Plaintiff at the administrative level received 27 or is anticipated to receive $7,200.00 in attorneys’ fees under

(a), and the total amount of all attorneys’ fees paid under § 406(a) and § 406(b) will not exceed 25% of Plaintiff’s 28 past-due award of benefits. (Doc. 23 at 1-2.) 1 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . . 2 3

(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002) (explaining 4 section 406(b) controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants in court). A 5 contingency fee agreement is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding twenty-five percent 6 of past-due benefits.

. “[A]n award of section 406(b) fees is 7 offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8 1:17-cv-00846-SAB,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021) (citing Gisbrecht,

at 796). 10 III. Discussion and Analysis 11 District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) 12 cases.” Hearn v. Barnhart,

(N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court 13 must review contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield 14 reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht,

. In doing so, the Court should 15 consider “the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.”

at 16 808. In addition, the Court should consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard 17 manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively 18 large in relation to the benefits received.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 19 2009) (en banc). 20 In this case, after carefully considering the fee agreement and the applicable law, the 21 Court finds Counsel’s requested fees to be reasonable. In support of the motion for authorization 22 of attorneys’ fees under

(b), Counsel attached the contingent fee agreement which 23 provided for a contingent fee of 25% of the past-due benefits. (Doc. 23-3.) Counsel accordingly 24 accepted the risk of loss in the representation. As a result of Plaintiff’s counsel’s work before the 25 Court, the matter was remanded for further proceedings and the Commissioner ultimately 26 awarded Plaintiff benefits. Counsel provided a copy of the instant motion for authorization of 27 attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff. (See Doc. 23 at 8.) Although served with the motion, Plaintiff did not 28 timely challenge the requested fees, which attests to their reasonableness. 1 Additionally, there is no indication Plaintiff’s counsel performed in a substandard manner 2 or engaged in severe dilatory conduct to the extent that a reduction in fees is warranted. Plaintiff 3 filed an opening brief and a reply brief in this action and was able to secure a remand for further 4 proceedings at the district court level and a subsequent award of past-due benefits. There is no 5 indication that the fees requested are excessively large in relation to the benefits received. 6 Plaintiff’s counsel expended a total of 31.0 hours while representing Plaintiff before the district 7 court. (Doc. 23-4 (itemization of attorney time).) The effective hourly rate requested equals 8 $248.38 per hour. (See also Doc. 23 at 4.) This hourly rate is not excessive when compared to 9 what district courts in the Ninth Circuit have approved in cases involving social security 10 contingency fee arrangements. See Garcia v. O’Malley, No. 1:20-cv-01366-SKO,

1118782, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024) (collecting cases and finding effective hourly rate of 12 $2,307.69 per hour not excessive). 13 Accordingly, the Court finds the fees sought by Counsel are reasonable in light of the 14 results achieved in this action. An award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 406(b) in the 15 amount of $7,700.00 is appropriate, and because Counsel did not receive EAJA fees, no offset of 16 any prior award of attorneys’ fees granted under the EAJA is warranted. Gisbrecht,

796. 18 IV. Conclusion and Order 19 Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 20 1. Counsel’s motion attorneys’ fees pursuant to

(b), (Doc. 23), is 21 GRANTED. 22 2. The Court approves an attorney fee award of $7,700.00 pursuant to

406(b), not subject to an offset as no prior EAJA fee award was received by Plaintiff’s counsel. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25

26 Dated: October 16, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27

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