1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4

5 ANDRES FELIPE ARRECHEA MAZORRA, Case No. 25-cv-10492 6 Petitioner, 7 ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY vs. RESTRAINING ORDER 8 SERGIO ALBARRAN, ET AL., 9 Respondents. 10

11 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. TRO 12 Mot., ECF No. 2. On December 6, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 13 and an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, against Respondents Field Office 14 Director of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office Sergio Albarran, 15 Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of the 16 Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela 17 Bondi. ECF Nos. 1, 2. Petitioner asks this Court to (1) order his immediate release from 18 Respondents’ custody pending these proceedings, and (2) enjoin Respondents from transferring 19 him out of this District or deporting him during the pendency of the underlying proceedings. See 20 Notice of Mot., ECF No. 2. For the foregoing reasons, the TRO is GRANTED as modified below. 21 I. Background 22 According to the record before the Court, Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled to the 23 United States from Colombia in 2024. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 3. “In 24 2024, when Respondents chose to release Petitioner on parole at the border, that decision 25 represented their finding that he was neither dangerous nor a flight risk.” Mot. at 10. “Since 26 being released, Petitioner has consistently reported to all required ICE and ISAP check-ins. He has 27 also reported monthly via the ISAP application on his phone. After his first appointment with ICE, 1 his ankle monitor was removed. He continued to follow ICE guidelines.” Pet. ¶ 5. Petitioner “has 2 no criminal history.” Id. ¶ 1. 3 On December 3, 2025, Petitioner attended an ICE check-in at 630 Sansome Street in San 4 Francisco. Pet. ¶ 6. He “showed up at the ICE check-in, already feeling unwell. He was not able 5 to bring his insulin to the check-in, nor did he have any food. He had only a small amount of his 6 HIV medication.” Id. ¶ 11. At the check-in, petitioner was informed that he was being detained. 7 Id. ¶ 6. “Soon after being detained at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco, Petitioner began 8 feeling nausea, headaches, and difficulty breathing. He was transported to Highland Hospital in 9 Oakland, California, where doctors are treating his severe complications from diabetes and 10 ordering additional tests.” Id. ¶ 12. Petitioner is currently being detained at Highland Hospital in 11 Oakland. Id. ¶ 2. 12 Late in the evening of December 6, 2025, this Petition was filed. The same day, 13 Petitioner’s counsel provided notice of the Petition and a forthcoming motion for a TRO, along 14 with a copy of the Petition, to Respondents’ counsel. Decl. of Jonathan Abel, ECF No. 2-2 ¶ 12. 15 Later that day, counsel filed the motion for the TRO and sent a copy to Respondents’ counsel. Id. 16 ¶ 12. In the motion, Petitioner contends that his arrest and detention violate the Due Process 17 Clause of the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because Respondents allegedly have no valid 18 interest in detaining him) and procedurally (because he was not provided with a pre-detention 19 bond hearing).

20 II. Legal Standard 21 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 22 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump,

, 1159 n.3 (9th 23 Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 24 to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 25 preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in 26 the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

(2008). 27 “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 1 the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 2 satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber,

(9th Cir. 2014) (internal 3 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final 4 two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder,

(2009). 5 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 6 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 7 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 8 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 9 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,

(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 10 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70,

423, 439 (1974)). 12 III. Discussion 13 Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his 14 ongoing detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 15 Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 16 entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 17 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP,

, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 18 July 24, 2025) (applying the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge,

(1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 20 06487-PCP,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 21 Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 22 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner faces is an 23 immediate and irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 24 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions,

(9th 25 Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio,

(9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier 26 v. Woodford,

(9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 27 conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that he has 1 The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 2 heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 3 procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 4 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv- 5 01434-JST,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 6 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 7 constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi,

(9th Cir. 8 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been 9 violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). As other courts in this 10 district and others have concluded under similar circumstances, “the potential harm to [Petitioner] 11 is significant, while the potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo Sequen,

2203419, at *3. At most, the government faces a short delay in detaining Petitioner if it ultimately 13 demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that his detention is necessary to prevent danger 14 to the community or flight. See Jorge M. F.,

, at *3; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 15 05071,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is not “harmed in 16 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 17 Immigr. & Nat. Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict between 18 [administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty 19 concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 20 F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler,

(9th Cir. 1983)). 21 A TRO immediately releasing Petitioner is appropriate to return him to the status quo. E. 22 Bay Sanctuary Covenant,

. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status 23 which preceded the pending controversy.” Doe v. Noem,

, 1166 (W.D.

) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,

(9th Cir. 2000)). 25 That is the moment prior to Petitioner’s likely illegal detention. See Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25- 26 cv-00663,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining 27 order requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a 1 Because Petitioner satisfies all requirements for temporary injunctive relief and such relief 2 is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO Motion is granted as detailed below. This Order 3 accords with many other recent grants of temporary relief in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Alva 4 v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (granting 5 temporary restraining order); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632,

, at *4 (N.D. 6 Cal. July 4, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring release of asylum seeker and a 7 pre-detention bond hearing before re-arrest); Singh,

, at *10 (granting 8 preliminary injunction); Doe v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-647-DJC-DMC,

, at *8 (E.D. 9 Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order); see also Diaz,

10 (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing before re-detention of 11 noncitizen out of custody five years); Garcia v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-5070,

, at *3 12 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing 13 before re-detention of noncitizen out of custody six years ); Enamorado v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 14 4072-NW,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025). 15 Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of 16 bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [Respondents] from enjoining [their] 17 conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday,

(9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is 18 needed to ensure that Respondents will be reimbursed for “costs and damages sustained by . . . 19 hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 20 IV. Order 21 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary 22 Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further briefing and a hearing 23 on this matter. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from Respondents’ 24 custody pending full briefing and hearing on the underlying petition and/or a preliminary 25 injunction regarding re-detention.1 Respondents shall file a status report by 10:00 a.m. on 26 1 Petitioner also asks the Court to order that he remain within the Northern District of 27 California in order to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction, but it is well-established that “when the ] Tuesday, December 9, 2025 confirming release and shall not re-detain pending resolution of the 2 || forthcoming hearing. 3 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be granted 4 || and/or a preliminary injunction should not issue regarding re-detention. Respondents shall file a 5 || response to Petitioner’s motion by no later than 12:00 noon on December 12, 2025. Any reply 6 || shall be filed by close of business on December 17, 2025. A hearing shall be heard at 10:00 a.m. 7 || by Zoom on December 22, 2025. This order shall remain in effect until that time. Parties are 8 advised that the assigned judge may change the briefing schedule and the hearing date. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: December 7, 2025 VONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE qa 12

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Oo Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2g ||

, 441 (2004).