1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-02879-DMS-AHG SARINEH GHARAKHAN,

12 O R D E R G R A N T I N G I N P A RT AND 13 Petitioner, DENYING IN PART PETITIONER’S v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14 CORPUS KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. 15 Department of Homeland Security;

16 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General; [ECF No. 1] TODD LYONS, Acting Director, 17 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 18 JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office Director, San Diego Field Office, San 19 Diego Field Office, CHRISTOPHER 20 LAROSE, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, 21 Respondents. 22

23 On October 24, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 24 (“Petition”), (Pet., ECF No. 1), and a motion for temporary restraining order, (ECF No. 2). 25 On November 5, 2025, this Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part 26 Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO Order”). (TRO Order, ECF No. 27 11). Specifically, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to be released from custody, but 28 1 denied Petitioner’s request to implement procedures before Respondents can effectuate a 2 third country removal. (Id. at 8). The Court now must rule on the Petition. Respondents 3 filed a supplemental response to Petitioner’s Petition, stating that “Respondents have no 4 supplemental information at this time.” (Suppl. Resp., ECF No. 13). Petitioner did not 5 submit a supplemental reply. For the following reasons, the Petition is granted in part and 6 denied in part. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 Petitioner and her family fled Iran when Petitioner was one year old. (Pet. 1). Her 9 family came to the United States in the late-1980s, receiving permanent resident status as 10 Armenian Christian refugees. (Id.); (Opp’n, ECF No. 9, at 1). In 2018, Petitioner was 11 convicted of robbery and subsequently ordered removed to Iran. (Pet. 1). However, 12 because of her status as an Armenian Christian and fear of persecution, Petitioner was 13 granted withholding of removal to Iran. (Id.). On October 2, 2018, Petitioner was released 14 from custody on an Order of Supervision. (Opp’n 1). If Petitioner committed any further 15 crimes while on supervised release, she would be re-detained. (Id.). On or around February 16 21, 2025, Petitioner was arrested in Orange County for possession of a controlled 17 substance. (Pet. 1); (Opp’n 1). She was released from county jail and taken directly into 18 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on February 23, 2025. (Pet. 1); 19 (Opp’n 1). She has since been in ICE custody. (Pet. 1). 20 Petitioner alleges that she has not been given a chance to contest her re-detention. 21 (Id.). Respondents allege that ICE officers showed Petitioner a Form I-200, Warrant for 22 Arrest of Alien, at the time of her re-detention, and a Notice of Custody Determination the 23 next day. (Opp’n 1–2). Respondents allege that Petitioner had the opportunity to request 24 that an immigration judge (“IJ”) review her custody determination, but Petitioner 25 affirmatively acknowledged receipt of the notification and declined review. (Id. at 2). 26 Petitioner alleges that approximately six months into her re-detention, an officer told her 27 that ICE was “trying to see what country they could send [her] to.” (Pet. 4). On August 28 15, September 18, and October 8, 2025, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations 1 (“ERO”) sent requests to the Removal Management Division for third country removal. 2 (Opp’n 5). On October 21, 2025, ICE provided Petitioner with notice that her custody 3 status will be reviewed on or about October 31, 2025. (Id. at 2). Petitioner alleges that this 4 was her first “90-day custody review.” (See Pet. 4). The ICE officer did not “tell 5 [Petitioner] why [she is] still detained . . ., if or why [her] order of supervision was revoked, 6 and what country ICE is trying to remove [her] to.” (Id.). 7 Petitioner filed her Petition, alleging that: (1) ICE failed to comply with its 8 procedural regulations; (2) Petitioner’s detention violates

and Zadvydas v. 9 Davis,

(2001); and (3) ICE cannot remove Petitioner to a third country 10 without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Pet. 8–21). 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their 13 respective jurisdictions.”

(a). A petitioner prevails in his petition for writ 14 of habeas corpus if he shows that his custody violates the Constitution or laws of the United 15 States.

§ 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 16 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 A. Zadvydas Claim 19 “[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien 20 from the United States within a period of 90 days” (referred to as the “removal period”). 21

(a)(1)(A). An alien must be detained during the 90-day removal period. 22

§ 1231(a)(2). After the removal period, an alien not yet removed may continue to be 23 detained or released under supervision; however, detention beyond the removal period is 24 limited to what is reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s removal. Id. § 1231(a)(6); 25 Zadvydas,

. Section 1231 contains an implicit time limitation of six months, 26 after which post-removal detention is no longer presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 27 U.S. at 690, 701. The petitioner has the initial burden to provide “good reason to believe 28 that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” after 1 which, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut this showing. Id. 2 at 701. If removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the petitioner’s detention is no longer 3 authorized by statute. Id. at 699–700. “In that case, . . . the alien’s release may and should 4 be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the 5 circumstances.” Id. at 700. 6 In its TRO Order, the Court determined that Petitioner had been detained for more 7 than six months, thus triggering the Zadvydas burden-shifting scheme. (TRO Order 6). 8 The Court also found that Petitioner received minimal communications regarding her 9 detention status: she was not told which countries have been contacted for her potential 10 removal, whether any country had agreed to accept her, or when a third country removal 11 might occur. (Id.). Thus, the Court found that based on Petitioner’s allegations, that the 12 Government did not have any third country locations underway and did not have an answer 13 as to when Petitioner will be removed. (Id.). These facts remain true and no additional 14 facts have been provided. Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner sufficiently raised a “good 15 reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 16 foreseeable future.” 17 The Court also found in its TRO Order that Respondents’ efforts did not rebut 18 Petitioner’s showing. (Id. at 7). To date, Respondents have “no supplemental information” 19 regarding their efforts to effectuate Petitioner’s removal. (See Suppl. Resp. 2). Thus, 20 Respondents have not shown that Petitioner’s removal is reasonably foreseeable. 21 Petitioner’s ongoing detention is therefore no longer authorized by statute. The Court 22 GRANTS the Petition.1 23 24 25 26 27 1 In light of this determination, the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s arguments that Respondents violated their procedural regulations. 28 1 B. Third Country Removal Claim 2 “A petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

is the proper 3 ||mechanism to challenge the legality of [Petitioner’s] detention pending removal.” Tran v. 4 || Bondi, No. C25-01897-JLR,

, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025). 5 || “However, it is not the proper vehicle to bring claims that are . . . not ripe for review.”

6 || While Petitioner argues that the potential to be removed to a third country is 7 || unconstitutional, she also argues that “[t]he [G]overnment has provided no evidence that it 8 || will succeed in removing [Petitioner] to a third country now.” (Reply, ECF No. 10, at 10). 9 || The Court recognizes Respondents’ contention that “there is a likelihood of removal to a 10 || third country,” (Opp’n 3), but there exists no evidence as to what countries are willing to 11 || accept Petitioner or when such a removal may occur. Thus, based on the record, the Court 12 declines to address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of her possible 13 removal to a third country and declines to impose any procedures required for Respondents 14 effectuate a third country removal. See, e.g., Tran,

, at *4; Do v. 15 || Scott, No. C25-2187RSL,

, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2025). A writ on 16 || this basis is DENIED. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 Based on the foregoing, the Court DECLARES Petitioner’s detention was unlawful 19 GRANTS the Petition on the Zadvydas claim. The Petition is DENIED as to the third 20 |}country removal claim. The TRO issued on November 5, 2025 is DISSOLVED. The 21 ||Court ORDERS that Petitioner SHALL REMAIN released from Respondents’ custody 22 |}under the same conditions of supervised release. The Court further ORDERS that 23 || Respondents are enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner during the pendency of her removal 24 || proceedings without prior leave of this Court.

. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: December 10, 2025 4 ins Yn. L4\ Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 28 United States District Judge