1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 VLAD KROUTIK, Landlord, Case No.: 25-CV-2794 JLS (AHG)

11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12 v. (1) DENYING MOTION FOR 13 NATALIE RAJIC, Tenant, RECONSIDERATION, 14 Defendant. (2) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE 15 TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY AS 16 MOOT, AND

17 (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 18 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 19

20 (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8)

21 22 Presently before the Court is Defendant Natalie Rajic’s Motion to Vacate Prior 23 Order, for Reconsideration, and for Judicial Recusal or Reassignment (“Mot.,” ECF No. 6). 24 Also before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Electronically File Documents 25 (ECF No. 7) and Defendant’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Immediate 26 Stay of State Eviction Proceedings (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 8). Having considered 27 Defendant’s arguments and the law, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motions. 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 On October 2, 2025, Plaintiff Vlad Kroutik filed an Unlawful Detainer action in the 3 Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, against Defendant Natalie Rajic. 4 Plaintiff filed the case as a Limited Civil Case, seeking $320.39 for unpaid rent and $172.26 5 per day in damages beginning September 24, 2025. ECF No. 1 Ex. A-2. On October 20, 6 2025, Defendant removed the current action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 7 District of California alleging the grounds for jurisdiction under

, 1343, 8 and 1443. ECF No. 1 at 1 (“Not.”). Defendant filed the action along with a Motion to Seal 9 in Entirety, an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, 10 and a Motion to Dismiss. See generally

11 On October 30, 2025, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Seal in Entirety 12 (“Order,” ECF No. 5) for failure to satisfy the “compelling reasons” standard. Order at 4. 13 The Court also remanded the action to the Superior Court of San Diego, finding a lack of 14 subject matter jurisdiction.

. Because the action lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 15 the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Defendant’s Application to Proceed 16 in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs as moot.

Defendant now seeks 17 reconsideration of this Order, judicial recusal, and injunctive relief. Mot. at 2; TRO Mot. 18 at 2. 19 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 20 I. Legal Standard 21 In the Southern District of California, a party may apply for reconsideration 22 “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been 23 made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(i)(1). 24 The moving party must provide an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, “what new or different 25 facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon 26 such prior application.”

“In resolving motions for reconsideration, courts often look to 27 the standard for relief from final judgment set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 59(e) and 60(b), which apply to motions for reconsideration of final appealable orders and 1 relief from judgment.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Venture Point, LLC, 2 No. 220CV01783KJDEJY,

, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 23, 2021). 3 “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it ‘is presented with newly 4 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the 5 controlling law.’” Wood v. Ryan,

(9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in 6 original) (quoting McDowell v. Calderon,

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). 7 “Clear error or manifest injustice occurs when the ‘reviewing court on the entire record is 8 left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Young v. 9 Wolfe, No. CV 07-03190 RSWL-AJWx,

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 10 2017) (quoting Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

(9th Cir. 2013)). “As 11 the Ninth Circuit has explained the clear error standard, ‘[t]o be clearly erroneous, a 12 decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member 13 of this court recently stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a 14 five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.’” Stanislaus Food Prod. Co. v. USS-POSCO 15 Indus., No. 1:09-CV-00560-LJO,

, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) 16 (quoting Fisher v. Roe,

(9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by 17 Payton v. Woodford,

(9th Cir. 2002)). 18 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 19 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 20

, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for 21 reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court. Navajo Nation v. 22 Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation,

(9th Cir. 23 2003) (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 883). A party may not raise new arguments or 24 present new evidence if it could have reasonably raised them earlier. Kona Enters., 229 25 F.3d at 890 (citing 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold,

(9th Cir. 1999)). 26 II. Analysis 27 Defendant asks the Court to reconsider its October 30, 2025, Order denying her 28 Motion to Seal in Entirety and remanding the action to the Superior Court of San Diego. 1 See generally Mot. Defendant contends reconsideration of the Motion to Seal is warranted 2 because the Court “[a]bused its discretion by failing to acknowledge that the motion was 3 unopposed”; “applied the wrong legal standard by ignoring the Full Faith and Credit Act 4

, and California’s Tenant Privacy Statute, California Code of Civil 5 Procedure § 1161.2”; and “overlooked controlling authority and evidence establishing 6 compelling reasons for limited sealing.” Id. at 4. Further, Defendant contends that the 7 Court’s remand of the case was improper because the case qualifies for jurisdiction under 8 “Federal civil-rights removal under § 1443(1)”; “[t]he federal claims were not merely 9 ‘defenses’ but substantive counterclaims”; and “[t]he Court did not make the findings 10 required by § 1447(c) that remand was warranted for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” 11 Id. at 5–6. 12 To the extent Defendant argues that her Motion to Seal was unopposed, the Court 13 considered the Motion on its merits, and whether it was opposed or not does not change 14 the underlying analysis. See Hilsley v. General Mills, Inc., No. 18-cv-395-L-BLM, 2020

, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2020) (“Lack of opposition to a motion to seal 16 therefore does not automatically resolve it. . . . Defendants, as the parties seeking to seal 17 judicial records, bear the burden of overcoming the strong presumption of access to court 18 records.”) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 19 2003)). Further, in so far as Defendant argues that the Court did not make the findings 20 required by § 1447(c) regarding remand, the Court respectfully disagrees, as the Court 21 thoroughly explained its reasoning. See Order 5–8. 22 Defendant’s other challenges largely reiterate the “same arguments, facts[,] and case 23 law” that this Court already considered; accordingly, Defendant raises insufficient grounds 24 to grant reconsideration. See Wargnier v. Nat’l City Mortg. Inc., No. 09cv2721-GPC-BGS, 25

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (denying motion for reconsideration 26 where the motion reflected the same arguments, facts, and case law that were previously 27 considered and ruled upon by the court). “A motion for reconsideration is not an 28 opportunity to renew arguments considered and rejected by the court, nor is it an 1 opportunity for a party to re-argue a motion because it is dissatisfied with the original 2 outcome.” See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., No. 06-CV-1952-JLS JMA,

, at *2 3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009) (quoting Devinsky v. Kingsford, No. 05 Civ.2064(PAC),

2704338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)), aff’d,

(9th Cir. 2010). To the extent 5 Defendant makes new arguments, she does not identify newly discovered evidence or an 6 intervening change in controlling case law. Consequently, Defendant has failed to 7 establish that she is entitled to reconsideration of the Court’s Order on the identified issues. 8 Arellano v. Santos, No. 3:18-cv-02391-BTM-WVG,

, at *3 (S.D. Cal.

, 2019) (holding motions for reconsideration do not give parties “a second bite at the 10 apple,” and may not “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought”) 11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Furthermore, the Court does not find that its decision to deny Defendant’s Motion 13 to Seal and remand the case gives rise to “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 14 has been committed.” Young,

, at *5 (citation and internal quotation 15 marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for 16 Reconsideration. 17 MOTION REQUESTING FOR JUDGE TO RECUSE HERSELF 18 I. Legal Standard 19 Under

(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 20 States shall disqualify [herself] in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might 21 reasonably be questioned.” Section 144 of the same title provides that a judge must recuse 22 “whenever a party . . . makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge . . . 23 has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28

. “Those provisions require recusal where ‘a reasonable person with 25 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 26 be questioned.’” Glick v. Edwards,

(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United 27 States v. Studley,

(9th Cir. 1986)). Under both provisions, the reviewing 28 court must determine whether the request to recuse is both timely and sufficient. See E. & 1 J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (holding requests 2 to recuse under section 455(a) must be timely);

(noting affidavits must be 3 “timely and sufficient”). Assuming that the affidavit is timely, Section 144 further requires 4 that the affidavit “be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is 5 made in good faith.”

. This requirement “serves a preventative purpose to 6 avoid the filing of frivolous affidavits.” United States v. Bennett, No. SACR 03-25 AHS, 7

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2008). 8 II. Analysis 9 As an initial matter, construing Defendant’s pro se Motion liberally, if Defendant 10 intends to proceed under

, Defendant’s recusal request is procedurally 11 defective, as Defendant’s filing is accompanied by neither an affidavit nor a certificate of 12 counsel of record stating that the affidavit is made in good faith.1 Even had Defendant 13 submitted an affidavit and certified that it was made in good faith, “as a pro per [defendant], 14 [Defendant] cannot make the certification.” Bennett,

, at *2 (first citing 15 Williams v. N.Y. City Housing Auth.,

(S.D.N.Y. 2003), then citing 16 Robinson v. Gregory,

, 337–38 (S.D. Ind. 1996)). “Some courts have 17 concluded that an individual proceeding in pro per cannot proceed under Section 144,” 18 while “[o]ther courts have ruled that the affidavit of any counsel who is a member of the 19 bar may sign the certificate of good faith.” Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, No. CV-F-07-367 20 OWW/SKO,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (collecting cases). Because 21 Defendant has submitted neither an affidavit nor a certification of good faith from a 22 member of the bar, she “cannot proceed pursuant to Section 144.” See

23 If Defendant seeks to proceed under Section 455, Defendant’s request is also 24 substantively insufficient because it fails to allege facts that would lead a reasonable person 25 26 1 Defendant did not submit a true affidavit, as it was not “sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” Bell-Sparrow v. Wiltz, No. C 12-2782 SI,

, at *2 (N.D. 27 Cal. May 15, 2013) (citing Black’s Law Dict., Ninth Ed.). “Because the document was not sworn to 28 before a judge or other authorized official, it is actually a declaration, not an affidavit.” Mahoney v. Diaz, 1 to conclude that the undersigned has personal bias and/or prejudice toward Defendant 2 “stem[ming] from an extrajudicial source.” See United States v. Grinnell Corp.,

(1966) (citing Berger v. United States,

(1921)); see also Studley, 4

(“The standard for recusal under

, 455 is ‘whether a 5 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s 6 impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’”) (quoting Mayes v. Leipziger,

, 7 607 (9th Cir. 1984)). 8 Defendant alleges that recusal is proper due to “[f]inancial [c]onflicts [c]reating [the] 9 [a]ppearance of [b]ias.” Mot. at 6. In Defendant’s eyes, this appearance of bias comes 10 from “[t]he 2023 Financial Disclosure Report” identifying “two rental properties in San 11 Diego and Del Mar”; “significant retirement income from the California State Judges 12 Retirement System and City of San Diego pension plans and related CalPERS-managed 13 funds”; “the [J]udge’s spouse and adult children maintain[ing] professional affiliations in 14 real-estate development, insurance defense, nonprofits, and higher-education institutions”; 15 and a San Diego Union-Tribune report from November of 2021 discussing Judge 16 Sammartino’s involvement in “cases involving companies linked to her family’s stock 17 holdings.”

at 6–7. 18 In assessing the sufficiency of a recusal affidavit, the Court determines “whether a 19 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s 20 impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 428

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma,

, 22 1502 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The ‘reasonable person’ in this context means a ‘well-informed, 23 thoughtful observer,’ as opposed to a ‘hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.’”

24 (quoting In re Mason,

(7th Cir. 1990)). For purposes of a motion to 25 disqualify, “[t]he judge is presumed to be qualified, and thus there is a substantial burden 26 upon the moving party to show that such is not the case.” Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158

, 1021–22 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (citing United States v. Zagari,

(N.D. Cal. 1976)); accord First Interstate Bank of Ariz., N.A. v. Murphy, Weid & 1 Butler,

(9th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases) (“Judicial impartiality is 2 presumed.”). Finally, “[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from 3 an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what 4 the judge learned from [her] participation in the case.” Grinnell Corp.,

5 (citing Berger,

). 6 The Ninth Circuit has articulated the following “helpful, nonexhaustive list of 7 various matters not ordinarily sufficient to require” disqualification: 8 (1) Rumor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters; (2) the mere 9 fact that a judge has previously expressed an opinion on a point 10 of law or has expressed a dedication to upholding the law or a determination to impose severe punishment within the limits of 11 the law upon those found guilty of a particular offense; (3) prior 12 rulings in the proceeding, or another proceeding, solely because they were adverse; (4) mere familiarity with the defendant(s), or 13 the type of charge, or kind of defense presented; (5) baseless 14 personal attacks on or suits against the judge by a party; (6) reporters’ personal opinions or characterizations appearing in 15 the media, media notoriety, and reports in the media purporting 16 to be factual, such as quotes attributed to the judge or others, but which are in fact false or materially inaccurate or misleading; and 17 (7) threats or other attempts to intimidate the judge. 18 Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178–79 (quoting Nichols v. Alley,

(10th Cir. 19 1995)). 20 Each of Defendant’s accusations fail to demonstrate that “a reasonable person with 21 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the [J]udge’s impartiality might reasonably 22 be questioned.” Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Herrington,

). Judge 23 Sammartino owning rental property, having family members involved in the real-estate 24 field, receiving retirement income from California Judges’ Retirement System, and being 25 involved in an unrelated conflict in a case from 2021, do not demonstrate that the Judge’s 26 impartiality may be questioned in this case. Judge Sammartino, her family, and her rental 27 properties are not related to the Plaintiff or Defendant in this case in any way. Defendant’s 28 alleged connection between the eviction allowing Plaintiff to “sell the property to 1 || ‘investors,’” and the “California State Judges Retirement System and City of San Diego 2 ||pension plans and related CalPERS-managed funds” is nonsensical. Therefore, 3 || Defendant’s Motion for Judicial Recusal is DENIED. 4 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 5 In the Court’s previous Order, the Court remanded this action for lack of subject 6 matter jurisdiction. A district court may not grant a temporary restraining order when it 7 lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action. See, e.g., Sirus v. 8 || Washington,

, 884 (9th Cir. 1963); Domingo v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, 9 19-cv-5864-ODW (JPRx),

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2019) 10 || (dismissing a request for TRO where there was no subject matter jurisdiction). Therefore, 11 || because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant’s claims, the Motion 12 Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED. 13 CONCLUSION 14 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Prior 15 || Order, for Reconsideration, and for Judicial Recusal or Reassignment (ECF No. 6). The 16 |}Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Electronically File 17 || Documents (ECF No. 7). The Court further DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Temporary 18 || Restraining Order (ECF No. 8). The Court empathizes with Defendant, but this matter is 19 |/proper for resolution in state court, not federal court. As this matter was previously 20 ||remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Clerk SHALL close the file. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: December 11, 2025

24 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 26 27 28