1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION

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12 TRACY SMITH, No. 5:25-cv-03096-HDV-BFM 13 Plaintiff, v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 WHY CASE SHOULD NOT BE ZACHERY MYERS, et al. DISMISSED 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 SUMMARY OF ORDER 19 This action involves a pro se civil rights complaint filed by Plaintiff Tracy 20 Smith. Plaintiff alleges that criminal charges were brought against her despite 21 an agreement with the San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office not to file such 22 charges. She claims the filing of charges violated her Fourth and Fourteenth 23 Amendment rights and led to fifteen months of false imprisonment. 24 In evaluating Plaintiff’s application for in forma pauperis status, the 25 Court is required to dismiss the case if it determines that the action fails to state 26 a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a 27 defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e). It appears that 28 may be the case here as the Complaint does not appear to state a federal claim 1 against any of the named Defendants. And without a viable federal claim, the 2 Court would not be inclined to accept supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 3 state law claims. 4 The Court therefore orders Plaintiff to explain why her case should not be 5 dismissed. If Plaintiff fails to timely respond to this order, the Court may 6 recommend that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure 7 to prosecute. 8 9 ORDER 10 A. Legal Standard 11 Where a plaintiff seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court 12 is required to review the complaint and dismiss claims that are frivolous, 13 malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seek 14 monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief.

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see also Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) 16 (en banc) (“It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a 17 district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 18 claim.”). In determining whether Plaintiff has stated a claim, the Court accepts 19 as true the factual claims in the Complaint and views all inferences in a light 20 most favorable to her. Hamilton v. Brown,

(9th Cir. 2011). 21 The Court does not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely 22 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 23 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 24 Because Plaintiff is not represented by counsel, the Court construes the 25 Complaint liberally. Barrett v. Belleque,

(9th Cir. 2008) 26 (per curiam). 27 28 1 B. Factual Background 2 The Complaint alleges the following facts, taken as true for purposes of 3 this Order: 4 In May 2022, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office agreed 5 not to file a “sales case” against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was released from 6 custody. (ECF 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 6-7.) Despite this agreement, Defendant Zachery 7 Myers caused a case to be filed against Plaintiff in September 2022. (Compl. ¶ 8 8.) Plaintiff was detained for approximately fifteen months until she posted bail. 9 The charges were ultimately dismissed in May 2025. (Compl. ¶ 9.) 10 C. Analysis 11 Claim One alleges a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth 12 Amendment rights. Constitutional violations may be remedied under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a complaint must allege: “(1) a 14 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, 15 (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state 16 law.” Crumpton v. Gates,

(9th Cir. 1991). 17 Where a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, 18 she must identify an official policy or custom that caused her injury. Bd. of Cnty. 19 Comm’rs v. Brown,

(1997). If there is no express policy, a 20 plaintiff must allege the existence of a “persistent and widespread” 21 custom. Trevino v. Gates,

, 918 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 22 691). Liability for an improper custom “may not be predicated on isolated or 23 sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 24 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 25 carrying out policy.” Id. Here, the Complaint does not identify a specific policy 26 maintained by San Bernardino County or the District Attorney’s Office that is 27 the driving force behind Defendants’ actions. Nor do the allegations suggest the 28 existence of an improper custom; Plaintiff only references her own experience, 1 which is insufficient. It appears, then, that the Complaint fails to state a claim 2 under § 1983 against the County and the District Attorney’s Office. 3 Plaintiff’s claim against Zachery Myers, who appears to be an attorney at 4 the District Attorney’s Office, fares no better. She alleges that Myers “caused a 5 case to be filed against her” despite the District Attorney’s Office’s prior 6 agreement not to file a case against her. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8.) Prosecutors, however, 7 are immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in “initiating a 8 prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” so long as that conduct is 9 “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Buckley 10 v. Fitzsimmons,

(1993); Ashelman v. Pope,

, 1076 11 (9th Cir. 1986). This immunity covers the “knowing use of false testimony at 12 trial, the suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious prosecution.” 13 Milstein v. Cooley,

(9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s claims against 14 Myers appear to be barred by such immunity since they are based on his decision 15 to initiate criminal proceedings against her. Whether that decision was contrary 16 to a prior agreement would appear to have no bearing on whether the immunity 17 applies. 18 Given the above, Plaintiff’s state law claims would also be subject to 19 dismissal. To have such claims heard in federal court, there would have to be a 20 related federal question present in her case; if there is not, this Court lacks 21 jurisdiction over her state claims. Shapiro v. McManus,

, 45-46 22 (2015). Claims that are “wholly insubstantial” or “obviously frivolous” are 23 insufficient to “raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional 24 purposes.” Id.; see also White v. White,

(9th Cir. 1984) 25 (“Federal jurisdiction exists if a complaint claims a right to recover under the 26 Constitution and laws of the United States and the claim is not wholly 27 insubstantial and frivolous”). Because there appears to be no viable federal 28 claim, the Court appears to lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For these reasons, it appears that in forma pauperis status should be 3 || denied, and the case dismissed without leave to amend. Before the Court 4 || recommends denial of the IFP application, however, the Court will give Plaintiff 5 || an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff is therefore ordered to show cause—to 6 || explain in writing—why the Court should not recommend denial of IFP status. 7 || Plaintiffs response should be filed no later than January 12, 2026. 8 || Plaintiffs failure to file a timely response as ordered may result in the 9 || Court recommending that her case be dismissed without prejudice for 10 || failure to prosecute and to follow court orders. 11 12 |} DATED: December 12, 2025 13 14 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28