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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANCISCO VALENCIA, Case No. 2:24-cv-2847-JDP (SS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of 15 Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of attorney fees under

(b).1 ECF No. 19 21. Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement providing that he would pay counsel twenty- 20 five percent of any award of past-due benefits. ECF No. 21-1 at 2. After this court remanded for 21 further proceedings, plaintiff was found disabled and awarded $86,209.00 in past-due benefits. 22 ECF No. 21-2 at 4.2 Plaintiff’s counsel requests $21,552.25 in attorney fees, which is equivalent 23 24 1 Although the motion for fees was filed under plaintiff’s name, plaintiff’s counsel is the 25 real party in interest. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

, 798 n.6 (2002). 2 Social Security’s Notice of Award states: “We usually withhold 25 percent of past due 26 benefits in order to pay the approved representative’s fee. We withheld $21,552.25 from your 27 past due benefits in case we need to pay your representative.” ECF No. 21-2 at 4. While Social Security’s notice does not explicitly state the total amount of past-due benefits awarded, 28 $21,552.25 is 25 percent of $86,209.00. 1 to the statutory maximum, and which equates to an effective hourly rate of $704.32. ECF No. 18 2 at 4. 3 An attorney is entitled to reasonable fees for successfully representing social security 4 claimants in district court. 5 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 6 attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 7 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 8 9

(b)(1)(A). Rather than being paid by the government, fees under section 406(b) 10 are paid by the claimant from the awarded past-due benefits. Crawford v. Astrue,

, 11 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht,

). The twenty-five percent 12 statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement; the court must ensure that the requested 13 fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht,

(“We hold that § 406(b) does not displace 14 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review 15 for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). In assessing whether a fee is reasonable, 16 the court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the representative 17 achieved.” Id. at 808. A “court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, 18 or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford,

. 19 The court finds that the requested fees to be reasonable. Counsel’s billing records reflect 20 a total of 30.59 hours of attorney time on this case. ECF No. 21-4 at 1-2. Counsel’s request for 21 $25,552.25, which is equivalent to the statutory maximum, would constitute an hourly rate of 22 approximately $704.32 for attorney services. Counsel did not engage in dilatory conduct or 23 perform in a substandard manner. Indeed, counsel’s representation resulted in this matter being 24 remanded for further proceedings, which resulted in a favorable decision and an award of 25 benefits. See ECF Nos. 18 & 21-2. Given counsel’s experience, the result obtained in this case, 26 and the risk of loss in representing plaintiff, the court finds the hourly rate reasonable. See De 27 Vivo v. Berryhill,

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (awarding fees at an effective 28 hourly rate of $1,116.26); White v. Berryhill, No. cv 04-00331-AS,

, at *3 1 | (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,612); Monica H. v. 2 | Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:16-cv-2111-JR (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2021) (awarding fees at an 3 || effective hourly rate of $2,000); Kelly Kay M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-cv-1969-DDL,

| 4536462, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,923.07). 5 Counsel concedes that the $7,500 award should be offset by the fees previously awarded 6 || under the under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 21 at 3; see ECF No. 20. 7 | He also indicates that he will reimburse plaintiff the amount previously awarded under the EAJA. 8 | See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002) (holding that where attorney’s fees are 9 | awarded under both EAJA and § 406(b), the attorney must refund the smaller of the two awards 10 | to the plaintiff). 11 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 12 1. The motion for attorney fees, ECF No. 21, is GRANTED. 13 2. Plaintiffs counsel is awarded $25,552.25 in fees pursuant to

(b). 14 3. Upon receipt of the $25,552.25 award, counsel shall refund to plaintiff the sum of 15 | $7,500 previously awarded under the EAJA. 16 7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ October 28, 2025 19 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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