Christina Marie Evers v. Ryan Barnes, Jimmy Escajeda, and Tanya Aker

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California

Christina Marie Evers v. Ryan Barnes, Jimmy Escajeda, and Tanya Aker

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTINA MARIE EVERS, No. 2:25-cv-2094-DC-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 RYAN BARNES, JIMMY ESCAJEDA, and TANYA AKER, 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, which was accordingly referred to the 19 undersigned. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 20 (“IFP”) and submitted the affidavit required by that statute. ECF No. 2; see

28 U.S.C. § 21

1915(a)(1). The District Judge assigned to this case has also referred Plaintiff’s Motion for a 22 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to the undersigned. ECF Nos. 3-4. 23 The motion to proceed IFP, ECF No. 2, will be granted. Upon screening the Complaint, 24 however, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and recommends dismissal 25 without leave to amend, and recommends dismissal of the TRO for the same reason. 26 I. LEGAL STANDARD 27 A court may authorize a person to proceed in an action without prepayment of fees if that 28 person “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets…that the person is unable to 1 pay such fees or give security therefor.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(a)(1). The federal IFP statute, 2 however, requires federal courts to dismiss such a case if the action is legally “frivolous or 3 malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from 4 a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(e)(2). In reviewing the 5 complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 6 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current- 7 rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure. 8 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and 9 plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 10 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled 11 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 12 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 14 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 15 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 16 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 17 Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325

(1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 18 court will (1) accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are 19 clearly baseless or fanciful; (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 20 plaintiff; and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327

. 21 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 22 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (court 23 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974) (court must 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 25 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519

, 520 26 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 27 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt,

643 F.2d 618

, 28 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 1 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2

556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). 3 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 4 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570

. “A claim has 5 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 6 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 7

678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 8 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. 9 Mesa,

698 F.3d 1202, 1213

(9th Cir. 2012). 10 II. COMPLAINT AND MOTIONS 11 Plaintiff Christina Evers is a resident of Sacramento, California, whereas Defendants are 12 residents of Palm Springs, California, and Davis, California. ECF No. 1 at 2-4. Without 13 referencing any statute or constitutional provision, the Complaint vaguely asserts that Defendants 14 Escajeda and Aker both have a dispute with Plaintiff, but would both go to her husband, Jonathan 15 Evers, to complain instead of working the problem out with her directly. Id. at 5. As to requested 16 relief, Plaintiff “wants to add” Escajeda and Aker “to person from whom protection is sought.” 17 Id. at 6. 18 Plaintiff’s TRO application is a semi-completed state court TRO application (Form CH- 19 110) seeking to keep Defendant Barnes, Plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend, at least 1000 yards away from 20 Plaintiff, her husband, her house, her car, her school, and her place of work. See ECF No. 3 at 9- 21 10, 12. It alleges that Barnes texted Mr. Evers on May 20, 2025, calling him names and using 22 several vulgar words. Id. at 9. It further asserts that Barnes is friends with people who know 23 where the Evers family’s address and vehicle, and Plaintiff has feared a physical altercation 24 would follow the text. Id. at 11. 25 The IFP application alleges that Plaintiff receives $1,200 in Supplemental Security 26 Income (“SSI”) per month for herself, $144 in SSI for her husband, and $700 for In-Home 27 Supportive Services (“IHSS”) every two weeks. ECF No. 2 at 1, 4. She has $200 saved, plus a 28 2025 Dodge Caravan, and receives an unspecified amount of Food Stamps and Medi-Cal benefits. 1 Id. at 2-3. Monthly expenses include $1,425 in rent and maintenance, $300 in food and 2 household items, $187 in utilities, $300 for clothing, $150 for laundry, and $218 in assorted 3 transportation costs. Id. at 4. 4 III. ANALYSIS 5 Plaintiff’s IFP application asserts that the Evers family has a total monthly income of 6 $2,744 and monthly expenses of $2,580. ECF No. 2. Although Plaintiff also admits to receiving 7 an unspecified amount of Food Stamps and Medi-Cal benefits, it is unlikely that this amount 8 results in a substantial surplus of income per month. Id. at 3. Plaintiff has demonstrated that she 9 currently does not have the resources to pay filing fees in this action. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(a)(1). 10 Leave to proceed IFP is granted. 11 Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to establish that federal subject matter jurisdiction. 12 Plaintiff openly admits that the allegations do not give rise to a claim under federal law or the 13 U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 1 at 4. As all Defendants and Plaintiffs are California citizens, this 14 Court does not have diversity jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1332

.

Id. at 2-4

. 15 This action should therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the 16 same reasons, there is no federal jurisdiction for this Court to entertain Plaintiff’s request for a 17 TRO. 18 IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint 20 without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could 21 not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar,

698 F.3d at 1212

. Here, however, the allegations do not 22 suggest any additional facts Plaintiff can plead to establish federal question jurisdiction, or to 23 establish diversity between the parties. The undersigned therefore recommends dismissal without 24 leave to amend. 25 V. PRO SE PLAINTIF SUMMARY 26 The magistrate judge is recommending that your case be dismissed because you cannot 27 plead facts that would grant this Court subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. 28 You can object to this recommendation in writing within 14 days. The District Judge will 1 | consider your objections and make a final decision. 2 VI. CONCLUSION 3 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs application to proceed IFP 4 || (ECF No. 2) be GRANTED. 5 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend; and 7 2. Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3) be DENIED as the 8 Court lacks jurisdiction over any request for relief. 9 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 10 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1). Within fourteen days 11 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 12 | with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 13 | and Recommendations.” The plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 14 | time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Yist, 951 15 | F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 | DATED: November 4, 2025 "7 mk 18 SEAN C. RIORDAN 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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