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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAROLINE LEE, Case No. 2:20-cv-0662-JDP (SS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of 15 Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of attorney fees under

(b).1 ECF No. 19 33. Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement providing that he would pay counsel twenty- 20 five percent of any award of past-due benefits. ECF No. 33-2 at 1. After this court remanded for 21 further proceedings, plaintiff was found disabled and awarded $126,928 in past-due benefits. 22 ECF No. 33-1 at 1. Plaintiff’s counsel requests $26,616.25 in attorney fees, which is less than the 23 statutory maximum, and which equates to an effective hourly rate of $879.88. ECF No. 33 at 4. 24 An attorney is entitled to reasonable fees for successfully representing social security 25 claimants in district court. 26 27 1 Although the motion for fees was filed under plaintiff’s name, plaintiff’s counsel is the 28 real party in interest. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

, 798 n.6 (2002). 1 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 2 attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 3 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 4 5

(b)(1)(A). Rather than being paid by the government, fees under section 406(b) 6 are paid by the claimant from the awarded past-due benefits. Crawford v. Astrue,

, 7 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht,

). The twenty-five percent 8 statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement; the court must ensure that the requested 9 fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht,

(“We hold that § 406(b) does not displace 10 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review 11 for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). In assessing whether a fee is reasonable, 12 the court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the representative 13 achieved.” Id. at 808. A “court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, 14 or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford,

. 15 The court finds that the requested fees are reasonable. Counsel’s billing records reflect a 16 total of 30.25 hours of attorney time on this case. ECF No. 33 at 7. Counsel’s request for 17 $26,616.25, which is less than the statutory maximum, would constitute an hourly rate of 18 approximately $879.88 for attorney services.2 Counsel did not engage in dilatory conduct or 19 perform in a substandard manner. Indeed, counsel’s representation resulted in this matter being 20 remanded for further proceedings, which resulted in a favorable decision and an award of 21 benefits. See ECF Nos. 27 & 33-1. Given counsel’s experience, the result obtained in this case, 22

23 2 Plaintiff’s counsel suggests that his hourly rate should be calculated from the total amount requested in the instant motion, minus $6,616.25 in fees previously awarded under the 24 Equal Access to Justice Act. ECF No. 33 at 7; see ECF No. 32. Because the fees requested under 406(b) must be offset by the EAJA award—i.e., counsel must return the $6,616.25 to plaintiff— 25 the court calculates the effectively hourly rate by dividing the present request for $26,616.25 by the total number of hours counsel worked on this matter. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

789, 796 (2002) (“[A]n EAJA award offsets an award under [§] 406(b), so that the amount of the 27 total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives will be increased by the EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits.”) (internal marks and 28 citations omitted). 1 | and the risk of loss in representing plaintiff, the court finds the hourly rate reasonable. See, e.g., 2 | De Vivo v. Berryhill,

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (awarding fees at an effective 3 | hourly rate of $1,116.26); White v. Berryhill, No. cv 04-00331-AS,

, at *3 4 | (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,612); Monica H. v. 5 | Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:16-cv-2111-JR (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2021) (awarding fees at an 6 || effective hourly rate of $2,000); Kelly Kay M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-cv-1969-DDL,

| 4536462, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,923.07). 8 Counsel concedes that the $6,616.25 award should be offset by the fees previously 9 | awarded under the under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 32; see ECF No. 10 | 33. He also indicates that he will reimburse plaintiff the amount previously awarded under the 11 | EAJA. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002) (holding that where attorney’s fees 12 | are awarded under both EAJA and § 406(b), the attorney must refund the smaller of the two 13 || awards to the plaintiff). 14 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 15 1. The motion for attorney fees, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED. 16 2. Plaintiffs counsel is awarded $26,616.25 in fees pursuant to

(b). 17 3. Upon receipt of the $award, counsel shall refund to plaintiff the sum of $6,616.25 18 | previously awarded under the EAJA. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ November 7, 2025 ow—— 22 JEREMY D,. PETERSON 54 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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