1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONALD L. SEAY, No. 1:25-cv-000177-KES-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 13 v. STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS/REHABILITATION, et (ECF Nos. 16, 19) 15 al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42

. 21 I. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on February 11, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) 24 On March 3, 2025, the Court screened the complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state a 25 cognizable claim for relief, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF 26 No. 9.) 27 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the March 3, 2025 28 order. Therefore, on May 13, 2025, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why the 1 action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 10.) After Plaintiff failed to respond to the order to 2 show cause, the Court issued Findings and Recommendations recommending the action be 3 dismissed. (ECF No. 13.) The Findings and Recommendations were served on Plaintiff and 4 contained notice that objections could be filed within 14 days. (Id. at 11.) 5 On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause. (ECF No. 14.) 6 Therein, Plaintiff stated that he has been involuntarily transferred among different prisons and he 7 had been without his legal property. (Id.) Therefore, on July 7, 2025, the Court vacated the 8 Findings and Recommendations and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint in 9 compliance with the Court’s March 3, 2025, screening order. (ECF No. 15.) 10 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on August 4, 2025. (ECF No. 16.) However, as 11 explained in the Court’s October 23, 2025, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint violated Local 12 Rule 220, and Plaintiff was granted thirty days to file an amended complaint in compliance with 13 the Court’s March 3, 2025, screening order. (ECF No. 19.) 14 On November 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice expressing his intent to not amend the 15 complaint. (ECF No. 19.) Consequently, the operative complaint is Plaintiff’s initial complaint, 16 which fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and dismissal is warranted. 17 II. 18 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 20 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 21 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 22 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 23 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 25 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 26 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 27 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (citing Bell 1 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 2 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v.

F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 5 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 7 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 8 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal,

; Moss 9 v. U.S. Secret Service,

(9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 10 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 11 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal,

; Moss,

. 13 III. 14 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 15 Plaintiff was consistently and constantly deprived of meals, clothing, personal property, 16 phone, shower, recreation time, medical treatment, social contact, commissary, care packages, 17 radio, reading books, tablet, television, legal property, and every other necessity to serve a natural 18 life sentence. 19 Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for the denial of his constitutional rights. 20 IV. 21 DISCUSSION 22 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 23 On the form complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that there is an inmate remedy process at 24 Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) and he filed an appeal or grievance regarding all the claims in 25 the complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, Plaintiff checks the box “no” in response to the 26 question whether the exhaustion process is complete, and states, “The appeal or grievance has not 27 been decided.” (Id.) 28 /// 1 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 2 respect to prison conditions under [

], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 3 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 4 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a 5 civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo,

(2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311

(9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a 7 precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to 8 suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison 9 life.” Porter v. Nussle,

(2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the 10 prisoner or the relief offered by the prison’s administrative process is of no consequence. Booth v. 11 Churner,

(2001). And, because the PLRA’s text and intent requires “proper” 12 exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA’s administrative grievance process if he files an 13 untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford,

. A prisoner 14 need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be proved by 15 defendant. Jones v. Bock,

(2007). A prison’s internal grievance process, not 16 the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement.

at 17 218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the 18 complaint. See Albino v. Baca,

(9th Cir. 2014). 19 The California prison grievance system has two levels of review. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 20 §§ 3483, 3485. “Completion of the review process by the Institutional or Regional Office of 21 Grievances resulting in a decision of ‘identified as staff misconduct,’ ‘pending legal matter,’ or 22 ‘time expired’ in accordance with subsections (g)(8) through (g)(10) of [ ] section [3483] does 23 constitute exhaustion of all administrative remedies available to a claimant within the 24 department.”

(l)(2). Additionally, “[c]ompletion of the review 25 process by the Office of Appeals resulting in a decision of ‘denied,’ ‘granted,’ ‘no jurisdiction,’ 26 ‘identified as staff misconduct,’ ‘pending legal matter,’ or ‘time expired’ in accordance with 27 subsections (g)(1) through (g)(3) and (g)(8) through (g)(10) of [ ] section 3485 constitutes 28 exhaustion of all administrative remedies available to a claimant within the department.” Cal. 1 Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3485(l)(1). 2 In general, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and 3 prove. Jones,

. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is 4 clear on the face of the complaint. See Albino,

. Here, it appears clear on the 5 face of his complaint that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit 6 as he admits the process is not complete and the inmate appeal/grievance has not been decided. 7 Here, from the face of the complaint, it appears Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative 8 remedies prior to filing suit. Thus, if Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must indicate 9 whether he has exhausted his administrative remedies. If he has not, he should allege why, if at 10 all, this action should proceed. See Jones,

; Lira v. Herrera,

, 11 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005) (If a court concludes that a prisoner failed to exhaust his available 12 administrative remedies before filing a civil rights action, the proper remedy is dismissal without 13 prejudice). 14 B. CDCR as Defendant 15 “Suits against state officials in their official capacity ... should be treated as suits against 16 the State.” Hafer v. Melo,

(1991); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.,

, 17 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating prisoner's suit against state officials in their official capacities as a 18 suit against the state of California). An official capacity suit “represent[s] only another way of 19 pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

, 165 (1985) (citation omitted). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, 21 for the real party in interest is the entity.”

(emphasis in original). 22 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, 23 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public 24 Safety,

, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal 25 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against 26 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid 27 congressional override....” Dittman v. California,

(9th Cir. 1999). “The 28 Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an 1 arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of 2 Lodi, Cal.,

, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “The 3 State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims 4 brought under § 1983 in federal court....” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State 5 Hosp. v. Scanlon,

(1985)); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs.,

(9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of Corrections and California Board of 7 Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue 8 claims for damages or injunctive relief against CDCR, the entity, in this action. 9 C. Supervisory Liability 10 A supervisory official is liable under section 1983 if (1) the official is personally involved 11 in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the 12 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile,

, 13 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca,

(9th Cir. 2011)). “The 14 requisite causal connection can be established … by setting in motion a series of acts by others or 15 by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 16 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 17 F.3d at 1207–08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, a 18 supervisor may “be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 19 training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional 20 deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 21 Keates,

(quoting Starr,

). 22 “Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about 23 constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory 24 role are insufficient to state a claim under

.” Sullivan v. Biter, No. 15-cv-00243, 25

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

, 691 (1978) and Starr,

). In other words, to state a claim against any 27 individual defendant based on supervisory liability, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the 28 individual defendant participated in or directed the alleged violation, or knew of the violation and 1 failed to act to prevent it.” Richard v. Holtrop, No. 15-cv-5632,

, at *5 (C.D. 2 Cal. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Barren v. Harrington,

(9th 3 Cir. 1998)) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 4 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”). 5 With respect to Defendant Warden Pat Horn, supervisory liability is not an independent 6 cause of action under § 1983, and Plaintiff must allege both an underlying constitutional violation 7 and a connection between the supervisor’s actions and the violation. See Starr v. Baca,

(9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if 9 there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 10 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 11 violation.’ ”), quoting Hansen v. Black,

(9th Cir. 1989); Leer v. Murphy, 844

, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on 13 the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 14 have caused a constitutional deprivation.”), citing Rizzo v. Goode,

, 375-77 15 (1976). Plaintiff may not simply attempt to hold a supervisory Defendant liable without any 16 factual allegations regarding their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or a 17 causal connection between their wrongful conduct and the violation. Further, simply stating 18 (without factual support) that these supervisor individuals knew or should have known of the 19 alleged misconduct based on prior complaints or written letters is likewise insufficient to state a 20 cognizable claim for relief. See, e.g., Rivera v. Fischer,

(W.D.N.Y. 2009) 21 (“Numerous courts have held that merely writing a letter of complaint does not provide personal 22 involvement necessary to maintain a § 1983 claim.”) (quoting Candelaria v. Higley, No. 04–CV– 23 277,

, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008) (gathering cases)); Sealey v. Giltner, 116

(2d Cir. 1997) (prison official who received inmate's letter but forwarded it to 25 subordinate for investigation and response was not personally involved in depriving inmate of 26 constitutional right); Jones v. Fischer, No. 9:11–cv–774 (GLS/CFH),

, at *10 27 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (“receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally investigating or 28 acting on the letter or grievance, is insufficient to establish personal involvement”); Smart v. 1 Goord,

, 642–643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (failure of supervisory prison official to 2 take action in response to letters complaining of unconstitutional conduct is insufficient to 3 demonstrate personal involvement). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim 4 against Warden Pat Horn. 5 D. Linkage Requirement 6 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act requires that there be an actual connection or link 7 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 8 Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a 10 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 11 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 12 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,

(9th 13 Cir. 1978); see also Barren v. Harrington,

(9th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff must 14 allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 15 deprivation of his civil rights.”). 16 Although Plaintiff names certain individual Defendants in the caption of the complaint, he 17 does not link them to any affirmative act or omission giving rise to his alleged constitutional 18 violations. 19 E. Conditions of Confinement 20 Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, and 21 only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 22 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503

(1992). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate 24 shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis,

726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted). Conditions of confinement in 26 combination may have a “mutually enforcing effect” that deprives a single identifiable human 27 need such as food, warmth, or exercise, but “[a]morphous overall conditions cannot rise to the 28 level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need 1 exists.” Brown v. Bueno, No. 1:17-cv-01295-LJO-SKO (PC),

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2 | Nov. 20, 2018) (citing and quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

(1991) (internal 3 | quotation marks omitted)). 4 Here, Plaintiff fails to link any individual Defendant to a specific alleged unconstitutional 5 | condition or that such condition was an extreme deprivation (e.g., allegations meals, clothing, 6 || personal property, etc.). Nor are there any facts setting forth the duration to which Plaintiff 7 | experienced such condition. In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to demonstrate that any 8 | individual acted with deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 9 | claim for relief.

RECOMMENDATION 12 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed 13 | for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 14 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 15 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of

(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 16 | days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 17 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 18 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is 19 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 20 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler,

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 21 | Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 1991)). 22 73 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le 24 | Dated: _November 17, 2025 _ OO STANLEY A. BOONE 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28