Marquise Louis Drumwright v. Jones, et al.

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MARQUISE LOUIS DRUMWRIGHT, Case No. 1:23-cv-00730-BAM (PC) 9 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 10 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS JONES, et al., REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND FAILURE 12 Defendants. TO OBEY A COURT ORDER 13 (ECF No. 16) 14 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE I. Background 17 Plaintiff Marquise Louis Drumwright (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

19 On October 3, 2025, the Court issued an order reassigning this case from Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin to the undersigned for all further proceedings. (ECF No. 15.) The order was served on Plaintiff at his current address of record at Mule Creek State Prison. On October 20, 2025, the order was returned as “Undeliverable, Inactive, Released 4/20/2025.”

23 On October 21, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint or to notify the Court of his willingness to proceed on cognizable claims within thirty days. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff was warned that failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in dismissal of this action, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and failure to prosecute. (Id. at 14.) The order was again served on Plaintiff at his current address of record. On November 7, 2025, the Court’s order was returned as “Undeliverable, Inactive 4/28/2025.”

2 The deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the Court’s order has now expired, and Plaintiff has not filed a notice of change of address or otherwise communicated with the Court.

4 II. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 5 A. Legal Standard 6 Plaintiff is required to keep the Court apprised of his current address at all times. Local Rule 183(b) provides: Address Changes. A party appearing in propria persona shall keep the Court and 9 opposing parties advised as to his or her current address. If mail directed to a plaintiff in propria persona by the Clerk is returned by the U.S. Postal Service, 10 and if such plaintiff fails to notify the Court and opposing parties within thirty (30) days thereafter of a current address, the Court may dismiss the action without 11 prejudice for failure to prosecute.

12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) also provides for dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute.1 14 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . .

16 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 21 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

25 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its Courts may dismiss actions sua sponte under Rule 41(b) based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U. S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

1 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 3 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

4 B. Discussion 5 Here, Plaintiff’s address change was due no later than November 19, 2025, and Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s October 21, 2025 order is also overdue. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order or otherwise communicate with the Court. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

10 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action.

12 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 14 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

18 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s October 21, 2025 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in dismissal of this action, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and for failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 16.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance.

25 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, making monetary sanctions of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case and updating his address.

2 More importantly, given the Court’s apparent inability to communicate with Plaintiff, there are no other reasonable alternatives available to address Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and his failure to apprise the Court of his current address. In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228–29; Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441.

6 III. Order and Recommendation 7 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a District Judge to this action.

9 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a Court order and failure to prosecute.

12 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated: December 2, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE