1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PATRICK S. ROBINSON, Case No. 2:22-cv-00740-CSK 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF No. 18) 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Patrick S. Robinson’s counsel’s motion for 19 attorney’s fees under

(b), seeking an award of $15,606.25.1 Pl. Mot. 20 (ECF No. 18.) This amount represents approximately 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits 21 of $65,625. Pl. Mot. at 3; ECF No. 18-2 at 4. Counsel was previously awarded $6,200 in 22 attorney’s fees previously paid under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), however 23 these funds were seized by the United States Treasury Department to pay an 24 outstanding federal debt owed by Plaintiff. Pl. Mot. at 2; ECF No. 18-5. 25 For the reasons that follow, the undersigned GRANTS the motion for attorney’s

26 1 This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to

(c) based on the 27 consent of all parties. (ECF Nos. 4, 6, 8.) Upon the retirement of the previous magistrate judge and the filing of the instant motion for attorney fees, this case was reassigned to 28 the undersigned. (ECF No. 20.) 1 fees in the amount of $15,606.25. 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint challenging the Commissioner’s 4 denial of Social Security benefits. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on 5 September 13, 2022. (ECF No. 10.) The parties then stipulated to a remand for further 6 proceedings before the Commissioner. (ECF No. 13.) The Court granted this stipulation, 7 remanded for further proceedings under

(g), and entered judgment in 8 favor of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 14.) The parties stipulated to an award of EAJA fees in the 9 amount of $6,200.00, which the Court granted. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) 10 In the further proceedings before the Commissioner, Plaintiff was found to be 11 disabled. Pl. Mot at 3. Plaintiff’s counsel attests that the $6,200.00 in EAJA fees were 12 seized by the United States Treasury Department to pay an outstanding federal debt 13 owed by Plaintiff.

; ECF No. 18-5. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s counsel has not received 14 any EAJA fees. Pl. Mot. at 6; see Def. Resp. at 4 (ECF No. 22). On September 5, 2025, 15 Plaintiff’s counsel received from Defendant a Retirement, Survivors, and Disability 16 Insurance (“RSDI”) Notice of Award dated September 2, 2025.

; ECF No. 18-2. 17 This notice indicates that 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits are $15,606.25. Pl. Mot. at 18 3; ECF No. 18-5 at 4-5. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to this fee amount. Pl. 19 Mot. at 3; ECF No. 18-1. 20 Plaintiff’s counsel now moves for court approval of attorney’s fees under 21

(b), seeking an award of $15,606.25, or approximately 25% of Plaintiff’s 22 past-due benefits. Pl. Mot. Defendant filed a response, and took no position on the 23 motion. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff has not filed a response. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 25

(b) provides in relevant part: 26 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before 27 the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 28 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the 1 past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 2 may. . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such 3 past-due benefits. In case of any such judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such 4 representation except as provided in this paragraph.

5

(b)(1)(A). The Commissioner typically does not act as an adversary, but 6 “plays a part in the fee determination resembling that of a trustee for the claimants.” 7 Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

, 798 n.6 (2002). Thus, “[b]ecause the 8 [Commissioner] has no direct interest in how much of the award goes to counsel and 9 how much to the disabled person, the district court has an affirmative duty to assure that 10 the reasonableness of the fee is established.” Crawford v. Astrue,

, 1149 11 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 12 In reviewing the fee request, the district court is to look first to the parties’ 13 contingency-fee agreement, then test it for reasonableness—always respecting “the 14 primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements[.]” Gisbrecht,

. The 15 Supreme Court has noted that courts following this method may “appropriately reduce[] 16 the attorney’s recovery based on the character of the representation and the results the 17 representative achieved.”

. To this end, the Ninth Circuit instructs: 18 A fee resulting from a contingent-fee agreement is 19 unreasonable, and thus subject to reduction by the court, if the attorney provided substandard representation or 20 engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits, or if the benefits are large in 21 comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case. As an aid to the court’s assessment of the 22 reasonableness of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, but not as a basis for satellite litigation, the court may require 23 counsel to provide a record of the hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for noncontingent 24 cases.

25 Crawford,

(quotations and alterations omitted). The burden of 26 establishing the reasonableness of the fee falls on the attorney seeking the fee. 27 Gisbrecht,

n.17. 28 1 Fees may be awarded under both § 406(b) and under the Equal Access to Justice 2 Act (“EAJA”), however plaintiff’s attorney must refund to the plaintiff the smaller fee 3 amount. Gisbrecht,

. 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 Here, in support of the motion for attorney’s fees, Plaintiff’s counsel attached 6 Plaintiff’s attorney-client agreement that provides for a contingency fee of up to 25% of 7 any past-due benefits. (ECF No. 18-1.) The Commissioner’s Notice of Award indicates 8 Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to no more than $15,606.25 pursuant to the fee agreement 9 between Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18-2 at 4.) Plaintiff’s counsel now 10 seeks attorney’s fees of $15,606.25. (ECF No. 18.) The Commissioner takes no position 11 on the reasonableness of the request. See Def. Resp. 12 In light of the guidance provided in Crawford, the Court finds counsel’s fee 13 request to be reasonable. As an initial matter, agreements providing for fees of 25% of 14 past-due benefits are the “most common fee arrangement between attorneys and Social 15 Security claimants.” Crawford,

(citation omitted). Additionally, the 16 undersigned sees no indication Plaintiff’s counsel performed substandard work or unduly 17 delayed the case. To the contrary, counsel’s work before this Court and before the 18 Commissioner upon remand resulted in a favorable decision for Plaintiff and an award of 19 benefits. Counsel assumed the risk of receiving no compensation, as Plaintiff’s 20 application for benefits was denied at the initial and reconsideration stages of the 21 administrative process, again denied after a hearing before an Administrative Law 22 Judge, and rejected on appeal before the Social Security Appeals Council. (ECF No. 10 23 at 5-6.) 24 Furthermore, the total amount sought ($15,606.25) does not appear to be 25 disproportionate to the amount of time counsel spent on the case. Counsel indicates he 26 dedicated 29.9 hours in the proceedings before this Court. (ECF No. 18-3.) Given the 27 hours and amount sought, counsel’s effective hourly rate would be $522. The Court finds 28 this rate reasonable, especially given the guidance in Crawford and cases finding much 1 | higher rates reasonable. See Langston v. Saul,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2 || 5, 2020) (awarding fees on an effective hourly rate of $1,453.42, when counsel 3 || requested $23,400 for 16.10 hours of attorney work); Thomas v. Colvin,

| 1529331, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) (awarding fees on an effective hourly rate of 5 || $1,093.22 for 40.8 hours of work); Villa v. Astrue,

, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. 6 | Jan. 7, 2010) (noting that “[rjeducing § 406(b) fees after Crawford is a dicey business’). 7 In sum, the Court finds the amount requested by Plaintiff's counsel to be 8 || reasonable in light of the years of litigation and the result achieved, the lack of evidence 9 || suggesting dilatory conduct or a windfall to counsel, and the reasonable rate. For these 10 | reasons, the Court awards counsel the requested amount of $15, 606.25 in attorneys’ 11 | fees under

(b). The Court directs this amount be paid to Plaintiff's 12 || counsel. Defendant notes that there is no requirement to refund Plaintiff the previously 13 || awarded EAJA fees because Plaintiff's counsel never received the fees. Def. Resp. at 4; 14 | see Gisbrecht,

. 15 | IV. CONCLUSION 16 In conclusion, IT |S HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. Plaintiffs counsel’s motion for attorney's fees under

(b) 18 (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED, and counsel is awarded $15,606.25 from the 19 withheld amounts. 20 2. Plaintiff should not be refunded the previously awarded EAJA fees 21 because Plaintiffs counsel never received the fees; and 22 3. Any past-due benefits withheld by the Commissioner in excess of the 23 amount of attorney’s fees awarded shall be released to Plaintiff after all fee 24 petitions are resolved. 25 26 | Dated: December 8, 2025 C i S \U 27 CHI SOO KIM 93 | UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE