1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAWNDA MOLLISON-SAPIER, No. 2:25-cv-2388 DJC CSK P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 LAVELLE PARKER, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for a 18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

. On October 31, 2025, petitioner was ordered 19 to show cause why this action should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. 20 Thirty days have now passed, and petitioner has not shown cause or otherwise responded to the 21 Court’s order. Accordingly, as discussed below, the petition should be dismissed with prejudice 22 because it is barred by the statute of limitations. 23 I. GOVERNING STANDARDS 24 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254 provides for 25 summary dismissal of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and 26 any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, 27 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Accordingly, the court reviews the petition pursuant to its authority under 28 Rule 4. 1 II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 2 A. Legal Standards 3 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which became 4 law on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of 5 habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. This statute of limitations provides that: 6 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody, pursuant to the judgment of 7 a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of – 8 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 9 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 10 by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 11 State action; 12 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 13 recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 14 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 15 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 16 17

(d)(1). 18 B. Chronology1 19 For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this case is 20 as follows: 21 1. In the Lassen County Superior Court, petitioner pled guilty to a violation of California 22 Penal Code § 245(a)(4), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and admitted she 23 was previously convicted of a strike offense. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 20.) On February 21, 2023, 24 petitioner was sentenced to “three years, doubled to six years for the prior strike.” (Id. at 21.) 25 /// 26

27 1 As set forth above, the limitations period may begin running later under certain specified circumstances,

(d)(1)(B), (C), & (D), but none of these circumstances apply 28 here. 1 2. On appeal, appointed counsel asked the court to review the record and determine 2 whether there were any arguable issues on appeal, citing People v. Wende (1979)

. 3 (ECF No. 1 at 21.) Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief raising four claims. (Id.) 4 3. On June 6, 2024, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the state court of appeal. (Id. 5 at 22.) 6 4. Petitioner did not file a petition for review or a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 7 California Supreme Court.2 8 5. On August 4, 2025, petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition. See Rule 9 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 10 C. Calculation of Limitations Period 11 For purposes of calculating the limitations period in this case, § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies. 12 Petitioner appealed the conviction. (ECF No. 1 at 3, 19.) The state appellate court affirmed the 13 judgment on June 6, 2024. (Id. at 19-22.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the 14 California Supreme Court. Therefore, the judgment became final on July 16, 2024, when the 15 forty-day deadline to file a petition for review expired. See Cal . R. Ct. 8.366(b)(1) (“[A] Court 16 of Appeal decision . . . is final in that court 30 days after filing.”); Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1) (“A 17 petition for review must be . . . filed within 10 days after the Court of Appeal decision is final in 18 that court.”). The limitations period begins the next day. Patterson v. Stewart,

, 19 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering 20 event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Thus, the one-year limitation period commenced on July 21 17, 2024, and, absent tolling, expired on July 17, 2025.

22 2 Petitioner makes many references to the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1 at 4-8, 15-17.) At one point after referring to the California Supreme Court, petitioner claims she is “awaiting 23 hearing.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) But then in response to whether any petition, appeal or other post- conviction proceeding is now pending in any court, petitioner responds “No.” (Id.) Searches 24 using all variations of petitioner’s name, including “Shawndra,” which was used by the state appellate court, revealed no filings in the California Supreme Court related to petitioner’s 2023 25 conviction. The court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 26 reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), including undisputed information posted on official websites. Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association,

(9th Cir. 27 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket sheet of a California court. White v. Martel,

(9th Cir. 2010). The address of the official website of the California 28 state courts is www.courts.ca.gov. 1 D. Statutory Tolling 2 Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for 3 State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 4 pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period.

(d)(2). A properly 5 filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules governing filings, 6 including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett,

(2000). 7 Here, petitioner filed no state post-conviction or other collateral review petitions and 8 therefore is not entitled to any statutory tolling. State habeas petitions filed after the one-year 9 statute of limitations expired do not revive the statute of limitations and have no tolling effect. 10 Ferguson v. Palmateer,

(9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the 11 reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed”); Jiminez v.

F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, even if petitioner were to return to state court and 13 file for relief in the California Supreme Court, her claims remain untimely. 14 E. Equitable Tolling 15 The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition may be equitably tolled if 16 extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on time. 17 Holland v. Florida,

, 645 (2010). A habeas petitioner is only entitled to equitable 18 tolling of the one-year statute of limitations if he shows: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 19 diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’ and prevented timely 20 filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). An “extraordinary 21 circumstance” has been defined as an external force that is beyond the prisoner’s control. Miles 22 v. Prunty,

(9th Cir. 1999). “The diligence required for equitable tolling 23 purposes is ‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 24 (internal citations and additional quotation marks omitted). In addition, petitioner must 25 demonstrate that the “‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn 26 v. Moore,

(9th Cir. 2003), quoting Stillman v. LaMarque,

, 1203 27 (9th Cir. 2003) (“petitioner entitled to equitable tolling ‘since prison officials’ misconduct 28 proximately caused the late filing.’”); Grant v. Swarthout,

(9th Cir. 2017). 1 “The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling . . . is very high, lest the exceptions 2 swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro,

(9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and 3 quotations omitted). 4 To apply the doctrine in “extraordinary circumstances” necessarily suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary 5 circumstances “stood in his way” suggests that an external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely 6 “oversight”, miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part, all of which would preclude the application of equitable tolling. 7 8 Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke,

(9th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert. 9 denied,

(2009). Equitable tolling is “a very high bar, and is reserved for rare 10 cases.” Yeh v. Martel,

(9th Cir. 2014). It is petitioner’s burden to 11 demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Espinoza-Matthews v. California,

(9th Cir. 2005). 13 The instant petition does not address equitable tolling. (ECF No. 1, passim.) But 14 petitioner alleges no extraordinary circumstances beyond petitioner’s control, fails to explain why 15 no petition for review was filed, and fails to explain the delay between the June 6, 2024 state 16 appellate court decision and the filing of the federal petition in August 2025. (Id.) Petitioner did 17 not respond to the Court’s order to show cause (ECF No. 7). Based on the petition, the Court 18 finds no equitable tolling applies. 19 III. EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES 20 A. Exhaustion Standards 21 The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for 22 writ of habeas corpus.

(b)(1); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

, 842 23 (1999). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with 24 a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. 25 Duncan v. Henry,

(1995) (per curiam). A habeas petitioner must give the state 26 courts “one full opportunity” to decide a federal claim by carrying out “one complete round” of 27 the state’s appellate process in order to properly exhaust a claim. O’Sullivan,

. 28 /// 1 For a petitioner in California state custody, this generally means that the petitioner must 2 have fairly presented his or her claims in a petition to the California Supreme Court. See 3 O’Sullivan,

(interpreting

(c)); Gatlin v. Madding,

882,888 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying O’Sullivan to California, and finding Gatlin was required to 5 exhaust his habeas claims in a petition for review to the California Supreme Court). 6 B. Unexhausted Claims 7 As set forth above, none of petitioner’s claims were presented to the California Supreme 8 Court. Thus, in addition to being time-barred, all of petitioner’s claims are unexhausted. Shinn v. 9 Ramirez,

(2022) (“AEDPA requires state prisoners to exhaust the remedies 10 available in the courts of the state before seeking federal habeas relief.”) (internal quotation marks 11 and citation omitted)). Under these circumstances, petitioner is not entitled to a stay because all 12 of the unexhausted claims are untimely.3 See Johnson v. Federal Court Judges,

2114931, at *6 (C.D. Cal. March 20, 2020) (petitioner not entitled to stay under either Rhines or 14 Kelly if claims are time-barred); King v. Frauenheim,

, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 15 2016) (neither a Rhines nor Kelly appropriate because staying the proceedings would not 16 eliminate the untimeliness problem). As set forth above, the statute of limitations expired on July 17 17, 2025. Because all of petitioner’s claims are unexhausted, and the limitations period has 18 expired, this action should be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, with prejudice. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 Because it is plain from the petition and appended exhibits that petitioner’s unexhausted 21 claims are barred by the one year statute of limitations, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 22 relief. 23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 24 habeas corpus be summarily dismissed with prejudice because the petition is barred by the statute 25

3 Federal law recognizes two different procedures that a prisoner may use to stay a federal habeas 26 action. See Rhines v. Weber,

(2005) (staying timely mixed petition); Kelly v. 27 Small,

(9th Cir. 2003) (allowing prisoner to dismiss unexhausted claims and stay action as to exhausted claims subject to potential later amendment of petition), overruled on other 28 grounds by Robbins v. Carey,

(9th Cir. 2007). 1 || of limitations. 2 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 3 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of

(b)(1). Within fourteen days 4 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 5 || objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 6 || Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” In the objections petitioner may address whether a 7 || certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this 8 || case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or 9 || deny certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant). A 10 || certificate of appealability may issue under

“only if the applicant has made a 11 | substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

(c)(3). Petitioner is 12 || advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 13 || District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst,

(9th Cir. 1991). 14 15 || Dated: December 9, 2025 A aA 6 Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 || /1imoll2388.fte.sol 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28