Isaiah Meleke Lawrence v. Gregoire, Deputy Sheriff, et al.
Isaiah Meleke Lawrence v. Gregoire, Deputy Sheriff, et al.
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ISAIAH MELEKE LAWRENCE, BMH033, Case No. 24-cv-05347-CRB (PR)
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 9 v. JUDGMENT
10 GREGOIRE, Deputy Sheriff, et al., (ECF No. 22) 11 Defendant(s).
12 Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Alameda County Jail, Santa Rita Facility, filed a pro se 13 First Amended Complaint (FAC) for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983alleging that on April 4, 14 2024, two deputy sheriffs at the jail used excessive force against him. Plaintiff specifically alleges 15 that after deputy sheriffs Gregoire and Silvia handcuffed him with his hands behind his back and 16 took him to processing for fingerprinting and photographing, Gregoire “grabbed me by the hair & 17 began to pull and twist my head” and Silvia “chopped me at my throat and started chocking me.” 18 ECF No. 15 (FAC) at 3. Plaintiff fell to the ground and Gregoire “climbed on top of me and 19 continued to pull my hair.”
Id.The deputies then placed plaintiff on a restraint chair and, while on 20 the chair, Silvia “choked me from behind by pulling my shirt around my neck.”
Id.Plaintiff 21 alleges that he sustained injuries to his hand, wrist, arm and knee because of the use of force against him by Gregoire and Silvia. 22 On April 25, 2025, the court found that, liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations 23 arguably state a cognizable claim under § 1983 for use of excessive force in violation of the Due 24 Process Clause against Gregoire and Silvia and ordered the United States Marshal to serve them.1 25 26 1 The court dismissed the warden/sheriff and the jail because “they are named solely on the 27 theory that, as superior or employer, they are responsible for the actions or omission of the jail’s 1 Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that they are entitled to 2 judgment as a matter of law because the body worn video recordings of the incident make clear 3 that defendants’ actions in connection with the April 4, 2024, incident were objectively reasonable 4 under the totality of circumstances confronting them. Defendants specifically argue that the body 5 worn video recordings show that plaintiff refused to comply with jail photographing and 6 fingerprinting protocols and that defendants used minimal force, if any, to obtain his compliance. 7 Defendants also claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff did not file an 8 opposition despite being advised to do so. 9 DISCUSSION 10 A. Standard of Review 11 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 12 is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a 13 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of 14 the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). A dispute as to a material 15 fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 16 nonmoving party.
Id.17 The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 18 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 19 issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323(1986). Where the moving 20 party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 21 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the 22 opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, [as is the case here,] the moving party need 23 only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Id.24 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 25 pleadings to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact by “citing to specific 26 parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence 27 1 or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A triable dispute of material fact exists 2 only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party to allow a jury to return a verdict 3 for that party. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the 4 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323. 5 There is no genuine issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the 6 nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. If the 7 evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 8
Id. at 249-50. 9 B. Analysis 10 Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment and qualified immunity on 11 plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Under Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194(2001), the court must 12 undertake a two-step analysis when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion for 13 summary judgment. The court first faces “this threshold question: Taken in the light most 14 favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated 15 a constitutional right?” 533 U.S. at 201. If the court determines that the conduct did not violate a 16 constitutional right, the inquiry is over, and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. 17 If the court determines that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, it then moves to 18 the second step and asks, “whether the right was clearly established” such that “it would be clear 19 to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201- 20 02. Even if the violated right was clearly established, qualified immunity shields an officer from 21 suit when he makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends 22 the law governing the circumstances he confronted. Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 198 23 (2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06. If “the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is 24 reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at 205.2 25 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial 26
27 2Although the Saucier sequence is often appropriate and beneficial, it is not mandatory. A 1 detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490
2 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535-39(1979)). To prove an 3 excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial detainee must show that the “force purposely or 4 knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
576 U.S. 5389, 397 (2015). “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable 6 officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of 7 hindsight.”
Id.“[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each 8 particular case.’”
Id.(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 9 A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of the force 10 used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; 11 the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount 12 of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the 13 officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 397. 14 1. Summary Judgment 15 Defendants argue that this case is proper for summary judgment because the body 16 worn video recordings of the April 4, 2024, incident make clear that plaintiff’s version of the 17 incident is a “visible fiction” as in Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372(2007). In Harris, a videotape 18 captured the events and contradicted Harris’ claims that Scott’s use of force was unreasonable 19 under the circumstances. Given the video evidence, the Court found Harris’ “version of events 20 [was] so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The 21 [lolwer court] should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the 22 light depicted by the videotape.”
550 U.S. at 380-381. The same rationale applies here. 23 Defendants submit declarations and documentary evidence showing that in the morning of 24 April 4, 2024, Deputy Gregoire observed plaintiff trying to “cheek” the medication nursing staff 25 had dispensed to him. Gregoire Decl. (ECF No. 22-1) ¶ 9. “Cheeking” is a practice where an 26 inmate attempts to smuggle dispensed medications back into their housing pod where they later 27 sell or barter the medications for food, favor, or money.
Id.Because of the dangers of someone 1 return to his assigned pod and instead escorted him to the Temporary Holding Cell (THC).
Id.2 ¶10; Silvia Decl. (ECF No. 22-2) ¶8. 3 While in the THC, plaintiff started screaming, kicking, and pounding on the cell door, 4 causing damage to the cell door lock, which had to be replaced as a result of the damage caused by 5 plaintiff. The locksmith estimated the cost to replace the lock was around $2,500.00. As a result, 6 Gregoire determined that plaintiff would be placed under arrest and booked for a violation of 7 Penal Code section 594(b)(1)–vandalism resulting in more than $400 in damage. Gregoire Decl. 8 ¶11; Silvia Decl. ¶9. Gregoire asked Deputy Silvia to assist him with the arrest and booking of 9 plaintiff. Gregoire Decl. ¶12; Silvia Decl. ¶10. 10 At approximately 2:00 PM, Gregoire placed plaintiff under arrest and escorted him to the 11 Intake, Transfer, Release (ITR) area of the jail to book him for a violation of section 594(b)(1). 12 Gregoire Decl. ¶13. When plaintiff and defendants arrived at ITR, Gregoire began to initiate the 13 booking process, but plaintiff became agitated and stated, “Ya’ll be lyin’ bruh…fuckin’ lyin’… 14 ain’t got no evidence, bruh…don’t give a fuck about no vandalism charge…every time you put me 15 in that iso cell I’m gonna do the same thing, kick the door.” Id. ¶17; Silvia Decl. ¶16. Plaintiff 16 refused to cooperate with defendants during the booking process and ignored several commands to 17 face toward the booking camera to be photographed. Gregoire Decl. ¶18; Silvia Decl. ¶17. Silvia 18 stated, “look up here at the camera” but plaintiff refused and said, “no,” turning his head away 19 from the camera and looking downwards so his hair was partially obscuring his face, and stated, “I 20 ain’t lookin’ at no camera…you can’t force me to look at no camera…” Silvia Decl. ¶ 18. Silvia 21 attempted to gently push Lawrence’s hair out of his face. Id. 22 Because plaintiff continue to resist being photographed for booking, defendants tried to 23 position plaintiff’s head for a clear photograph to be taken, by Gregoire holding up the top of 24 plaintiff’s hair while Silvia attempted to raise plaintiff’s chin in a forward-facing position to be 25 photographed. Plaintiff began swearing at defendants and sat down on the floor, stating “stop 26 grabbin’ my hair, bitch”, “stop choking [me]” and “I’m finna’ sue you bitch ass niggas” in a 27 hostile manner. Plaintiff also kicked Gregoire in his left shin. Gregoire Decl. ¶20; Silvia Decl. 1 Defendants then attempted to take plaintiff’s booking photo while he was sitting on the 2 ground. They did so by holding plaintiff in place and requesting that he look in a specific 3 direction, but plaintiff replied, “I ain’t lookin at shit!” and further falsely accused defendants of 4 pulling his hair and “choking” him, and aggressively stated, “Fuck is wrong with you. I ain’t gotta 5 listen to you … bitch, you a coward.” Gregoire Decl. ¶22; Silvia Decl. ¶20. 6 After plaintiff’s booking photo was taken, defendants stood plaintiff up, and Gregoire 7 escorted plaintiff to the fingerprinting room next door. Plaintiff demanded a wheelchair, yelling, 8 “I can’t walk, I can’t walk, I can’t walk.” He continued to state profanities and yelled, “I’m finna 9 sue you bitch ass niggas!” Gregoire Decl. ¶¶23-24; Silvia Decl. ¶¶21-22. 10 Plaintiff was provided with a wheelchair per his request. He called Gregoire a “punk ass 11 white boy” and yelled “look how tight the cuffs on bitch,” as well as yelling “stop choking me 12 nigga!” in an irate manner, despite the fact that Gregoire was not choking him. Plaintiff then 13 called Gregoire a “bitch ass nigga” and stated, “I said I’m not walking, that mean I ain’t walking, 14 nigga.” Plaintiff began claiming that he could not breathe, despite the fact that he clearly could 15 because he was yelling “I can’t breathe bitch” and “hatin’ ass nigga” in a loud and irate manner. 16 Gregoire Decl. ¶25; Silvia Decl. ¶23. Plaintiff began yelling, “I ain’t walkin’! I’m not walking!” 17 and “you a mark! You a mark!” Gregoire Decl. ¶26; Silvia Decl. ¶24. 18 As defendants began wheeling plaintiff in the wheelchair, he yelled, “I’m taking both of 19 you bitch ass niggas to court … you pulled my motherfuckin’ hair…scared ass niggas.” Plaintiff 20 also stated, “fuck this jail nigga . . . fuck all y’all niggas … I don’t give a fuck about this shit, 21 nigga … I don’t respect none of that shit, nigga … I’ll take you bitch ass niggas to court . . . you a 22 coward, bruh.” Plaintiff then stated, “I’m not lookin’ at no fuckin camera, nigga … I don’t gotta 23 follow your any and every word…the fuck you think I’m gonna follow your rules while I’m in 24 jail?” Gregoire Decl. ¶27; Silvia Decl. ¶25. As defendants approached plaintiff’s cell, plaintiff 25 stated, “I’m gonna terrorize y’all.” After he was placed in his cell, he stated, “bitch ass nigga…I’ll 26 break any lock I want.” Gregoire Decl. ¶28; Silvia Decl. ¶26. 27 The April 4, 2024, incident with plaintiff was recorded by both defendants’ body worn 1 recordings of the incident from both body worn cameras show that plaintiff’s claimed version of 2 the incident is a “visible fiction.” Harris,
550 U.S. at 380. The recordings show that plaintiff was 3 uncooperative from the moment defendants went to his cell to move him to ITR. He became 4 belligerent, refused to cooperate with the booking process, verbally refused and physically resisted 5 efforts to photograph him and take his fingerprints and moved and thrashed about. Plaintiff’s 6 assertion that he complied with instructions to look at the camera for photographing is utterly 7 belied by the video recordings of the incident. In fact, the recordings show that from the first time 8 that defendants asked plaintiff to look at the camera for photographing, plaintiff refused to raise 9 his head and adamantly stated “No!” and repeatedly said, “You can’t force me to look at no 10 camera” as he refused to look up and repeatedly moved his head down. Because he was moving 11 his head and looking down, his long hair fell in front of his face and prevented a clear photograph. 12 As a result, Silvia attempted to brush plaintiff’s hair out of his face so he could be photographed. 13 Plaintiff abruptly jerked his head away and moved to avoid the attempt to clear his hair and 14 continued moving his head and upper body around to resist photographing while he verbally 15 continued refusing to be photographed. Gregoire then tried to hold plaintiff’s hair up out of his 16 face, while Silvia tried to put his hand under plaintiff’s chin to stop him from ducking his head 17 down. Plaintiff continued swearing at the deputies, verbally and physically resisting efforts to 18 have his picture taken and then slid his back down the wall until he was sitting on the floor. The 19 recordings show defendants were patient and respectful throughout, remained calm, did not react 20 to plaintiff’s increasingly loud swearing, insults and personal attacks, and notably used only 21 minimal force, if any, to overcome plaintiff’s physical resistance and raise his head to position him 22 so he could be photographed. The recordings plainly show that Plaintiff’s version of the incident 23 alleging that Silvia “chopped” him at his throat and choked him, that the deputies did anything that 24 caused plaintiff to fall to the ground, and that Gregoire “climbed” or “jumped” on top of him and 25 pulled his hair is an utter visible fiction. 26 After plaintiff finally was photographed, he refused to get up and walk. Defendants 27 patiently stood by and waited while plaintiff continued his verbal tirade and remained seated on 1 eventually helped plaintiff stand up, and defendants walked with him to the fingerprinting area as 2 plaintiff moved his weight around and resisted walking. Gregoire maintained minimal positive 3 control to overcome plaintiff’s resistance as he attempted to guide plaintiff toward the 4 fingerprinting area. Plaintiff continued pushing back on Gregoire and pulling forward as he 5 walked and demanded a wheelchair, claiming he was unable to walk. As they waited for a 6 wheelchair, plaintiff became increasingly agitated, began yelling and swearing louder, tensed his 7 body and arms and moved around as Gregoire attempted to maintain control by holding his wrist. 8 A wheelchair was provided for plaintiff, as he requested, and he sat down in the chair. The 9 recordings show no action by either defendant that would have injured plaintiff’s knee or arm 10 while he was assisted onto the wheelchair, as he claims. The recordings show that once plaintiff 11 was placed in the wheelchair, he continued moving, thrashing around and shouting as defendants 12 merely attempted to move the wheelchair to the fingerprinting machines to take his fingerprints. 13 Gregoire held the back of plaintiff’s shirt to keep him upright in the wheelchair and maintain some 14 control over his movement, as plaintiff continued to be agitated and thrash about and falsely claim 15 that Gregoire was choking him. The recordings show that any injuries plaintiff claims to have 16 sustained (of which there is no proof other than his allegations) were caused by his physical 17 resistance to defendants’ minimal use of force, if any, to maintain control of his movements. 18 Plaintiff’s claimed version of the April 4, 2024, incident is “so utterly discredited by the 19 record that no reasonable jury could . . . believe[] him.” Harris,
550 U.S. at 380. This court 20 instead should “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape[s].”
Id. at 381. Those facts 21 show that plaintiff was belligerent and uncooperative throughout the booking process, verbally 22 refused to comply with orders and physically resisted defendants’ efforts to photograph him and 23 take his fingerprints and moved and thrashed around while cursing and threatening defendants. 24 Defendants in turn only used minimal force, if any, to brush plaintiff’s hair out of his face and 25 raise his head for a quick photograph, obtained a wheelchair for plaintiff when he refused to walk 26 and merely held the back of his shirt as he repeatedly jerked forward and away and thrashed 27 around as he sat in the wheelchair yelling obscenities and falsely claiming that defendants were ] connection with the April 4, 2024, incident with plaintiff were not “objectively unreasonable.” 2 || Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourteenth 3 Amendment excessive force claim against them. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323. 4 2. Qualified Immunity 5 Defendants also are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourteenth 6 || Amendment excessive force claim against them. A reasonable deputy sheriff could have believed 7 || that his conduct—using minimal force to ensure that a resisting detainee complies with the jail’s 8 booking process—was lawful under the circumstances. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. After 9 || all, plaintiff cannot identify any factually similar legal authority that squarely governs and 10 || prohibited defendants’ conduct in the particular circumstance of this case, such that every 11 reasonable deputy sheriff in the same situation would have known that the minimal use of force in 12 || response to plaintiff's resistance was unlawful. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) is 15 || GRANTED. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 17 || Dated: December 12, 2025 18 a CHARLES R. BREYER 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Reference
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