1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 MARTINA MARTIN GARCIA, Case No. 3:25-cv-10617 Petitioner, 5 v. 6 ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 7 SERGIO ALBARRAN, Field Office RESTRAINING ORDER Director of the San Francisco Immigration Re: Dkt. No. 3 8 and Customs Enforcement Office; TODD LYONS, Acting Director of United States 9 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the United 10 States Department of Homeland Security, PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the 11 United States, acting in their official capacities, 12 Respondents. 13

14 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (“TRO Mot.”), 15 ECF No. 3. On December 11, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and an 16 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, against Respondents San Francisco Immigration and 17 Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Sergio Albarran, Acting Director of Immigration and 18 Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Kristi 19 Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi. ECF Nos. 1, 3. Petitioner asks this 20 Court to: (1) order her immediate release from Respondents’ custody pending these proceedings 21 and enjoin Respondents from re-detaining her absent further order of this Court, and (2) enjoin 22 Respondents from transferring her out of this District or deporting her during the pendency of the 23 underlying proceedings. See Notice of Mot., ECF No. 3. For the following reasons, the TRO is 24 GRANTED as modified below. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 According to the record before the Court, Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled to the 27 United States from Guatemala in April 2024. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶ 1, ECF. No. 1 ¶ 1. 1 When Petitioner arrived in the United States, she was “released on her own recognizance and was 2 placed in INA section 240 (8 U.S.C. 1229a) removal proceedings.” Id. ¶ 2. Since then, “she has 3 complied with her supervision conditions, including checking in regularly with ICE’s Intensive 4 Supervision Appearance Program (‘ISAP’),” and “has never missed an in-person ISAP or ICE 5 check-in.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 28. Petitioner “has no criminal history and no prior entries into the United 6 States.” Id. ¶ 3. Petitioner “received a removal order on June 24, 2025, and filed an appeal with 7 the Board of Immigration Appeals (‘BIA’) that same day.” Id. ¶ 4. Under

(a), 8 the appeal stays Petitioner’s removal until the BIA renders a final decision in her case. Because 9 Petitioner’s appeal is “still awaiting adjudication and has no final set date for a decision,” 10 Petitioner is not subject to a final removal order. See Mayo v. Semaia,

, at *3 11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025). 12 On December 11, 2025, Petitioner was arrested while attending a scheduled Immigrations 13 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco.

Petitioner 14 is currently being detained at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco, California.

. Petitioner 15 is “now separated from her one-year-old, United States Citizen baby, her fourteen-year-old son, 16 her ten-year-old daughter, and her five-year-old daughter.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 37. Moreover, it appears 17 that the basis for the arrest may have been minor, technical violations that could have been the 18 result of the government’s own system failing or its failure to communicate properly with 19 Petitioner. Dkt. No. 3-2 ¶¶ 9-12. 20 On December 11, 2025, this Petition was filed. In the early morning hours of December 21 12, 2025, counsel filed the motion for the TRO and sent a copy to Respondents’ counsel.

. 22 In the motion, Petitioner contends that her arrest and detention violate the Due Process Clause of 23 the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because Respondents allegedly have no valid interest in 24 detaining her) and procedurally (because she was not provided with a pre-detention bond hearing). 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 27 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump,

, 1159 n.3 (9th 1 success on the merits, [2] the sufferance of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 2 [3] that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest. 3 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

(2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can 4 only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser showing than likelihood of 5 success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips 6 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild 7 Swan v. Weber,

(9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 8 “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 9

(2009). 10 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 11 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 12 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 13 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 14 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,

(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 15 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70,

423, 439 (1974)). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that her 19 ongoing detention violates her procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 20 Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 21 entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 22 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP,

, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 23 July 24, 2025) (applying the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge,

(1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 25 06487-PCP,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 26 Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 27 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner faces is an 1 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions,

(9th 2 Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio,

(9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier 3 v. Woodford,

, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 4 conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that she has 5 “also carried [her] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez,

. 6 The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 7 heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 8 procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 9 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv- 10 01434-JST,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 11 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 12 constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi,

(9th Cir. 13 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been 14 violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). As other courts in this 15 district and others have concluded under similar circumstances, “the potential harm to [Petitioner] 16 is significant, while the potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo Sequen,

2203419, at *3. At most, the government faces a short delay in detaining Petitioner if it ultimately 18 demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that her detention is necessary to prevent danger 19 to the community or flight. See Jorge M. F.,

, at *3; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 20 05071,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is not “harmed in 21 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 22 Immigr. & Nat. Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict between 23 [administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty 24 concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 25 F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler,

(9th Cir. 1983)). 26 A TRO immediately releasing Petitioner is appropriate to return her to the status quo. E. 27 Bay Sanctuary Covenant,

. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status

) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,

(9th Cir. 2000)). 2 That is the moment prior to Petitioner’s likely illegal detention. See Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25- 3 cv-00663,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining 4 order requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a 5 restoration of the status quo). 6 Because Petitioner satisfies all requirements for temporary injunctive relief and such relief 7 is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO Motion is granted as detailed below. This Order 8 accords with many other recent grants of temporary relief in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Alva 9 v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (granting 10 temporary restraining order); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632,

, at *4 (N.D. 11 Cal. July 4, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring release of asylum seeker and a 12 pre-detention bond hearing before re-arrest); Singh,

, at *10 (granting 13 preliminary injunction); Doe v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-647-DJC-DMC,

, at *8 (E.D. 14 Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order); see also Diaz,

15 (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing before re-detention of 16 noncitizen out of custody five years); Garcia v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-5070,

, at *3 17 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing 18 before re-detention of noncitizen out of custody six years ); Enamorado v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 19 4072-NW,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025). 20 Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of 21 bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [Respondents] from enjoining [their] 22 conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday,

(9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is 23 needed to ensure that Respondents will be reimbursed for “costs and damages sustained by . . . 24 hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 25 IV. ORDER 26 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary 27 Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further briefing and a hearing 1 custody pending full briefing and hearing on the underlying petition and/or a preliminary 2 injunction regarding re-detention.1 3 Respondents shall file a status report by 10:00 a.m. on December 13 confirming release 4 and shall not re-detain pending resolution of the forthcoming hearing. 5 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be granted and/or 6 a preliminary injunction should not issue regarding re-detention of Petitioner without notice and a 7 pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker and from removing Petitioner from the 8 United States. 9 Respondents shall file a response to Petitioner’s motion by no later than 12:00 noon on 10 December 18, 2025. Any reply shall be filed by close of business on December 22, 2025. A 11 hearing shall be heard at 10:00 a.m. by Zoom on December 26, 2025. This order shall remain 12 in effect until that time. Parties are advised that the assigned judge may change the briefing 13 schedule and the hearing date. 14 The Court issues this order on December 12, 2025 at 5:37 a.m. and, given the hour, sends 15 a courtesy copy by email to Pamela Johann, Civil Chief of the San Francisco office of the U.S. 16 Attorney for the Northern District of California at [email protected] and to Petitioner’s 17 counsel, Alyosha Maggin, [email protected]. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: 20 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 1 Petitioner also asks the Court to order that she remain within the Northern District of California 26 in order to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction, but it is well-established that “when the Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the 27 District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction