1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Julieth Mayerly DURAN ROMERO, Case No.: 25-cv-3567-AGS-VET 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE 5 v. 6 Christopher J. LaROSE, et al., 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Julieth Duran Romero seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2241 challenging her immigration detention. At this stage, she need only make out a 11 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 12 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if 13 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 14 entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 15 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit 16 “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114

, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential 18 merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]”

19 Duran Romero alleges that she’s been in immigration custody since “November 11, 20 2025,” after originally being detained upon entry in “January 2023” and being released on 21 “her own recognizance.” (ECF 1, at 6.) She claims to be subject to “mandatory detention” 22 and categorically ineligible for a “custody redetermination” under

(b). 23 (ECF 1, at 4, 6.) This is because a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in “Matter of 24 Yajure Hurtado” “affirm[ed] the government’s new interpretation of § 1225” to apply to 25 individuals in her circumstances. (ECF 1, at 5.) Petitioner challenges her detention under 26 Yajure Hurtado and the government’s allegedly new, broader interpretation of § 1225, 27 claiming it “(a) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (b) disregards the 28 relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (c) would render a recent amendment to 1 ||section 1226(c) superfluous; and (d) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory 2 interpretation and practice.” (ECF 1, at 5.) 3 This challenge is sufficient to warrant a response. Functionally identical cases across 4 || the country have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the merits” or have resulted 5 ||in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM),

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[T]he Court concludes that petitioners 7 ||are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because section 1226(a), not section 8 || 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB- 9

, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (same); see also Rodriguez vy. 10 || Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC,

, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) 11 ||(noting at the time “[e]very district court to address this question has concluded that the 12 ||government’s position belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory 13 |/interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice.”); Quispe v. 14 || Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1471-AJT-LRV,

, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 15 |}2025) (“Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary framework, not 16 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures, as at least thirty federal district courts around 17 || the country, including two in this Circuit, have concluded when faced with habeas petitions 18 || from comparably situated petitioners.”). 19 By December 30, 2025, respondent must answer the petition. Any reply by 20 || petitioner must be filed by January 8, 2026. The Court will hold oral arguments on the 21 || petition on January 14, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. 22 ||Dated: December 15, 2025

4 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 25 26 27 28