1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CALVIN B. GRIGSBY, Case No. 25-cv-00192-DMR

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 10 U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 23 11 Defendants.

12 On August 19, 2025, the court denied Plaintiff Calvin Grigsby’s motion for summary 13 judgment, which was styled as a “motion for expedited processing (Rule 56).” [Docket No. 22 14 (Order); see Docket No. 16 (MSJ).] Grigsby now seeks leave to file a motion for reconsideration 15 of that Order.1 [Docket No. 23 (Mot.).] 16 This matter is suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), 7-9(d). 17 For the following reasons, Grigsby’s motion for reconsideration is denied. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 The Order sets forth a detailed factual history of this case. Order at 1–4. As is relevant here, 20 on May 28, 2025, Grigsby filed a motion for summary judgment which sought expedited processing 21 of his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See 22 MSJ. The motion for summary judgment presented three arguments: (1) the FBI failed to show due 23 diligence in processing, which “calls for expedited processing”; (2) the FBI had no credible basis 24 for denying Grigsby’s request for expedited processing; and (3) compelling needs warranted 25 expedited processing, namely, media interest, Grigsby’s need to “rectify due process violations in 26

27 1 Grigsby purports to bring his motion under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) and Federal Rule of Civil 1 two separate acquittals,” and an anticipated expungement motion. Id. at 6–17. 2 On August 19, 2025, the court denied the motion for summary judgment. See Order. The 3 court found there was no evidence that the FBI was not diligent in responding to Grigsby’s FOIA 4 request, as it provided responses within the statutory deadline. Id. at 7–11. The court further found 5 that the FBI properly denied Grigsby’s request for expedited processing, as there was no evidence 6 that Grigsby had met any of the statutory requirements set forth in

(a)(6)(E) or 28

(e)(1) to warrant expedited processing.

at 11–12. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Civil Local Rule 7-9 provides that, “[b]efore the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the 10 claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case, any party may make a motion before 11 a Judge requesting that the Judge grant the party leave to file a motion for reconsideration of any 12 interlocutory order on any ground set forth in Civil L.R. 7-9(b).” A party seeking leave to file a 13 motion for reconsideration must “show reasonable diligence in bringing the motion” and one of the 14 following three grounds: (1) a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented 15 to the court, which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the party applying for reconsideration 16 did not know at the time of the order for which reconsideration is sought; (2) the emergence of new 17 material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest failure by the court to consider material facts or 18 dispositive legal arguments presented before such order. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)–(3). The moving party 19 may not reargue any written or oral argument previously asserted to the court. Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). 20 Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in the sound discretion of the district courts. 21 Navajo Nation v. Norris,

, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Grigsby contends that the court only addressed one of two arguments he presented for 24 summary judgment: 25 The [motion for summary judgment] makes two entirely separate claims for summary based on two entirely separate legal bases: 26 A. Plaintiff’s First Claim—request to [promptly] expedite because the 27 Agency failed to exercise due diligence following a “determination” B. Plaintiff's Second Claim—request for expedited treatment under 1 28 C.F.R. $16.5 (e)C)Gv): “A matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exists possible questions about the 2 government’s integrity that affect public confidence (the “Widespread Media Interest Claim’). (Dkt. 18, p. 13 headnote and 3 discussion pp. 13-15.) 4 || Mot. at 1 (second brackets in the original). Grigsby moves for reconsideration on grounds that the 5 “Order . . . does not rule on Plaintiffs ‘Failure to Process Determination Claim.’” Id. 6 Grigsby’s argument lacks merit because the court only permitted him to file an early 7 summary judgment motion on a narrow issue. Grigsby was “granted leave to Plaintiff to file an 8 early Rule 56 motion solely to challenge the denial of his request for expedited processing of his 9 || FOIA request.” [Docket No. 14.] His argument that he is entitled to expedited processing “because 10 || the Agency failed to exercise due diligence following a ‘determination’ [under] 5 USC ll §552(a)(6)(A)Gi)C)” does not relate to the FBI’s denial of his request for expedited processing. 12 || Rather, Grigsby contends he is entitled to expedited processing as a remedy for the FBI’s failure to

13 timely process and produce documents following its October 5, 2022 email. Because this argument

v 14 || falls outside the scope of the court’s grant of leave, the fact that the court did not make any explicit

15 findings as to the implications of the October 5, 2022 email is not grounds for reconsideration. This Q 16 || ruling is without prejudice to Grigsby’s ability to advance his “Failure to Process Determination

= 17 Claim” argument at an appropriate juncture of the case.

18 || IV. CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons stated above, Grigsby’s motion is denied. The court will hold a further case 20 || management conference on March 18, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. via Zoom webinar. The parties shall file 21 an updated joint case management statement by March 11, 2026. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: December 15, 2025

Donna M. Ryu 25 Chief Magistrate Judge 26 27 28